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INTRODUCTION 
Civil law systems have developed over time on the basis of general 
principles that find their expression in civilian methodology and 
terminology.1 “Juridical act” is a key term in the civilian lexicon that 
expresses the fundamental principle of autonomy of the will.2 The notion 
of juridical act is premised on the idea that a person’s legal position can 
change—that is, the person can acquire, modify, transfer, or extinguish 
rights—either by that person’s voluntary act (juridical act) or by operation 
of law (juridical fact).3 This idea permeates the civil law and manifests 
 
 1. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 94 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM]; Max Rheinstein, Common Law and Civil 
Law: An Elementary Comparison, 22 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 90, 92–93 (1952). 
 2. See LITVINOFF & W. THOMAS TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: 
THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS v–vii (1969); EMILIO BETTI, TEORIA 
GENERALE DEL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 39–51 (2d ed. 1952). 
 3. See BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 33–38 (2d ed. 1992). 




itself in a wide array of everyday transactions, legal relations, and legally 
important acts and facts ranging from personal status (birth, marriage, 
adoption, death) to commercial transactions (contracts, conveyances, 
torts) and estate planning (testate and intestate successions).4 Juridical acts 
have been lauded as the “proudest achievement of civil law doctrine.”5 
This fundamental concept is universally accepted and recognized in all 
civil law systems—including Louisiana. This concept, however, can only 
be useful if it is placed within a solid theoretical framework.6    
The value of a general theory of juridical acts is that it enunciates 
general rules and principles applicable to all types of acts that transcend 
across different legal subjects.7 Thus, this theory is sound because it 
analyzes legal acts and facts in a more systematic and intelligible way; 
sometimes, the theory is more analytical than a civil code.8 For example, 
an offer of a reward made to the public and a testament are seemingly 
unrelated legal acts. Under a theory of juridical acts, however, these acts 
present common features and are placed in the same category of “unilateral 
juridical acts,” to which certain basic rules apply pertaining to their 
validity—for example, consent or legality—and revocability.9 A 
comprehensive theory of juridical acts generally fulfills three objectives.10 
First, it elaborates general rules and principles as to the structure and 
essential elements of a juridical act—the requirements for the act’s formal 
and substantive validity, interpretation, and proof.11 If the act is invalid, the 
 
 4. See H.D.S. VAN DER KAAIJ, THE JURIDICAL ACT. A STUDY OF THE 
THEORETICAL CONCEPT OF AN ACT THAT AIMS TO CREATE NEW LEGAL FACTS 
140–41 (2019). 
 5. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL 
LAW TRADITION 75 (3d ed. 2007). 
 6. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 51–72; VAN DER KAAIJ, supra note 4, at 140–42.  
 7. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37; VAN DER KAAIJ, supra note 4, at 140–42. 
 8. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at vii (“through learning the 
principles of juridical acts [a law student] may develop some idea of the technique 
by which specific rules in the Civil Code may be generalized into principles 
applicable to situations not directly covered by those rules, and reapplied in new 
cases, for it is in that manner that a civil code provides the living law of a people”); 
NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37; VAN DER KAAIJ, supra note 4, at 140–42. 
 9. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1606–07, 1945 (2019).  
 10. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 2; 1 BERNARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES 
PANDEKTENRECHTS § 69 (Theodor Kipp ed., 9th ed. 1906); 2 ANDREAS VON 
TUHR, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS PT. 1, § 
50 (1914, reprt. 1957) [hereinafter VON TUHR I]. 
 11. Several other issues belong in this broad category, including the doctrines 
of representation and modalities (terms and conditions). See BETTI, supra note 2, 
at 125–280, 329–73, 514–610; HENRI CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DU 




doctrine of nullity applies.12 Second, the theory places juridical acts in 
separate categories depending on a multitude of factors, such as the number 
of parties to an act and the type of legal rights affected by the act—different 
rules and principles apply to each nominate category of acts.13 Third, the 
theory separates juridical act from juridical fact.14 Indeed, juridical acts are 
volitional acts that must be proven and may fail if they are defective or run 
afoul of mandatory law. Conversely, juridical facts occur and are taken into 
account by operation of law—they do not fail.15 A general theory of juridical 
acts provides a sound basis for further doctrinal elaboration and judicial 
analysis of any given topic of the civil law.16  
Nevertheless, although the concept of juridical act is widely 
recognized, there is no universally accepted theory of juridical acts.17 
Instead two different principal models exist: the German and French 
models. Some civilian jurisdictions, however, present a “mixed model” 
that is primarily based on one principal model but also adopts certain 
features from the other model. Louisiana is one of the jurisdictions that 
has a mixed model.18 German legal doctrine was the first to enunciate a 
contemporary theory of juridical act (Rechtsgeschäft) in the 19th century.19 
This theory is noted for its sophistication, as well as its formalism.20 
German legal scholars forged a narrowly defined category of juridical acts 
and several individual categories of “quasi-juridical acts.”21 “Juridical act” 
 
DROIT CIVIL 281–312, 337–67, 376–407 (5th ed. 1927) [hereinafter CAPITANT, 
INTRODUCTION]. 
 12. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 373–513; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, §§ 55–
58; Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Rethinking the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 663 
(2014) [hereinafter Scalise, Rethinking Nullity]. 
 13. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 281–328; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, 
supra note 1, at 448–51; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, §§ 53–54; 2 WERNER FLUME, 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS. DAS RECHTSGESCHÄFT 124–82 
(5th ed. 1992).  
 14. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 1–39; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 43. 
 15. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37. 
 16. See id.; VAN DER KAAIJ, supra note 4, at 140–42. 
 17. See Aline Tenenbaum et al., Terminology, in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, 
MATERIALS FOR A COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE: TERMINOLOGY, GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES, MODEL RULES 92–100 (Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis 
Maneaud eds., 2008) (discussing the lack of uniformity as to the identification of 
sources of obligations). 
 18. See id. at 76–91. 
 19. See id. at 82–84. 
 20. THANASSIS PAPACHRISTOU, E OIONEI DIKAIOPRAXIA [THE QUASI-
JURIDICAL ACT] 65 (1989) (Greece). 
 21. See id. at 31–42. 




is a term of art in German civil law. The term is regulated in detail in the 
First Book of the German Civil Code, titled “General Part,” and it appears 
throughout the text of the Code.22  
French doctrine did not immediately advance any theory of juridical 
acts. Instead, more specific and practical terms, like “agreement” and 
“contract,” prevailed and were included in the Code Napoléon.23 As a 
result, later French theories of juridical act that surfaced in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries were less ambitious.24 French doctrine opted for 
a binary and broader categorization of acte juridique and fait juridique. 
Development of these theories, however, was basically confined in the law 
of obligations—French scholars perceived juridical acts and facts mostly 
as sources of obligations.25 In any event, the binary categorization of acte 
juridique and fait juridique is classic; it is noted for its practicality and 
simplicity; however, it is also vague—especially regarding the precise 
delineation between juridical act and fact—and overly restricted to 
obligations law.26 Doctrinal interest in the juridical act has revived in 
France lately. As a result, definitions of the terms acte juridique and fait 
juridique were introduced in the French Civil Code in the recent revision 
of the law of obligations in 2016.27 Thus, acte juridique is just now 
becoming a term of art in the French Civil Code, albeit mostly for the 
purposes of obligations law. 
Several civil law systems whose civil codes were modeled after the 
Code Napoléon remained faithful to the French understanding of acte and 
fait juridique. In the mid-20th century however, the civil law doctrines of 
jurisdictions, such as Argentina, Quebec, Italy, Puerto Rico, and Spain, 
began importing components of the more detailed German theory of 
juridical acts. Louisiana belongs to this list of mixed civil law systems.28 
 
 22. See Allgemeiner Teil des BGB, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] 
[CIVIL CODE] arts. 1–240 (Ger.). 
 23. See Olivier Moréteau, Libres propos sur l’avenir des codes civils en 
Europe, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE SERGE GUINCHARD 1049, 1050–52 
(Dalloz ed., 2010) [hereinafter Moréteau, Libres propos]; Olivier Moréteau, A 
Summary Reflection of the Future of Civil Codes in Europe, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
HULMUT KOZIOL 1139, 1140–42 (P. Apathy et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter 
Moréteau, Reflection]. 
 24. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–37. 
 25. See 2 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & JULIEN BONNECASE, TRAITÉ 
THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL: SUPPLÉMENT Nos. 254, 363–65 (1925) 
[hereinafter BONNECASE II]. 
 26. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 13–15, 21–26. 
 27. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1100-1, 1100-2 (2016) (Fr.); 
cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (1984). 
 28. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 51–53. 




Conversely, other jurisdictions closer to the German Civil Code, such as 
Greece and Switzerland, have pulled away from the formalistic German 
categories of juridical act in favor of a more flexible and practical 
approach.29  
Prior to 1976, Louisiana’s civil law system remained faithful to the 
French tradition and did not contain any mention of juridical acts in the 
Civil Code.30 Two eminent jurists, in whose memories this Article is 
dedicated—Professors A.N. Yiannopoulos and Saúl Litvinoff—imported 
the term “juridical act” into the Louisiana Civil Code31 and civilian 
doctrine.32 As a result, the current civil law system of Louisiana presents 
an interesting mixed approach. It maintains the French dichotomy of 
juridical act and juridical fact; at the same time, however, the Louisiana 
Civil Code has employed the concept of juridical act as a term of art, thus 
moving closer to the German and Greek civil codes. Still, the concepts of 
juridical act and juridical fact remain undertheorized in Louisiana 
doctrine. A lack of such a theory is explained historically. Arguably, 
French and Louisiana law survived quite well for two centuries without 
these concepts in the civil codes. Common law systems also seem happily 
ignorant of these concepts.33 
In Louisiana, however, any debate as to the utility of a theory of 
juridical acts has become moot after the revisions to the Louisiana Civil 
Code in the latter half of the last century. As mentioned, “juridical act” is 
 
 29. Id. at 56–58. 
 30. See Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, 
Mandate, and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 
1087, 1109 n.103 (1999).  
 31. See id. 
 32. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–81; 
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, passim. 
 33. Anglo-American legal theory recognizes the concept of a legal act as 
foundational, but this concept has never surfaced as a standard term of art in the 
common law lexicon. This concept has been given different names—“legal 
transaction,” “juristic act,” “act-in-the-law,” “juridical act”—that are synonymous. 
See SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS BOOK I, § 85, at 129–30 n.7, in 6 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (1969) [hereinafter, LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I]; FREDERICK 
H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 164 (1955, reprt. 
1977); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 77 (“In fact there is no conception of a 
juridical act in the common law, which fact would probably delight the student if 
only he knew what he was missing. The student’s probable delight, however, has to 
be set against the regrets expressed by an eminent authority of the common law who 
saw in the lack of such conception at common law a veritable shortcoming that 
obliterates the understanding of very important concepts.”); id. at 77 n.20; 4 ROSCOE 
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 424 (1959). 




a term of art in Louisiana, as it is in several other civil law systems 
following the German and Greek models. The term now appears numerous 
times in the text and revision comments of the Civil Code34 and in the 
opinions of the Louisiana judges.35 At the same time, however, the revised 
Louisiana Civil Code—still faithful to the French tradition—does not 
elaborate further on the meaning and function of juridical acts, leaving this 
task to doctrine.  
This Article asserts that Louisiana civil law doctrine is primed for a 
general theory of juridical acts that comports with the French theory of 
acte juridique and yet benefits from certain tried and tested components 
of the German theory of Rechtsgeschäft. To establish the validity of this 
general theory of juridical acts and to determine the useful components 
drawn from each system, this Article examines the concept of juridical act 
from both a comparative and Louisiana law perspective. Part I examines 
the historical foundations of the German and French conceptions of 
juridical act. This comparative excursus will reveal that the concept of 
juridical act is highly technical and sophisticated in Germany and more 
functional but less systematic in France.  
 
 34. For examples from each Book of the Louisiana Civil Code, see LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 7 (1987) (laws for the preservation of public interest); id. art. 28 (capacity 
to make juridical acts); id. art. 195 cmt. e (2005) (presumption of paternity by 
marriage and acknowledgment); id. art. 213 cmt. b (2008) (adult adoption); id. art. 
222 cmt. a (2015) (parental authority—representation of minor); id. art. 517 cmt. c 
(1979) (voluntary transfer of immovable); id. art. 544 (1976) (methods of 
establishing usufruct); id. art. 654 (1977) (kinds of predial servitudes); id. art. 776 
(1977) (establishment of building restrictions); id. art. 797 (1990) (ownership in 
indivision); id. art. 2292 cmt. b (1995) (negotiorum gestio); id. art. 2298 (enrichment 
without cause); id. art. 2347 cmt. c (1979) (alienation of community property); id. 
art. 2369.1 (1990) (application of co-ownership provisions to former community 
property); id. art. 2781 cmt. b (2012) (annuity for life or time period); id. art. 2985 
(1997) (representation); id. art. 2987 (1997) (procuration); id. art. 2989 cmts. b, d, e 
(1997) (mandate); id. art. 3471 (1982) (limits of contractual freedom in 
prescription); id. art. 3483 (1982) (just title); id. arts. 3505 and 3505.2 (2013) (acts 
extending liberative prescription); id. art. 3515 cmt. c (1991) (general and residual 
choice-of-law rule); id. art. 3541 (1991) (law applicable to other juridical acts and 
quasi-contractual obligations). For a full list, see infra note 221.  
 35. See, e.g., Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 122–23 (La. 
1974) (enrichment without cause); Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess 
Corp. et al., 79 So. 3d 246, 256 (La. 2011) (real rights versus personal rights); 
Palomeque v. Prudhomme, 664 So. 2d 88, 93 (La. 1995) (acquisitive prescription 
of predial servitude). A Westlaw search using the term “juridical act” yielded a total 
of 450 cases in the Louisiana state courts (49 from the Louisiana Supreme Court 
and 401 from the Courts of Appeal) and 146 federal cases. (Apr. 25, 2020).   




On the basis of these comparative findings, Part II focuses on introducing 
the components of a Louisiana theory of juridical acts. The basis for this 
theory is the French approach. The elements for the validity of a juridical act 
are taken from the French and Louisiana civil codes and jurisprudence. The 
contribution of this Article in this respect is twofold. First, this Article dispels 
the misconception that the usefulness of juridical acts and facts is confined 
mostly in the law of obligations. Indeed, in France and Louisiana, the rules of 
obligations apply by analogy to the elements for the validity of most juridical 
acts. Juridical acts and facts are also veritable sources of obligations. 
Nevertheless, accurate analysis of juridical acts and facts requires a proper 
understanding of their broader function in the civil law—juridical acts and 
facts can create, modify, transfer, and extinguish all rights, real and personal. 
Second, this Article sheds light on the proper legal treatment of certain tacit 
(de facto) acts that have been the subject of debate in the Louisiana 
jurisprudence and doctrine, such as precarious quasi-possession and 
reconciliation as a defense to divorce, unworthiness, and disinherison. Part II 
then proceeds to the categorizations of juridical acts. The analysis will reveal 
that several French subcategories of patrimonial juridical acts are of limited 
utility. Instead, German subcategories of patrimonial acts provide more 
workable solutions, as in the example of the “sale of a thing of another” under 
the convoluted article 2452 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Part II concludes 
with a comparative excursus of the doctrine of nullity. The French binary 
system of absolute and relative nullity is contrasted with the more technical 
German and Greek concepts of null and annullable acts. This comparison will 
reveal a striking similarity with respect to certain “mixed nullities” that are 
located between absolute and relative nullity in both French and German 
systems. The validity of this finding will be tested successfully again with 
reference to the example of the sale of a thing of another.  
Lastly, Part III attempts to fix the boundary between juridical act and 
juridical fact, a task that still bedevils French legal scholars. A comparison 
between German “quasi-juridical acts”—such as putting in default and 
occupancy—with French juridical facts—such as voluntary establishment 
of domicile—will reveal that the true decisive factor is capacity. Juridical 
acts always require capacity of the maker; juridical facts do not. The 
Article concludes with a proposed schematic of a Louisiana theory of 
juridical acts. This theory maintains the French binary system of juridical 
act and juridical fact; however, to achieve a proper delineation between 
the two, the theory imports the German juridical act and “quasi-juridical 
act” as examples of juridical acts in the Louisiana system. 




I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF JURIDICAL ACTS 
A general concept of juridical acts was unknown in Roman law.36 
Instead, several specific types of nominate legal acts are found scattered 
in the Roman sources.37 It was not until the time of the German 
 
 36. See 1 MAX KASER, DAS RÖMISCHE PRIVATRECHT 227 (2d ed. 1971); FLUME, 
supra note 13, at 28; WILLIAM WARREN BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 
FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 180 n.1 (2d ed. 1932); 1 GEORGIOS PETROPOULOS, 
HISTORIA KAI EISIGISEIS TOU ROMAIKOU DIKAIOU [HISTORY AND INSTITUTES OF 
ROMAN LAW] 513 (2d ed. 1963, reprt. 2008) (Greece). The Greeks and the Romans 
were familiar with the philosophical concept of a “just act” (dikaiopragema) as a 
lawful voluntary act. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1135a (c. 384 B.C.E.); 
THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS No. 1033 (C. I. 
Litzinger trans., 1964); Emmanuel Michelakis, Dikaiopraxiai. Eisagogikai 
Paratiriseis eis Arthra 127–200 [Juridical Acts. Introductory Observations on 
Articles 127–200] No. 1, in 1 ERMINEIA TOU ASTIKOU KODIKOS. GENIKAI ARCHAI. 
ARTHRA 127–200 [1 COMMENTARY TO THE CIVIL CODE. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
ARTICLES 127–200] (Alexandros Litzeropoulos et al. eds., 1954) (Greece). They were 
also aware of the distinction between voluntary transactions (contracts) and wrongful 
acts. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131a; cf. G. INST. 3.88 (F. de Zuleta trans., 
1946) (“for every obligation arises either from contract or from delict); PETROPOULOS, 
supra note 36, at 858 n.2. For a more detailed analysis of these concepts, see 2 
MARIANOS KARASIS, GENIKES ARCHES ASTIKOU DIKAIOU. DIKAIOPRAXIA. MEROS A 
[GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW. JURIDICAL ACT. PART A] 3–60 (1993) (Greece).  
 37. Examples include testamentum, stipulatio, emptio, and mancipatio, 
among others. KASER, supra note 36, at 227. The Roman term negotium, loosely 
translated as “transaction,” roughly corresponds to the civilian meaning of 
juridical act, although this term was never used as a precise legal term. WILLIAM 
WARREN BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW xxi–xxii (2d ed. 1953, 
reprt. 1981). Other similar terms include actus (act) and gestum (performed 
deeds). FLUME, supra note 13, at 28; FERDINAND REGELSBERGER, PANDEKTEN § 
135, at 488 n.1 (1893). The Roman term instrumentum, on the other hand, 
resembles the modern use of the term “act” when describing the probative value 
of a document, as in the case of an “act under private signature” or an “authentic 
act.” See 1 HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION À 
L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT No. 258 (F. Chabas ed., 12th ed. 2000) [hereinafter MAZEAUD 
ET AL. I]; 1 GEORGES RIPERT & JEAN BOULANGER, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL, 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE, LES PERSONNES No. 560 (1956); Claude Brenner, Acte 
Juridique, in RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL DALLOZ Nos. 2–3 (2013); JEAN PINEAU, 
THÉORIE DES OBLIGATIONS 15 (1979) (Quebec).  




Pandectists38 that a general theory of juridical acts began to take shape.39 
In their effort to draw general principles of civil law from fragmented 
Roman sources, the Pandectists placed great emphasis on the autonomy of 
the will,40 which was capable of producing legal effects.41 An effort to 
systematize all voluntary legal acts under one generic concept began 
during the 18th century, and the term Rechtsgeschäft (juridical act)42 was 
coined.43 Subsequent intense scholarly discourse in Germany throughout 
the 19th century—mainly focused on challenging the conceptual nature of 
the Pandectists’ theory44—ultimately contributed to a sophisticated and 
intricate modern theory of Rechtsgeschäft.45 
Most of these critical voices did not find the same fertile ground in 
France, where the Code Napoléon had already been enacted and autonomy 
 
 38. The Pandectists were 19th-century German legal scholars who developed 
a theory of “conceptual jurisprudence” (Konstruktionsjurisprudenz) on the basis 
of Justinian’s Digest (also known as the “Pandect”) in the Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
Several groups of Roman law scholars emerged from this intellectual movement, 
including the Historical School of Jurisprudence led by the German law professor 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny. See Matthias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German 
Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837 (1990). See also infra note 51.  
 39. See FLUME, supra note 13, at 28. 
 40. The concept of autonomy of the will was not new. It derived from 
Aristotelian philosophy and was accepted by natural law scholars. The 
Pandectists, however, had turned away from these sources in an effort to create a 
“scientific body of law.” See Reimann, supra note 38, at 842–46; JAMES 
GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 162–
64 (1991); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 47, at 65–66.  
 41. See 2 MAX KASER, DAS RÖMISCHE PRIVATRECHT 73 (2d ed. 1975); 
PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 11–12.  
 42. The precise translation of Rechtsgeschäft is “legal transaction.” This term 
is synonymous with “juridical act.” See Tenenbaum et al., supra note 17, at 66–100. 
 43. The term Rechtsgeschäft appeared toward the end of the 18th century in 
Germany and Prussia. Earlier, the terms actus juridicus and negotium juridicum had 
appeared during the 17th century. The term actus juridicus is also found in the Canon 
Law. See 1983 CODE C.124–28; CODE OF CANON LAW ANNOTATED 141–44 (E. 
Caparros et al. eds., 1993); Helmuth Pree, On Juridic Acts and Liability in Canon Law 
– Part One, 58 JURIST 41 (1998); Helmuth Pree, On Juridic Acts and Liability in 
Canon Law – Part Two, 58 JURIST 479 (1998). For a more detailed account of the 
historical evolution of the concept of the juridical act, see FLUME, supra note 13, at 
28–31; Georges Rouhette, La doctrine de l’acte juridique: Sur quelques matériaux 
récents, 71 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE THÉORIE JURIDIQUE [DROITS] 29, 31 (1988); 
KARASIS, supra note 36, at 65–70; REGELSBERGER, supra note 37, § 135, at 488 n.1. 
 44. For more detail, see Reimann, supra note 38, at 858–74. Cf. Roscoe 
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457 (1909). 
 45. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 11–13. 




of the will was an undisputed political principle.46 Thus, the development 
of a theory of the French acte juridique came later and gave rise to a 
simpler modern concept of acte juridique.47   
A. The German Rechtsgeschäft 
German law professor Friedrich Carl von Savigny was the first to 
enunciate a comprehensive theory of juridical acts. Savigny’s proposition 
was quite linear: A person can, by mere volition,48 create, modify, or 
abolish juridical relations, that is, legal relationships with other persons or 
things.49 Put simply, the declared will constitutes a Rechtsgeschäft, which 
sets the law in motion and produces legal consequences—the acquisition, 
transfer, and extinction of rights in the civil law.50  
Savigny’s followers, the Pandectists of the Historical School of 
Jurisprudence,51 further elaborated—and slightly amended—his theory to 
 
 46. See ALFRED RIEG, LE RÔLE DE LA VOLONTÉ DANS L’ACTE JURIDIQUE EN 
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS ET ALLEMAND 2–11 (1961). 
 47. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 13–15. 
 48. In his analysis, Savigny uses the term “declaration of will” 
(Willenserklärung) as a synonym to Rechtsgeschäft. See FLUME, supra note 13, at 25–
31. Under modern German and Greek doctrines, however, not every declaration of 
will is a Rechtsgeschäft. For instance, an offer is a declaration of will, not a juridical 
act. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 53, at 224; FLUME, supra note 13, at 31–34; 
Konstantinos Simantiras, Arthra 185–86 [Articles 185–86] No. 27 in 1 ERMINEIA TOU 
ASTIKOU KODIKOS. GENIKAI ARCHAI. ARTHRA 127–200 [1 COMMENTARY TO THE 
CIVIL CODE. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. ARTICLES 185–94] (Alexandros Litzeropoulos et 
al. eds., 1966) (Greece); GORDLEY, supra note 40, at 175. Cf. Saúl Litvinoff, Consent 
Revisited. Offer, Acceptance, Option, Right of First Refusal, and Contracts of 
Adhesion in the Revision of the Louisiana Law of Obligations, 47 LA. L. REV. 699, 
706 (1987) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Consent] (“An offer is a unilateral declaration of 
will that a person—the offeror—addresses to another—the offeree—whereby the 
former proposes to the latter the conclusion of a contract.”) (emphasis added).  
 49. See 3 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN 
RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 103, 275 (1840) [hereinafter SAVIGNY III]. See BETTI, supra 
note 2, at 2 (explaining the linear logic in the theory of juridical acts). 
 50. See RIEG, supra note 46, No. 376; GORDLEY, supra note 40, at 162–63. 
 51. The Historical School of Jurisprudence was a 19th-century intellectual 
movement of German legal scholars who studied the Roman law of the Pandect 
(Digest of Justinian). They rejected the notion of natural law and advocated in 
favor of a customary law that was a product of the spirit of the people (Volkgeist), 
just like language, music, and culture. They were led by Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny. His followers include Georg Friedrich Puchta and Bernhard 
Windscheid. See Reimann, supra note 38, at 851–58; J.E. GOUDSMIT, THE 




reflect three propositions. First, it is the declared will, and not necessarily 
the actual will, that produces legal consequences.52 This proposition has 
been widely accepted in German law, forming the basis for the German 
“declaration theory” in contract interpretation.53 Second, the desired legal 
consequences from a Rechtsgeschäft ensue because the law so provides, 
on the basis of the will of the maker.54 Thus, it is not the will alone that 
produces legal consequences, but the law that is prompted by the will of 
the maker.55 Third, the maker of a Rechtsgeschäft must intend to produce 
legal consequences. In other words, the maker of a juridical act looks 
forward to achieving a legal result through this act. An act whose legal 
consequences were unintended is not a Rechtsgeschäft.56 Under this 
approach, a contract for the sale of goods is a Rechtsgeschäft. It is based 
on the declared wills—offer and acceptance—of the buyer and seller. The 
legal consequences—obligation to transfer ownership of the goods and 
obligation to pay the price—are imposed by law on the basis of the parties’ 
declared will. The parties intended these legal consequences—for 
example, the buyer intended to obtain legal ownership of the goods.57 
Conversely, a hunter who captures a wild animal may acquire ownership 
of the animal directly by operation of law, not on the basis of the hunter’s 
intent.58 Likewise, a person who acts to prevent a neighboring dilapidated 
house from collapsing might intend to protect her own property or may 
wish to tend to her neighbor’s property. Regardless of this person’s true 
 
PANDECTS, A TREATISE ON THE ROMAN LAW § 9 (R. de Tracy Gould trans., 1873). 
See also supra note 38. 
 52. This proposition existed in Savigny’s concept of Willenserklärung. See 
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 111–12; PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 12. 
 53. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 135, at 224. See infra note 62. 
 54. See WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 69; GEORG FRIEDRICH PUCHTA, 
PANDEKTEN §§ 49, 54 (12th ed. 1877); LUDWIG ENNECCERUS, RECHTSGESCHÄFT, 
BEDINGUNG UND ANFANGSTERMIN 55, 152 (1888).  
 55. As Windscheid explained, the will orders a legal effect, but the law allows 
this effect to take place. WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 69. 
 56. See SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, at 5; PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 
13, 31; FLUME, supra note 13, at 106. 
 57. According to Savigny, the buyer in this example obviously and consciously 
enters into this transaction to acquire ownership of the goods. On the basis of this 
acquired right, the buyer may then actually enjoy these goods or enter into further 
transactions (e.g., by reselling the goods). SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, at 6 n.(f).  
 58. Thus, occupancy is not a Rechtsgeschäft. SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, at 6 
n.(g). Under this approach, the hunter will acquire ownership of certain wild 
animals, “provided they are captured in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3412 cmt. d (2019). In essence, it is the law that 
grants ownership of the caught animal to the hunter, regardless of the hunter’s intent.  




intent, the law imposes certain obligations and grants certain rights to this 
person who acted as a manager of her neighbor’s affairs.59   
Under Savigny’s theory, the Rechtsgeschäft became an integral part 
of a broader civilian theory of “private rights” (the German theory of 
subjektives Recht, which consequently became the French theory of droit 
subjectif).60 This theory is linear: A person (subject of the law) can acquire, 
modify, transfer, or extinguish rights (objects of the law) either by 
voluntary act (Rechtsgeschäft) or by operation of law. Subjektives Recht 
was thus defined as a legally recognized “power of the will” 
(Willensmacht, Willensherrschaft) to generate or extinguish private 
rights.61 Because of the recognition of the primacy of the will, the 
Pandectists’ general theory of the subjektives Recht—which includes the 
theory of Rechtsgeschäft—became known as the “will theory.”62  
 
 59. Thus, negotiorum gestio is not a Rechtsgeschäft. SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, 
at 6 n.(g); cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2292–97 (2019). Likewise, delictual or other legal 
obligations are not Rechtsgeschäft. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 660, 661 (2019) 
(concerning the legal obligation of a building owner to keep the building in repair). 
 60. The definition and delineation of the subjektives Recht and the 
corresponding droit subjectif have been the topic of intense debate in civilian 
theory and are outside the scope of this present analysis. For further discussion of 
this topic, see JEAN DABIN, LE DROIT SUBJECTIF (1952, reprt. 2017); PAUL 
ROUBIER, DROITS SUBJECTIFS ET SITUATIONS JURIDIQUES (1963); 1 JACQUES 
GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION 
GÉNÉRALE 117–83 (2d ed. 1983). Suffice it here to note that proper English 
translations of these terms are “private rights” or “civil law rights.” As Professor 
Yiannopoulos explained, “In a number of continental languages, the word right 
has the further ambiguity of also meaning law: jus in Latin, droit in French, Recht 
in German, diritto in Italian, and derecho in Spanish means right as well as law.” 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 435. See also WINDSCHEID, 
supra note 10, § 37; 1 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION, LES 
PERSONNES, LA FAMILLE, L’ENFANT, LE COUPLE No. 104 (reprt. and rev. 2d ed. 
2017) (27th ed. 2002) [hereinafter CARBONNIER I]; Geoffrey Samuel, “Le Droit 
Subjectif” and English Law, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 264 (1987). Therefore, for the 
purposes of linguistic clarity, the terms subjektives Recht and droit subjectif refer 
to rights, whereas the terms objektives Rechts and droit objectif refer to the law. 
This semantic problem does not exist in the English language. Thus, a literal 
translation of “subjective law” or “objective law” would be false. See APOSTOLOS 
GEORGIADES, GENIKES ARCHES ASTIKOU DIKAIOU [GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
CIVIL LAW] 258 (4th ed. 2012) (Greece). 
 61. See WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 37, at 156 n.3. 
 62. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 105–09. Savigny’s work 
constituted the basis of the “will theory” in the civil law of contract. According to 
this theory, the actual will of a contracting party controls the interpretation and 
the effectiveness of that party’s declaration of will. See KARASIS, supra note 36, 




Toward the end of the 19th century, the subjective “will theory” was 
met with criticism by German legal scholars who argued in favor of an 
“objective theory.” These scholars—known as the “objectivists”—
challenged the soundness of the will theory on several grounds.63 The 
criticism involved the subjektives Recht in general,64 but it also focused on 
the law of obligations65 and the Rechtsgeschäft.66  
With respect to the Rechtsgeschäft, the objectivists criticized the will 
theorists for their metaphysical, curious, and positivist67 fixation on 
 
at 69 n.30. Thus, under the traditional “will theory,” a vitiated consent of a 
contracting party due to error would render the contract absolutely null not 
because of the party’s mistake, but because the true will of that party did not 
correspond to the declaration. See GORDLEY, supra note 40, at 191. The primacy 
of the will in Savigny’s theory is also evident in property law. Compare 
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES BESITZES, EINE CIVILISTISCHE 
ABHANDLUNG (1803) (enunciating his theory that later became known as the 
“subjectivist theory of possession”), with RUDOLPH VON JHERING, DER 
BESITZWILLE (1889) (advancing the “objectivist theory of possession”). See A.N. 
YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, § 12:3, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 
2015) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY] (discussing the Savigny–Jhering 
debate in the context of Louisiana property law). As noted, Savigny’s followers 
pulled slightly away from the notion of the primacy of the will in favor of a 
“declaration theory” in contract interpretation, which ultimately prevailed in 
Germany. See supra note 53. 
 63. For instance, the objectivists questioned why the will of the parties to a 
contract should be binding. As Professor Gordley explains, the will theorists were 
left open for attack from their critics because they had turned away from the 
Aristotelian sources and thus had no justification for their doctrine. See GORDLEY, 
supra note 40, at 161–213.  
 64. For instance, the German legal scholar Rudolph von Jhering, who was 
once a follower of the will theory, later denounced it, proposing his own definition 
of the subjektives Recht as “a legally protected interest.” See 3 RUDOLPH VON 
JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS §§ 60, 61 (5th ed. 1906); 
REGELSBERGER, supra note 37, § 14.  
 65. Proponents of the “will theory of obligations” conceptualized an 
obligation as a “rapport between the duty of the obligor and a claim of the 
obligee.” LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 47, at 63. Conversely, 
supporters of the “objective theory” see an obligation as a “relation between two 
patrimonies which is created through the obligatory bond.” Id. at 66.  
 66. See JEAN HAUSER, OBJECTIVISME ET SUBJECTIVISME DANS L’ACTE 
JURIDIQUE 50–65 (1971) (discussing the influence of the debate concerning the 
droit subjectif on the theory of juridical acts).  
 67. See Reimann, supra note 38, at 889–94 (describing the positivist nature 
of Savigny’s theory). 




the power of the will.68 The objectivists argued in favor of a more pragmatic 
approach. In particular, they challenged the position of the will theorists that 
the maker of a Rechtsgeschäft must intend all of the legal consequences of 
a transaction.69 They maintained that, in reality, a person who participates 
in everyday transactions is interested in achieving an actual and material 
result,70 which is usually financial,71 social,72 or practical,73 but very seldom 
legal. As one commentator noted, “When one purchases firewood and coal, 
bread or meat, one does this to stay warm or to eat, and not to have the 
pleasure of becoming the legal owner of these things.”74  
In essence, the objectivists argued that the current definition of the 
Rechtsgeschäft was too narrow.75 They failed, however, to propose an 
alternative definition of the Rechtsgeschäft, and their views did not 
prevail.76 The criticisms voiced by the objectivists did contribute, 
however, to the further development of the German theory of 
Rechtsgeschäft in two diametrically opposite ways. First, in a positive 
way—the objectivists injected a dose of pragmatism into the doctrinal 
understanding of the Rechtsgeschäft. Proponents of the traditional view 
were now ready to concede that the intentions of the maker of a juridical 
act are not necessarily purely legal; they can be practical, so long as a legal 
 
 68. In particular, the objectivists questioned why the will of the parties to a 
contract should be binding. See JHERING, supra note 64, § 53; GORDLEY, supra 
note 40, at 163; PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 15. 
 69. Among these critics, see SIEGMUND SCHLOSSMANN, DER VERTRAG 
(1876); Otto Lenel, Parteiabsicht und Rechtserfolg, 19 JHERINGS JAHRBÜCHER 
FÜR DIE DOGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 
154–253 (1881); 2 AUGUST BECHMANN, DER KAUF NACH GEMEINEM RECHT. 
SYSTEM DES KAUFS (1884); EUGEN EHRLICH, DIE STILLSCHWEIGENDE 
WILLENSERKLÄRUNG (1893); ERICH DANZ, DIE AUSLEGUNG DER 
RECHTSGESCHÄFTE (2d ed. 1906).  
 70. See SCHLOSSMANN, supra note 69, at 128, 326. 
 71. See Lenel, supra note 69, at 162–63. 
 72. See EHRLICH, supra note 69, at 2–3, 10. 
 73. See DANZ, supra note 69, at 6, 22; BECHMANN, supra note 69, at 6–11.  
 74. Lenel, supra note 69, at 176. American jurists also voiced similar 
objections. See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 615 
(1920) (“To assume first that everybody knows the law, and, second, that 
everybody thereupon makes his contract with reference to it and adopts its 
provisions as terms of the agreement, is indeed to pile a fiction upon a fiction.”); 
Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365, 371 (1921). The 
German objectivists also influenced French scholars. See infra note 131. 
 75. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 13–14, 19. 
 76. The German jurist Alfred Manigk directed the harshest criticism of these 
views. ALFRED MANIGK, WILLENSERKLÄRUNG UND WILLENSGESCHÄFT (1907). 




intent can be gleaned.77 Second, in a negative way—these opposing views 
prompted a highly abstract and conceptualized debate on the legal nature 
of the Rechtsgeschäft. As a result, the general theory in this area became 
even more complicated. For instance, several German scholars came up 
with new and obscure categories of voluntary acts. In particular, some 
scholars highlighted several types of voluntary acts—such as notifications, 
expressions of emotion, and material acts—whose legal consequences 
ensue regardless of the maker’s intent.78 These de facto expressions of will 
did not fit neatly under the category of Rechtsgeschäft, though they closely 
resembled it. The same scholars, however, did not agree on the precise 
classification of these hybrid acts.79 The categorizations that ultimately 
prevailed are precise and systematic; however, they are also formalistic 
and detached from transactional reality.80  
Under the prevailing view,81 this hybrid category of volitional acts is 
named “legal acts in the strict sense.”82 These acts do not qualify as 
Rechtsgeschäft. This hybrid category of acts contains 
the noteworthy subcategories of “quasi-juridical acts”83 and “material 
 
 77. See ENNECCERUS, supra note 54, at 18–19; GORDLEY, supra note 40, at 211. 
 78. Savigny had identified these acts, excluding them from the category of 
Rechtsgeschäft. SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, at 5. The redactors of the German 
Civil Code were also aware of the existence of these acts. MOTIVE ZU DEM 
ENTWURFE EINES BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES FÜR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH, 
BAND 1, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 126 (J. Guttentag & D. Collin, 1888). Manigk further 
analyzed these new categories of acts and put forward a categorization of legal 
acts that remains classic. MANIGK, supra note 76, at 652.  
 79. See, e.g., the classic categorizations of MANIGK, supra note 76, at 652; 
PETER KLEIN, DIE RECHTSHANDLUNGEN IM ENGEREN SINNE (1912). Alternative 
categorizations were also proposed by PAUL ELTZBACHER, DIE 
HANDLUNGSFÄHIGKEIT 157–61 (1903); 2 LUDWIG ENNECCERUS, ALLGEMEINER 
TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS 572–80 (14th ed., Hans Nipperdey 1955) 
[hereinafter ENNECCERUS & NIPPERDEY]; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 48. For a 
critical overview of these categorizations, see FLUME, supra note 13, at 104–13. 
 80. See FRITZ VON HIPPEL, DAS PROBLEM DER RECHTSGESCHÄFTLICHEN 
PRIVATAUTONOMIE 25–26 (1936) (disputing the soundness and practical 
usefulness of the concept of “quasi-juridical acts”); PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 
20, at 63–65 (proposing a binary categorization of juridical acts and juridical facts 
modeled after the French approach). 
 81. For a critical discussion of this prevailing view, see FLUME, supra note 
13, at 104–13. 
 82. Rechtshandlungen im engeren Sinne. KLEIN, supra note 79, at 23–26; 
MANIGK, supra note 76, at 650–78.  
 83. Geschäftsähnliche Handlungen. A quasi-juridical act is an act—usually 
in the form of a manifestation of will—that produces legal consequences 
regardless of the person’s intent. An example of a quasi-juridical act is the 





establishment of voluntary domicile. A person may establish domicile without 
intending the legal consequences attached to such a choice (e.g., jurisdiction of 
the local courts). Another example is putting in default. When a lessor demands 
payment of rent that is past due, the lessee is also put in default, regardless of 
whether the lessor intended that result. The rules on juridical acts (e.g., capacity) 
apply by analogy. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447; 
VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 48, at 112. Other examples of “quasi-juridical acts” 
are certain de facto acts whose makers merely express an emotion. Reconciliation 
between the spouses and reconciliation or forgiveness in the context of 
unworthiness or disinherison are examples of such acts. Thus, when the decedent 
has forgiven the unworthy heir, the action for unworthiness is extinguished 
regardless of whether the decedent had intended this legal consequence. Lastly, 
notifications of events or other acts of giving notice are considered quasi-juridical 
acts because the maker is primarily interested in a practical result—the legal 
consequences ensue regardless of what was intended by giving notice. Putting in 
default has been mentioned as an example; other examples include providing 
inventory or an account, giving notice of termination of contracts for continuous 
or periodic performance, and giving notice of an assignment of a right. In 
Louisiana, numerous occasions of giving notice are also found in the Private 
Works Act. Cf. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4801 (2019). See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 
20, at 33, 67–134.   




acts.”84 The rules applicable to Rechtsgeschäft apply by analogy to the 
“quasi-juridical acts” but not to the “material acts.”85 “Legal acts in the 
strict sense,” together with the Rechtsgeschäft, constitute the general 
category of “legal acts in the broad sense.”86 Furthermore, any act or event 
that entails legal consequences belongs to the broader category of 
“operative facts.”87 
 
 84. Realakte. A material act is a physical action that produces legal 
consequences regardless of the will or capacity of the person. Here, there is no need 
to apply the rules on juridical acts because no manifestation of will is involved in 
the act. Occupancy is an example. Thus, even an incapable person (e.g., a minor) 
who finds an abandoned movable takes original ownership through possession. 
MANIGK, supra note 76, at 652; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 48, at 112; Cf. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3412 (2018); YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 12:11, at 
695–96 (“Incompetents may acquire possession by their own acts and intent or 
through their legal representatives.”); Symeon C. Symeonides, One Hundred 
Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA. L. 
REV. 69, 83 n.35 (1983) [hereinafter Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes] (“the 
acquisition of possession should not require capacity to enter into juridical acts.”) 
On the concept of “original acquisition of a right,” see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 442–43; ALEX WEILL & FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, DROIT CIVIL. 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE No. 342 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter WEILL & TERRÉ I]; 
see also infra notes 397–98. The relinquishment of possession is a fact that is taken 
into account together with the intent to give up ownership to determine whether the 
thing has been abandoned. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3418 cmt. c (2019); id. art. 3433 cmt. 
c; YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 12:14; Poirrier v. Dale’s Dozer 
Service Inc., 770 So. 2d 531, 536–37 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000). 
 85. See KARL LARENZ, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN 
RECHTS § 26 (5th ed. 1980); DIETER MEDICUS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BGB 78–
81 (1982). 
 86. Rechtshandlungen im weiterer Sinne. MANIGK, supra note 76, at 637–52; 
KLEIN, supra note 79, at 23–26; GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 53. 
 87. Juristische Tatsache. The translated term “operative facts” is taken from 
POUND, supra note 33, at 411, 420 (attributing the term to Hohfeld); SAÚL 
LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS §1.6, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 
(2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL]; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 89, at 136 n.38. The term “juridical fact” would 
also be an accurate translation, but it is not used in this Article to avoid any 
confusion with the French fait juridique. Any legally relevant act, licit or illicit, 
or event constitutes an “operative fact.” On the contrary, acts or events that entail 
no legal consequences are “inoperative facts” or “legally irrelevant facts” 
(“Tatsache, die für das Recht irrelevant sind”). SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, at 3; 
VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 43, at 7; ENNECCERUS & NIPPERDEY, supra note 79, 
at 570–72; GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 48. This broad understanding of 
“operative facts” in German law has no relation to the more specific term fait 
juridique of the French law, particularly as a source of obligations. Cf. CODE CIVIL 




This prevailing theory influenced the redactors of the German Civil 
Code. The first book of the Code, titled General Principles,88 contains a 
detailed regulation of the Rechtsgeschäft. Topics such as capacity, 
consent, vices of consent, interpretation, terms and conditions, and 
representation—which in Louisiana and France appear in the law of 
obligations—are contained in a general regulation of juridical acts, 
applicable to all nominate and innominate types of volitional acts. The 
term Rechtsgeschäft is thus broader than contract and agreement, 
including also unilateral acts, such as testaments and notices.89 Keeping 
with the tradition of the codifications of the time, the redactors made 
frequent use of the term Rechtsgeschäft but resisted defining the term in 
the final text of the Code,90 leaving this task to legal doctrine.91 
From this necessarily succinct overview,92 it follows that the German 
concept of Rechtsgeschäft has been the topic of extensive discourse devoted 
to the philosophical underpinnings of the legal force of the individual will.93 
As a result, the German understanding of juridical act is remarkably 
sophisticated as a product of legal science. However, it is also: (1) narrow—
restricted in principle to the Rechtsgeschäft and expanding by exception into 
similar acts not necessarily involving intended legal consequences; (2) 
conceptual—to the point where the notion of juridical act perhaps becomes 
 
[C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 (2016); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (2019); 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, § 1.6; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, § 89, at 136 n.38. In Germany and Greece, juridical acts and the law are 
the enumerated sources of obligations. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL 
SERVITUDES, § 3:14, at 116, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES].  
 88. Allgemeiner Teil des BGB. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL 
CODE] arts. 1–240 (Ger.). 
 89. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447; ARTHUR T. 
VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 829 n.2 (2d ed. 1977). 
 90. The exposé des motifs of the BGB contained the following definition: 
“Rechtsgeschäft is the declaration of private will directed to the production of a 
legal consequence, which occurs according to law, because such consequence is 
desired.” MOTIVE, supra note 78, at 127. 
 91. The classical definition was furnished by the German scholars 
Enneccerus and Nipperdey: “A juridical act (Rechtsgeschäft) is a set of facts 
(Tatbestand) that contains a declaration or act of will and is recognized by law as 
the reason for the occurrence of the intended legal consequence.” ENNECCERUS & 
NIPPERDEY, supra note 79, at 604. 
 92. For a detailed account of the German theory of Rechtsgeschäft, see 
FLUME, supra note 13, at 23–133. 
 93. For a more elaborate discussion of this topic, see GORDLEY, supra note 
40, at 161–213. 




too theoretical; and (3) formalistic—enunciating several subcategories of 
acts and using tight factors for this categorization.94 
A very general depiction of the basic German categories follows:95  
 
The German System  




 94. The theory of Rechtsgeschäft has received mixed evaluations from 
comparativists. It has been heralded by some as “a hallmark of German legal 
science.” FLUME, supra note 13, at 30–31. At the same time, others have 
questioned whether this concept is “a valuable conquest of the human mind or . . . 
an aberration.” LAWSON, supra note 33, at 165.   
 95. The purpose of this diagram is to display the general categories of legally 
relevant acts. It is not an exhaustive or accurate depiction of the multitude of 
German scholarly opinions on this topic. The terms and categories used are based 
on the classifications of MANIGK, supra note 76, at 650–78; KLEIN, supra note 79, 
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B. The French Acte Juridique  
Discussion of juridical acts appeared much later in France, during the 
late 19th and 20th centuries.96 The term acte juridique (juridical act) did 
not appear in the French Civil Code until 1980, when it was inserted in 
two articles dealing with proof of obligations.97 This timid appearance of 
the acte juridique in the French legal vocabulary is attributable to two 
factors. First, the structure of the Code Napoléon98—drafted before the 
time of Savigny’s theory of the Rechtsgeschäft—was designed as a Code 
addressed to the layperson, discouraging the inclusion of legalese, 
definitions of terms, or general principles in the text of the law.99 Second, 
the domination of the School of Exegesis100 when the Code Napoléon was 
 
 96. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 2. 
 97. The term first appeared in the 1980 revisions of articles 1326 and 1348 of 
the French Civil Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1326 (1980) 
(Fr.) (“The juridical act by which only one party binds himself to another to pay 
him a sum of money or to deliver fungible goods to him must be established in an 
instrument that carries the signature of the person making that commitment as 
well as the statement written by that party himself of the sum or of the quantity in 
full in both letters and numerals. In case of difference, the act under private 
signature is to be taken into account as regards the sum written in full letters.”) 
(emphasis added); id. art. 1348 ¶ 2 (“The rules above do not apply when the 
obligation arises from a quasi-contract, a delict or quasi-delict, or when one of the 
parties either did not have the material opportunity or moral possibility to obtain 
written proof of the juridical act, or has lost the instrument that he intended to use 
as written proof in consequence of a fortuitous event or of force majeure.”) 
(emphasis added). The term also appeared in other provisions of the French Civil 
Code in the 2000 and 2004 revisions. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 6. 
Previously, an attempt had been made to insert a general provision on acte 
juridique in the French Civil Code, but this attempt failed. See infra note 157.  
 98. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] (1804) (Fr.). 
 99. See Moréteau, Libres propos, supra note 23, at 1050–52; Moréteau, 
Reflection, supra note 23, at 1140–42; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, No. 
563. The drafters of the Code Napoléon did not consider it necessary to include 
provisions on general principles and concepts of civil law in the Code. The 
redactors of the Swiss Civil Code and Swiss Code of Obligations followed suit. 
The German and Greek civil codes each contain a book on general principles of 
civil law. Nevertheless, juridical acts are not defined in these codes. Elaboration 
on this theory is left to civilian doctrine. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 
363–65; EUGENE HUBER, CODE CIVIL SUISSE: EXPOSÉ DES MOTIFS DE L’AVANT-
PROJET 18–21 (1902). See also BETTI, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the absence 
of a detailed general part in the Italian Civil Code). 
 100. The School of Exegesis, or Exegetical School, was an intellectual 
movement of legal scholars that dominated France in the 19th century. Scholars 




drafted and for years after the Code went into effect precluded any critical 
analysis of the concepts and tenets in the Code.101  
Furthermore, the concept of the acte juridique was largely confounded 
with the French principle of autonomy of the will, the veracity of which 
was undisputed at the time.102 In Germany, autonomy of the will was a 
philosophical question subject to extensive doctrinal discourse concerning 
the Rechtsgeschäft.103 In France, autonomy of the will was a political 
principle—a product of the French Revolution.104 This principle of 
individualism permeated the Code Napoléon and gave rise to the “French 
will theory.”105 In the Code Napoléon, this theory was expressed in the law 
of obligations under the heading of convention.106 Autonomy of the will 
 
supporting this movement professed the primacy of legislative will. The jurist is 
tasked with determining that will, working within the four corners of the text. See 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 285–86. 
 101. See Olivier Moréteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis: 
The Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C. J. INT’L & COMP. REG. 273, 
279–82, 289 (1995); FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES 
EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF 8–30 (La. State L. Inst. transl., 1963) (2d ed. 1954); 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 285–86. Cf. Reimann, supra 
note 38, at 876–77 (discussing Savigny’s opposition to the Prussian, French, and 
Austrian codification movements). 
 102. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 21. 
 103. See RIEG, supra note 46, at 2–11; FLUME, supra note 13, at 1–22; VON 
MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 89, at 829 n.2; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra 
note 37, No. 563.  
 104. See Rouhette, supra note 43, at 29, 31; Christophe Grzegorczyk, L’acte 
juridique dans la perspective de la philosophie du droit, 71 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE 
THÉORIE JURIDIQUE [DROITS] 47 (1988). 
 105. As noted, the German “declaration theory” places emphasis on the 
declared will, thus giving due regard to the protection of third parties and the 
effectiveness of transactions in general. See supra notes 53 and 62. The French 
“will theory,” based on individualism and personal freedom, gives in principle 
effectiveness to the real will. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 12–13, 61–62, 83; 
RIEG, supra note 46, at 7; JEAN CHABAS, DE LA DÉCLARATION DE VOLONTÉ EN 
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS (1931); VERONIQUE RANOUIL, L’AUTONOMIE DE LA 
VOLONTÉ. NAISSANCE ET ÉVOLUTION D’UN CONCEPT 71–74 (1980); 1 JACQUES 
FLOUR ET AL., DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS, L’ACTE JURIDIQUE Nos. 94–110 
(16th ed. 2014); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 369–77; Wayne Barnes, The 
French Subjective Theory of Contract: Separating Rhetoric from Reality, 83 TUL. 
L. REV. 359 (2008). 
 106. In French legal literature, convention and contrat are sometimes used 
interchangeably. They do not have the same meaning, however. Convention—
translated as “agreement”—is a generic term referring to any type of agreement, 
whereas contrat is a special term referring to an agreement that creates, modifies, 




was codified in the law of contract.107 To a French lawyer at the time of 
the Code Napoléon, acte juridique basically meant “contract.”108 Confined 
in the law of contract, the acte juridique did not undergo significant 
theoretical development during the 18th and 19th centuries.109  
The primacy of the autonomy of the will, however, provided fertile 
ground for the later development of a theory of acte juridique. The seed 
was planted toward the end of the 19th century when the Pandectists’ will 
theory of the “private rights” (subjektives Recht), which included the 
concept of Rechtsgeschäft, arrived in France unopposed.110 Based on this 
theory, the French jurist Henri Capitant expounded a French will theory of 
the “private rights” (droit subjectif), which included the acte juridique.111 
Capitant furnished a classic definition of the acte juridique: a 
manifestation of will that is made in view of acquiring, transferring, 
modifying, or extinguishing a right and that produces the effect intended 
by its maker because the law sanctions this manifestation of will.112 
Capitant’s interpretation of this definition, however, was rather broad. 
Inspired by the Pandectists, he started his analysis with the general concept 
of “operative facts,” which included all legally relevant acts and facts.113 
 
or extinguishes obligations. 1 GABRIEL MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL. 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE À L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT No. 149 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter 
MARTY & RAYNAUD I]. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2019). See infra note 487. 
 107. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1134, 1156 (1804) (Fr.); 
MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 270; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 
169; 25 CHARLES DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOLÉON Nos. 3, 70 (1878); 
RANOUIL, supra note 105, at 71–74.  
 108. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 255, 271–76.  
 109. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, No. 563. As one eminent 
authority observed, early French doctrine remained “hypnotized” under a broad 
doctrine of contract and did not elaborate a theory of acte juridique. See 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 254. 
 110. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 14–15. 
 111. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, at 268 n.1 (citing the German 
legal scholars Savigny, Windscheid, and Puchta in his introduction to the general 
theory of acte juridique); see supra note 51; Michel Boudot, Les civilistes français 
face à l’œvre de Savigny, 1 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT MICHEL VILLEY 39 (2009).  
 112. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, at 230; 1 AMBROISE COLIN 
& HENRI CAPITANT, COURS ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 49 (8th 
ed. 1934) [hereinafter COLIN & CAPITANT I]; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 
106, No. 149; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 167; BORIS STARCK, DROIT 
CIVIL. INTRODUCTION No. 365 (1972); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 251; 
JACQUES MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, L’ACTE JURIDIQUE UNILATÉRAL 22–24 (1951). 
 113. Capitant translated the German term “operative facts” (juristische 
Tatsachen) into “fait juridique” in the broad sense. This broad notion of fait 




He then identified two subcategories: (1) licit voluntary acts intended to 
produce legal consequences (actes juridiques); and (2) other acts and facts 
that are illicit or whose legal consequences are independent of the will 
(faits juridiques—a novel concept not found in German doctrine).114 
Capitant’s notion of acte juridique, however, was more extensive than 
what his definition above suggests. It encompassed all licit voluntary acts 
that result in the acquisition, transfer, modification, or extinction of rights, 
regardless of whether the maker of the act actually intended this legal 
result.115 Under this broader meaning, acte juridique encapsulates all 
bilateral acts, such as contracts, as well as all voluntary unilateral acts, 
such as testaments, quasi-contract, occupancy, offer and acceptance, and 
notifications.116 In essence, according to Capitant, all licit voluntary acts—
which make up most operative facts—were actes juridiques.117 
 
juridique encompasses all acts and events that produce legal consequences. Juridical 
acts and juridical facts in a strict sense are the two subsets of this broad category. 
See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, Nos. 228–29; BONNECASE II, supra 
note 25, Nos. 252, 312. The French jurist Demogue refers to the broad meaning of 
“juridical fact” when discussing sources of obligations. 1 RENÉ DEMOGUE, TRAITÉ 
DES OBLIGATIONS EN GÉNÉRAL, No. 11 (1923); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 
313 n.1. Capitant’s use of “juridical facts in the broad sense”—as the equivalent of 
the German “operative facts”—and “juridical facts in the narrow sense”—as 
encompassing anything that is not an acte juridique—confused several French 
writers, including Aubry and Rau. See 12 CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, DROIT 
CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 762, at 245 n.5 (P. Esmein ed., 6th ed. 1958) [hereinafter AUBRY 
& RAU XII] (including a clarification from the editor, Professor Esmein, as to the 
confused use of fait juridique in the broad sense). For this reason, the term 
“operative facts” is used in this Article instead of the confusing term “juridical facts 
in the broad sense.” The translated term “operative facts” is taken from POUND, 
supra note 33, at 411, 420 (attributing the term to Hohfeld); LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 1.6; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, § 89, at 136 n.38. See supra note 87. 
 114. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, Nos. 228–30; BONNECASE 
II, supra note 25, No. 268; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 40. On the philosophical 
origins of this opposition between acte and fait juridique, see Michel Bastit, 
Suggestions sur les origines philosophiques de l'acte juridique, 71 REVUE 
FRANÇAISE DE THÉORIE JURIDIQUE [DROITS] 11 (1988). 
 115. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, Nos. 229–35; MARTIN DE 
LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, at 22–24. 
 116. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, Nos. 229–35; MARTIN DE 
LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, at 22–24. 
 117. Capitant’s notion of the primacy of the will had surpassed Savigny’s 
original definition of the Rechtsgeschäft. Under Capitant’s definition, all 
voluntary acts, including the German “quasi-juridical acts” and “material acts,” 




Doctrinal discourse of this very broad definition of acte juridique 
began in the 20th century when French118 and German119 civil law scholars 
challenged the French will theory. Inspired by German objectivists, these 
scholars advocated a more restrictive definition of the acte juridique.120 
The proposed definition, however, was considered too narrow and was 
rejected.121 A more intense debate, however, was sparked by an “outsider,” 
the public law scholar Léon Duguit, who, also inspired by the German 
objectivists,122 questioned the validity of the entire premise of the French 
theory of droit subjectif.123 Duguit also turned his attention to the acte 
juridique. He expanded the notion of acte juridique to include acts of the 
government that were regulated under public law.124 French civilians 
 
would qualify as actes juridiques. Under Savigny’s definition, these acts would 
not qualify as Rechtsgeschäfte. See SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, at 5.  
 118. See EMMANUEL GOUNOT, LE PRINCIPE DE L’AUTONOMIE DE LA VOLONTÉ 
EN DROIT PRIVÉ (1912). 
 119. See RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLONTÉ (1901). 
 120. See GOUNOT, supra note 118, at 240–48 (arguing that an acte juridique 
should be confined to situations where the will of the maker intended all the legal 
consequences of the act). 
 121. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 272–73; MARTIN DE LA 
MOUTTE, supra note 112, at 24–26; Solange Becqué-Ickowicz, Sources des 
obligations – Actes et faits juridiques No. 10, JurisClasseur Civil, Art. 1100 à 1100-
2, Fascicule 10, Jun. 26, 2018 (accessed July 23, 2019); Brenner, supra note 37, No. 
65; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 370–75. 
 122. In particular, Duguit was heavily influenced by the later works of Jhering. 
See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 277; GORDLEY, supra note 40, at 163. 
 123. In short, Duguit argued that the term droit subjectif (private right) was an 
invalid logical proposition because it relied too heavily on the will. In its place, 
Duguit advocated his objective theory of situation juridique (juridical situation), 
that is, the relationship of a person not with another person or thing, but with the 
law. See LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ 
DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLÉON, 82–113 (1912); GHESTIN & GOUBEAUX, supra note 
60, No. 168. The Austrian jurist Kelsen also advocated in favor of an objective 
alternative to droit subjectif. See Hans Kelsen, What Is a Legal Act, 29 AM. J. 
JURIS. 199 (1984); GHESTIN & GOUBEAUX, supra note 60, No. 169. These theories 
also manifested themselves in the law of obligations. See LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 48, 66–71 (discussing the “objective theory of 
obligations”). See also infra notes 416–17.  
 124. Duguit put forward three categories of acts: (1) subjective acts (actes 
subjectives) that create or modify legal relations mostly of a patrimonial nature 
(e.g., contracts); (2) acts-conditions (actes-conditions) that are made within a 
certain recognized legal institution (e.g., acts within the institution of family, such 
as marriage and adoption); and (3) acts-rules (actes-règles) that are acts of 
government. These acts may have an indefinite number of recipients, such as 




immediately reacted to and, for the most part, rejected Duguit’s intrusive 
theory.125 This discourse, however, inadvertently led to a more elaborate 
French theory of acte juridique.126 
Contrary to the German discourse, the French debate did not focus on 
the validity or necessity of the acte juridique. This is so because the “will 
theory” remained largely undisputed in French civilian doctrine. Instead, 
the distinction between acte juridique and fait juridique was at the 
epicenter of the discourse.127 Capitant’s original definition led to a very 
broad acte juridique, tantamount to the law itself.128 Conversely, the 
objectivists had proposed a restrictive definition that encroached on the 
autonomy of the will.129 As a product of this debate, French doctrine 
formulated a distinction between acte juridique and fait juridique that 
remains classic.130 
The distinction relies on the role of the will in the ensuing legal 
consequences of an act or event. In an acte juridique, the legal 
consequences of an act ensue because the maker so intended. According 
to the prevailing view, the will can be directed to legal or actual 
 
legislation and ordinances; they may also be addressed to a particular citizen, like a 
license issued to a particular person or a fine imposed on a particular person. Acts-
rules also appear in private transactions, as is the case of predetermined contracts 
(adhesion contracts). See DUGUIT, supra note 123, at 82–113; Brenner, supra note 
37, Nos. 205–17; HAUSER, supra note 66, at 56–60. These categories transcended 
the strict private–public law boundary of French doctrine and were perceived as an 
invasion by French civil law scholars. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 24. 
Indeed, under modern civil law, juridical acts are manifestations of will of a person 
acting in her private capacity. “Acts” of branches of government (e.g., judgments, 
laws, or executive orders) are not juridical acts. See infra note 242.  
 125. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 343–46; 4 FRANÇOIS GÉNY, 
SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF 198–213 (1924). 
 126. See, e.g., JEAN BRETHE DE LA GRESSAYE & MARCEL LABORDE-LACOSTE, 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE À L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT No. 215 (1947). 
 127. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 14–15. 
 128. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 255, 513 (arguing that under this 
broad definition a maker of a juridical act becomes a legislator). Several 
commentators caution against the absolute primacy of voluntarism, arguing that 
the effectiveness of the juridical act is based on individual as well as societal 
considerations. See Grzegorczyk, supra note 104, at 50; Brenner, supra note 37, 
No. 68; DEMOGUE, supra note 113, No. 15. 
 129. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 23–24. 
 130. See id. at 13–15. 




consequences,131 so long as these legal consequences are triggered.132 
Conversely, in a fait juridique, the legal consequence attaches 
independently of a person’s will.133 Therefore, if the person’s will is either 
irrelevant or absent, there is no acte juridique—there is always a fait 
juridique. Contrary to the German theory, there is no intermediary 
category of “quasi-juridical acts” or “material acts.”134 A legally relevant 
act or event (that is, an operative fact) will either be an acte juridique or a 
fait juridique. As clear and straightforward as this proposition seems, 
French scholars have struggled with the delineation of these two opposing 
categories.135 
In reaction to the objectivists, the French scholar Martin de la Moutte 
proposed a three-prong test to determine whether an act qualified as an 
 
 131. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 10; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, 
No. 9. This prevailing view was not universally accepted. For instance, the French 
scholar Demogue observes that: 
[When] [w]e want to hold a certain object, [or when] we want to live in 
a certain house, the legal aspect appears only incidentally in thought. If 
we were questioned, we would add I want to have these things in full 
ownership, that is to say, to have a right, but of one’s self one does not 
think about it [in a legal sense]. We must therefore define the juridical 
act: that in which the social goal pursued agrees with an individual will.  
DEMOGUE, supra note 113, No. 13 (emphasis added). Demogue’s comment 
closely resembles the criticism voiced by the German objectivists. See supra note 
74 and accompanying text. Demogue’s views were criticized as “lacking in legal 
technique” and “haunted by the social aspect of law, following the tendency of 
public law scholars.” BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 320. See also FRANÇOIS 
TERRÉ, L’INFLUENCE DE LA VOLONTÉ INDIVIDUELLE SUR LES QUALIFICATIONS, at 
190–95 (1957) [hereinafter TERRÉ, QUALIFICATIONS] (discussing the several 
other interpretations of the prevailing view). Nevertheless, modern scholars agree 
that under the doctrine of cause, a practical purpose for a transaction (e.g., 
purchasing groceries to consume) justifies the legal effect of the transaction. See 
PETROPOULOS, supra note 36, at 508–09; see also infra note 431. 
 132. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 272–73.  
 133. See MICHEL STORCK, ESSAI SUR LE MÉCANISME DE LA REPRÉSENTATION 
DANS LES ACTES JURIDIQUES 21–22 (1982). 
 134. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 14–15. 
 135. See Grzegorczyk, supra note 104, at 47–57; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 
21-24; Benoît Moore, De l’acte et du fait juridique ou d’un critère de distinction 
incertain, 31 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS, 277 (1997); HAUSER, supra note 66, at 
19–20 (admitting that the distinction is oftentimes fictitious). To paraphrase a 
quote from one eminent authority, words such as “fait” or “chose” are among “the 
vaguest in the French language.” 2 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, LES BIENS, 
LES OBLIGATIONS, No. 1172 (reprt. and rev. 2d ed. 2017) (22d ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter CARBONNIER II]; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 33.  




acte juridique: (1) there must be a manifestation of will that provokes legal 
effects; (2) the maker of the act must desire these legal effects; and (3) the 
will of the maker is the absolutely necessary condition for the production 
of these legal effects.136 Anything short of this definition would not be an 
acte juridique, but a fait juridique.137 Fait juridique, therefore, is a residual 
category of operative facts. This test has been widely accepted in French 
doctrine.138 
Nevertheless, identifying the precise boundaries between acte 
juridique and fait juridique has not been an easy task for French scholars. 
In fact, based on the above test, French doctrine has mischaracterized 
certain acts as faits juridiques and has failed to explain the characterization 
of other acts as actes juridiques. A brief comparative excursus might 
illustrate this point. As mentioned, the intermediate German category of 
“quasi-juridical acts” is unknown in French doctrine. Thus, acts that under 
German doctrine would qualify as “quasi-juridical” must fall under the 
category of either acte juridique or fait juridique in France.139 For 
example, in Germany, putting in default140 is classified as a “quasi-
juridical act” because the obligee is primarily interested in an actual 
result—payment by the obligor. The same act does entail several other 
legal consequences—for example, accrual of legal interest or shifting of 
risk from obligee to obligor. These consequences, however, are incidental 
and occur regardless of the obligee’s intention.141 French scholars, based 
on the abovementioned test, characterize putting in default as an acte 
juridique,142 even though this act entails several legal consequences that 
are not necessarily desired or intended. On the other hand, establishment 
of voluntary domicile,143 which is a “quasi-juridical act” under the German 
 
 136. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, at 26–27.  
 137. Id.  
 138. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 273 n.1; Moore, supra note 
135, at 292–95. 
 139. On the contrary, all “material acts” of the German law correctly fall under 
the category of fait juridique because the provisions on juridical acts do not apply 
here. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 64–65. 
 140. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1989–93 (2019). 
 141. See MANIGK, supra note 76, at 726–29; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 48, 
at 108–12; FLUME, supra note 13, at 112–13; GEORGIOS BALIS, GENIKAI ARCHAI 
TOU ASTIKOU DIKAIOU [GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW] 106–07 (8th ed. 
1961); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447. 
 142. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 273; MARTIN DE LA 
MOUTTE, supra note 112, at 56. 
 143. “Voluntary domicile” refers to a domicile chosen by a person—a 
“domicile of choice.” Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 44 (2019). “Legal domicile,” on the 




approach,144 is considered by the prevailing view in French doctrine as a fait 
juridique because the legal effects take place regardless of the person’s 
intent.145 This view also seems flawed. If putting in default is considered an 
acte juridique even though it may give rise to several unintended legal 
consequences, then the establishment of voluntary domicile—which is a 
voluntary act par excellence—ought to be considered an acte juridique by 
even greater force. Furthermore, the prevailing French view fails to account 
for the fact that contractual capacity is required for putting in default and for 
establishment of voluntary domicile.146 It ought to follow, therefore, that 
voluntary establishment or change of domicile is a juridical act.147 
Be that as it may, the French acte juridique is a broader concept 
compared to the German Rechtsgeschäft because it includes certain acts 
that under German theory would qualify as “quasi-juridical acts.”148 
Conversely, the French category of fait juridique has no counterpart in 
German doctrine.149 Because French doctrine placed more focus on fixing 
the boundary between acte juridique and fait juridique rather than 
elaborating the very idea of the acte juridique, the French understanding 
of the concept is more practical and flexible rather than comprehensive 
and thorough.150 Furthermore, it should be noted that discussion of acte 
and fait juridique is usually confined to issues of sources of obligations,151 
 
other hand, refers to a domicile imposed by law, such as the domicile of minors 
and other incapables. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 41–43 (2019).  
 144. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 84.  
 145. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 273 n.1; MARTIN DE LA 
MOUTTE, supra note 112, at 28; GOUNOT, supra note 118, at 240–41; 
CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 167.  
 146. This debate, however, is of little practical importance because the law 
imposes a “legal domicile” on persons lacking legal capacity to establish domicile. 
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 41–43 (2019); PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 84–86. 
 147. See JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY & RODERICK A. MACDONALD, QUEBEC CIVIL 
LAW, AN INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW No. 141 (1993). See also 
Succession of Robert, 2 Rob. 427, 430–31 (La. 1842) (finding that capacity is 
required for establishment of voluntary domicile).  
 148. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 43–44. 
 149. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 268; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 
40; STARCK, supra note 112, Nos. 371–78; TERRÉ, QUALIFICATIONS, supra note 
131, at 189.  
 150. See, e.g., JEAN CARBONNIER, FLEXIBLE DROIT, TEXTES POUR UNE 
SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT SANS RIGUEUR 36 (5th ed. 1983) (describing the will of the 
maker of a juridical act as “that which is destined to introduce a human 
relationship into the sphere of law”).  
 151. For a thorough analysis of the French doctrine on the sources of 
obligations, see BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 281–307; Henri Mazeaud, 




even though it is theoretically understood that these concepts can give rise 
to other legal relationships as well.152 
Today, the concept of acte juridique is universally accepted in French 
doctrine.153 The term also appears frequently in the jurisprudence.154 More 
importantly—and departing from the usual legislative style of the French 
Civil Code155—as a result of the recent revision of the law of 
obligations,156 definitions of the terms acte juridique and fait juridique 
now appear in the French Civil Code—in new Title III of Book III on 
“sources of obligations.”157 In particular, article 1100-1 of the French Civil 
Code defines actes juridiques as “manifestations of will that are intended 
 
Essai de classification des obligations, 35 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 
1, 5–21 (1936). 
 152. For instance, in the law of successions and donations, succession can be 
either by juridical act (testate) or by juridical fact (intestate). See BONNECASE II, 
supra note 25, Nos. 270, 318; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 271–72. 
 153. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 7. Eminent French authorities had 
recognized the central importance of juridical acts in legal life. See 1 MARCEL 
PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, Nos. 255–56 (La. State L. Inst. trans., 1959) 
(12th ed. 1939) [hereinafter PLANIOL I] (stating that “juridical acts, their forms, their 
conditions, their effects are in themselves the principal object of the science of 
law”); CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, No. 229 (“Juridical acts . . . form 
the fabric of social life.”). Such statements, however, have been criticized as 
exaggerated statements that overlook the equal importance of juridical facts in 
transactional life. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 316–17. 
 154. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 6 (citing several French cases).  
 155. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 252; David W. 
Gruning, Codifying Civil Law: Principle and Practice, 51 LOY. L. REV. 57, 63–64 
(2005) (discussing the strong opposition of Portalis—the original drafter of the 
Code Napoléon—to the inclusion of doctrinal material in the Code). It is noteworthy 
that the German and Greek civil codes, although more verbose and heavily 
influenced by the Pandectists, do not contain definitions of juridical acts and facts.  
 156. For a detailed discussion of the recent 2016 revision of the French law of 
obligations, see Philippe Simler, Réforme du droit des obligations (Ord. No. 2016-
131, 10 févr. 2016), JurisClasseur Civil, Art. 1100 à 1386-1, Fascicule unique, 
Mar. 22, 2016 (accessed July 23, 2019).  
 157. The enactment of general provisions on the acte juridique, modeled after 
the provisions of the German Civil Code, had been envisaged in the past but failed. 
See 3 TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU CODE CIVIL 2–347 (1947–
48); Robert A. Pascal, Report on the French Civil Code Revision Project, 25 TUL. 
L. REV. 205, 208–10 (1951). Prior to the obligations revision, the term acte 
juridique had incidentally entered the French Civil Code but had not been defined. 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1326, 1328 (1980) (Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C. 
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1316-4 (2000) (Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] 
art. 1108-1 (2004) (Fr.). See supra note 97.  




to produce legal effects. They can be conventional or unilateral. Their 
validity and effects are governed, as appropriate, by the rules governing 
contracts.”158 Furthermore, article 1100-2 provides that “faits juridiques 
are conduct or events to which the law attaches consequences. Obligations 
arising from a fait juridique are governed, as the case may be, by the 
subtitle relating to extracontractual responsibility or the subtitle relating to 
other sources of obligations.”159 French commentators observe that these 
new provisions are of a didactic nature160 and faithful to the most classical 
conception of the acte and fait juridique.161 Some have also noticed that 
the placement of these definitions in the law of obligations is not 
doctrinally accurate.162 In any event, contrary to the German and Greek 
models, the French and Louisiana civil codes do not contain a 
comprehensive “general part” that would regulate general concepts such 
as juridical acts. As a result, actes juridiques are governed by the rules 
applicable to conventional obligations by default.163 
 
 158. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-1 (2016) (Fr.). See Matthieu 
Poumarède, La place de l'acte juridique dans les projets de réforme du droit des 
obligations, in METAMORPHOSES DE L’ACTE JURIDIQUE 11 (Marc Nicod ed., 2018).  
 159. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 (2016) (Fr.).  
 160. See Simler, supra note 156, Nos. 11–12; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 
121, Nos. 2, 6. According to the report delivered to the President of the Republic 
relative to revision of the law of obligations:  
[T]hese texts respond to a recurring demand expressed in the framework 
of the public consultation. They allow us to apply the traditional 
distinction between acte juridiques and faits juridiques . . . these notions 
of actes juridiques and faits juridiques are well known in doctrine and 
jurisprudence, and are widely used by legal practitioners, even if there 
may be controversy as to their exact definitions and contours . . . The 
introduction of these preliminary articles thus applies fundamental 
notions of the law of obligations and makes it possible to introduce in a 
pedagogical fashion the structure of Title III. 
Rapport au Président de la République, relatif à l’ordonnance No. 2016-131 du 10 
février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la prevue 
des obligations, available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTe 
xte=JORFTEXT000032004539&categorieLien=id [https://perma.cc/Z3Q7-PGKY] 
(2016) (July 23, 2019). 
 161. See Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 11. 
 162. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 7 (commenting on the legislative 
technique in the reform of the French law of obligations). 
 163. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (2019); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 
1100-1 ¶ 2 (2016) (Fr.); Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, Nos. 25-28; Bruno 
Petit & Sylvie Rouxel, Contrat – Définition du contrat et liberté contractuelle No. 
5, in JURISCLASSEUR CIVIL, Art. 1101 et 1102, Fascicule unique, Nov. 15, 2016 




The distinction of acte juridique and fait juridique remains 
important.164 This distinction is intended to cover all acts and events that 
produce legal consequences, that is, all operative facts.165 Thus, all lawful 
voluntary acts that produce intended legal consequences are actes 
juridiques.166 Everything else is a fait juridique,167 including all natural 
events that are legally significant,168 as well as all illicit169 and licit acts 
whose legal consequences were not intended.170 
From this overview of the French doctrine,171 it follows that the acte 
juridique expresses the principle of autonomy of the will, which is rooted 
deeply in the French legal tradition.172 Compared to the German theory of 
Rechtsgeschäft, the French doctrine of acte juridique is more practical, 
geared toward the binary classification of acte juridique and fait juridique. 
This simplicity, however, is achieved at the expense of a lack of a 
sophisticated, comprehensive, and conceptual theory.173 
 
(updated Nov. 27, 2018); JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOIN & PIERRE-GABRIEL JOBIN, LES 
OBLIGATIONS No. 46 (6th ed. 2005) (Quebec). 
 164. A similar classification appears in Anglo-American legal theory. See 
JOHN SALMOND, ON JURISPRUDENCE § 124 (G. Williams ed., 11th ed. 1957) 
(distinguishing between “acts in the law”—volitional acts having legal effects—
and “acts of the law”—legal effects by operation of law). 
 165. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 252, 312. These “operative facts” 
(referred to in French doctrine as “juridical facts in the broad sense”) are opposed 
to “inoperative facts” (also referred to as “facts purely material”), that is, facts that 
do not carry direct legal consequences. See AUBRY & RAU XII, supra note 113, § 
762, at 245 n.5. The term “operative facts” is used consistently in this Article. See 
supra note 113. 
 166. Examples include contracts and unilateral acts such as testaments and 
notices, among others. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 149; 
STARCK, supra note 112, Nos. 366–70. 
 167. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 163; CARBONNIER II, 
supra note 135, No. 1114; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 29.  
 168. Examples include birth, death, and fortuitous events. See STARCK, supra 
note 112, No. 372; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 360, 367. 
 169. Examples include delict and quasi-delict. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, 
supra note 106, No. 163; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 35.  
 170. Examples include enrichment without cause and negotiorum gestio. 
MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 163; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 30. 
Other examples from property law include possession and occupancy. Brenner, 
supra note 37, No. 31; STARCK, supra note 112, Nos. 373–76.  
 171. For a more detailed analysis of this topic, see Brenner, supra note 37; 
Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121.  
 172. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 47. 
 173. Thus, the classifications of actes juridiques in French doctrine lack 
precision. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 218 (admitting the lack of systematic 




A general depiction of the French system follows:174   
 
The French System 




C. Mixed Approaches and the Louisiana Juridical Act  
The German and French ideas discussed above traveled to other 
civilian jurisdictions as codification endeavors expanded during the 19th 
and 20th centuries.175 Despite noted hesitations of comparativists to group 
national legal systems into “legal families,”176 it would be natural here to 
assume that the civilian jurisdictions whose civil codes were influenced by 
 
accuracy in the well-known classification of actes juridiques into constitutive, 
declarative, and translative).  
 174. This diagram displays the very general categories of operative facts. It is 
not exhaustive. It is based on BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 312–17, 358, 
360, 366; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 300–12; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, 
supra note 37, Nos. 258–79. 
 175. For a more detailed discussion of the codification movement, see 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 43–58. 












- Other legal events




the German Civil Code177 received the Rechtsgeschäft theory, and those 
influenced by the Code Napoléon178 adopted the acte juridique theory. 
There are notable examples, however, of civil law jurisdictions that 
followed a somewhat mixed approach, receiving components from both 
theories. It is submitted that Louisiana is among these jurisdictions. Before 
the discussion turns to Louisiana, a few examples should establish this 
point. 
Italy, Spain, Argentina, the Netherlands, and Quebec are examples of 
jurisdictions whose original civil codes179 were modeled after the Code 
Napoléon.180 As the French had yet to codify the concept, these codes also 
made no direct reference to juridical act. Later influences from German 
legal doctrine, however, led to the development of comprehensive theories 
of juridical acts. These theories were influenced by the Rechtsgeschäft 
model, but they also maintained the French functional understanding of 
acte juridique. Thus, Italian scholars developed a theory of negozio 
giuridico—legal transaction (a subset of atto guiridico—legal act) that 
largely corresponds to the Rechtsgeschäft.181 The amended Italian Civil 
Code of 1942, departing slightly from the French tradition in many 
respects,182 provided in its article 1324 that the rules on conventional 
obligations apply to “unilateral acts inter vivos of a patrimonial nature.”183 
 
 177. Jurisdictions influenced by the German Civil Code, together with 
Germany, are part of the “Germanic Legal Family,” according to KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 132–79 (3d 
ed. 1998). See KISCHEL, supra note 176, at 201–02.  
 178. Jurisdictions influenced by the French Civil Code, together with France, 
are members of the “Romanistic Legal Family,” according to ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, 
supra note 177, at 74–131. See also YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra 
note 1, at 51–53 (discussing the dissemination of the Code Napoléon to other 
countries, including Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Greece); KISCHEL, supra 
note 176, at 524–27 (discussing the influence of the Code Napoléon on the 
Spanish Civil Code). 
 179. See CODICE CIVILE [C. C.] [CIVIL CODE] (1865) (It.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] 
[CIVIL CODE] (1889) (Spain); BURGERLIJK WETBOEK VAN 1838 [BW (OUD)] 
(1838) (Neth.). 
 180. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 51–53. 
 181. See BETTI, supra note 2, passim; John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style 
I: Doctrine, 18 STAN. L. REV. 39, 49–51 (1965) (discussing the basic principles 
of the Italian doctrine of juridical act). 
 182. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 52. 
 183. CODICE CIVILE [C. C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1324 (1942) (It.). See FLUME, 
supra note 13, at 30–31 (discussing the German influence on Italian legal doctrine 
concerning the Rechtsgeschäft). 




Likewise, Spanish scholars, influenced by German184 and Italian185 
sources, articulated a similar theory of negocio jurídico—legal transaction 
(a subset of the acto jurídico—legal act).186 Several jurisdictions 
influenced by the Spanish law espoused this theory. Most notably, an 
advanced theory of negocio jurídico is found in Puerto Rico187 and 
Argentina.188 A general regulation of legal transaction—Rechtshandeling—
according to the German model appeared in the 1992 revision of the Civil 
Code of the Netherlands.189 Quebec also represents a civilian jurisdiction of 
the French legal family with an advanced and elaborate doctrine of juridical 
 
 184. See KISCHEL, supra note 176, at 524–27 (discussing the German influence 
on Spanish legal doctrine and the Spanish translation of German legal treatises). 
 185. For instance, the seminal work of the Italian jurist Betti on juridical acts, 
see supra note 2, was translated into Spanish. See EMILIO BETTI, TEORÍA 
GENERAL DEL NEGOCIO JURÍDICO (A. Martín Pérez transl., 2d ed. 1959, reprt. 
2000) (2d ed. 1952).  
 186. See FEDERICO DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, EL NEGOCIO JURÍDICO §§ 19–23 
(1985) (Spain) (discussing the reception of the doctrine of the juridical act into 
Spanish legal doctrine). 
 187. See 1 EDUARDO VAZQUEZ BOTE, DERECHO CIVIL DE PUERTO RICO, 
VOLUMEN 2, PARTE GENERAL 115–507 (1972) (expounding a general theory of 
negocio jurídico in Puerto Rican law). 
 188. See, e.g., CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 944 (1871) (Arg.); 
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 978 (1882) (Arg.) (Frank Joannini 
trans., Boston 1917) (“Juridical acts are voluntary lawful acts, the immediate 
purpose of which is to establish between persons juridical relations, to create, 
modify, transfer, preserve or extinguish rights”); 1 ROBERTO H. BREBBIA, 
HECHOS Y ACTOS JURÍDICOS. COMMENTARIO DE LOS ARTÍCULOS 896 A 943 DEL 
CÓDIGO CIVIL. DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA (1979) (Arg.); 2 ROBERTO H. 
BREBBIA, HECHOS Y ACTOS JURÍDICOS. COMMENTARIO DE LOS ARTÍCULOS 944 A 
1065 DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL. DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA (1985) (Arg.). The same 
provision now appears in the new Argentine Civil Code. See CÓDIGO CIVIL Y 
COMMERCIAL DE LA NACION [CÓD. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 259 (2015) (Arg.), available at http://servicios.infoleg 
.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/235000-239999/235975/norma.htm#9 [https://per 
ma.cc/72HN-C7F3] (July 23, 2019). 
 189. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 3.32–3.59 (1992) (Neth.). 
See Arthur S. Hartkamp, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: A Survey of Its 
System and Contents, and Its Influence on Dutch Legal Practice, 35 LA. L. REV. 
1059, 1066–67 (1975); Martijn W. Hesselink, The Common Frame of Reference as 
a Source of European Private Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 919, 958 (2009) (discussing 
the inclusion of the juridical act in the revision of the Dutch Civil Code).  




act, both in private190 and public law.191 Jurisdictions influenced mostly by 
the German and partly by the French legal systems, such as Switzerland192 
and Greece,193 have developed their own theories of Rechtsgeschäft.194 
Lastly, the term “juridical act” appears in the European Draft Common 
Frame of Reference.195 It is evident from the above examples that modern 
 
 190. See 1 MAURICE TANCELIN, SOURCES DES OBLIGATIONS, L’ACTE JURIDIQUE 
LÉGITIME, Nos. 10.1, 356.1–394.9 (1993) [hereinafter TANCELIN, SOURCES]; 
MAURICE TANCELIN, DES OBLIGATIONS, CONTRAT ET RESPONSABILITÉ 177–80 
(1984) (introducing the theory of unilateral juridical acts to the legal doctrine of 
Quebec); BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, No. 44; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, 
supra note 147, No. 140. 
 191. See Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, S.Q. 1975, c. 12, art. 12 
(Can.) (“No one may, through discrimination, refuse to make a juridical act 
concerning goods or services ordinarily offered to the public.”); id. art. 13 (“No 
one may in a juridical act stipulate a clause involving discrimination. Such a 
clause is without effect.”). 
 192. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 56–57; 
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 177, at 167–79 (discussing the characteristic 
features of the Swiss codes). The redactors of the Swiss Code thought that an 
analytical general part would not solve any practical need and that the issues of 
legal definitions and theories ought to be left to legal doctrine. BONNECASE II, 
supra note 25, No. 363–65; HUBER, supra note 99, at 18–21.  
 193. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 52, 57–58 
(explaining the Roman, German, and French influences on the Greek legal 
system). For a discussion of the Greek theory of juridical act, see BALIS, supra 
note 141, §§ 32–66; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, §§ 28–50. 
 194. The terms “Rechtsgeschäft” and “acte juridique” appear frequently in the 
respective German and French versions of the Swiss Civil Code and Swiss Code 
of Obligations. See, e.g., SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB]. CODE 
CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE [CC] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 210, 
arts. 392, 418, 650 (Switz.); OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR], CODE DES OBLIGATIONS 
[CO], CODICE DELLE OBLIGAZIONI [CO] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] Mar. 30, 1911, 
SR 220, RS 220, arts. 34–39 (Switz.). 
 195. 1 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW, DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 125, 128–29 (Christian 
von Bar and Eric Clive eds., 2009) (defining a juridical act as “any statement or 
agreement, whether express or implied from conduct, which is intended to have 
legal effect as such. It may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.”); Tenenbaum 
et al., supra note 17, at 66–100. European scholars are divided as to the practical 
usefulness of this concept. See, e.g., Phillip Hellwege, Juridical Acts in the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference – A Model for Scotland, 18 EDINBURGH L. REV. 358 
(2014); Phillip Hellwege, Allgemeines Vertragsrecht und “Rechtsgeschäfts”-
lehre im Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), 211 ARCHIV FÜR DIE 
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 665 (2011) (arguing in favor of the inclusion of juridical 
act and fact in the Common Frame of Reference); contra Hesselink, supra note 




civil law systems have benefitted from a mixed approach that combines 
components of German and French theories of juridical act. Louisiana 
belongs to this category of mixed systems. 
Louisiana’s civil law system was originally influenced by French and 
earlier Spanish sources.196 The term “juridical act” does not appear in the 
Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870, although it is evident that 
Louisiana lawyers were familiar with the concept.197 Similar terms, such 
as “legal act,” appeared in the Civil Code.198 The Louisiana courts were 
also familiar with the notions of “legal act” and “legal transaction.”199 
More importantly, and departing slightly from the Code Napoléon, the 
 
189, at 968–70 (questioning the usefulness of a general notion of juridical act in 
the Common Frame of Reference); Nils Jansen & Reinhard Zimmermann, 
Contract Formation and Mistake in European Contract Law: A Genetic 
Comparison of Transactional Model Rules, 31 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 625, 629–32 
(2011) (explaining that several European jurisdictions are unfamiliar with the 
German concept of Rechtsgeschäft).   
 196. For a detailed discussion of the historical foundations of the Louisiana civil 
law system, see JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS AND HISTORY. 
LAW REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866), at 19–28, 39–80, 427–77 
(2015); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 59–90; RICHARD H. 
KILBOURNE, A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE. THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 
1803–1839 (1987). For a discussion of the debate regarding the early sources of 
Louisiana law, see A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Louisiana Law: 
Critical Appraisal of a Controversy 87–107, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 
(Edward F. Haas ed., 1983); Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French Connection and 
the Spanish Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of 
French Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067 (2003). See also 
John Randall Trahan, The Continuing Influence of le Droit Civil and el Derecho 
Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 1019 (2003).  
 197. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at vi–vii. 
 198. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE p. 88 art. 6 (1808) (“it is in that name that 
[corporations] must . . . do all their legal acts”) (emphasis added). The French term 
used in the code is “actes légaux.” See id. The same provision also appeared in the 
1825 and 1870 codes. LA. CIV. CODE art. 423 (1825); LA. CIV. CODE art. 432 (1870). 
 199. See, e.g., Succession of Woods, 30 La. Ann. 1002, 1004 (1878) 
(distinguishing between “legal act or pact, and . . . ‘délits or quasi délits’” as 
potential sources of obligations) (emphasis added); Pepper v. Dunlap, 16 La. 163 
(1840) (legal act of conventional mortgage); Boyle v. West, 107 La. 347 (1902) 
(invalid donation is not a legal act that can substantiate a petitory action); 
Succession of Spyker, 159 So. 347, 352 (Orleans Ct. App. 1935) (“An executor is 
bound by the legal acts of his predecessor, and cannot be heard to complain of a 
transaction legally consummated by him.”) (emphasis added); Bowlero et al. v. 
Allen, 205 So. 2d. 196, 197 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1967) (putting in default is a 
“juridical act or legal transaction”) (emphasis added).  




early Louisiana codes contained general rules governing legality200 of all 
acts and general legal capacity.201 Nevertheless, there was no developed 
concept of juridical act in the previous codifications. 
The term “juridical act”202 began to appear in the Louisiana Civil Code 
as a product of the revisions undertaken by the Louisiana State Law 
 
 200. The original provisions were articles 11 and 12 of the 1808 Digest. See LA. 
CIV. CODE p. 4 art. 11 (1808) (“Individuals cannot by their conventions, derogate 
from the force of laws made for the preservation of public order or good morals”) 
(emphasis added). It is noteworthy that the French text of article 11 uses the words 
“conventions particulières.” Id. A similar provision appears in the Code Napoléon. 
See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 6 (1804) (Fr.). See also LA. CIV. CODE 
p. 4 art. 12 (1808) (“The prohibiting laws import a nullity, though it be not formally 
expressed”). There is no counterpart of this provision in the Code Napoléon. An 
identical provision is found in Article IX of the Projet du Gouvernement—the draft 
of the Code Napoléon. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its 
Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 36 (1971). A second 
paragraph was added to article 11 in the 1825 codification. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
11 (1825) (“But in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited, they 
can renounce what the law has established in their favor, when the renunciation does 
not affect the right of others, and it is not contrary to the public good.”) The redactors 
explained this insertion: “This ancient maxim of law has been universally respected 
and always must be, were it not established by positive law; we propose it here as 
the complement of the article to which it relates.” 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET 
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, 2 (1937) (1823). Notably, article 12 was amended 
slightly in the 1825 code. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 12 (1825) (“Whatever is done in 
contravention of a prohibitory law, is void, although the nullity be not formally 
directed.”) (emphasis added). These provisions were maintained in the 1870 code. 
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 11–12 (1870). Louisiana scholars and courts applied these 
provisions to all legal transactions, including donations and negotiable instruments. 
See, e.g., Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1942) (void donation 
omnium bonorum); Boring v. La. State Ins. Co., 97 So. 856 (La. 1923); A. Lorenze 
Co. v. Penn-Louisiana Oil & Gas Co., 99 So. 586 (La. 1924) (illegal promissory 
note); Gibson v. Foster, 2 La. Ann. 503, 507–08 (1847) (tracing the sources of article 
12 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 to the Code of Justinian; see CODE JUST. 
1.14.5 (Constantine 439); cf. DIG. 1.3.11–41 (Julian, Digest 58 et al.)). 
 201. See LA. CIV. CODE p. 8 art. 2 (1808) (“Men are capable of all kinds of 
engagements and functions”) (emphasis added). The French text of this provision 
is: “les hommes sont capables de contracter toutes sortes d’engagements et 
d’exercer toutes sortes de fonctions.” Id. (emphasis added). This provision, 
establishing general legal capacity, was amended slightly and retained in the 
subsequent Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 25 (1825); LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 25 (1870) (“Men and women are capable of all kinds of functions 
and engagements”) (emphasis added). 
 202. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at vi (“In Louisiana we use the 
technical term juridical acts, a very literal translation of the French term for such 




Institute203 in the 1970s and 1980s.204 Two jurists, well versed in the civil 
and common law methodologies—Professors A.N. Yiannopoulos205 and 
Saúl Litvinoff206—chaired several revision committees. Under their 
direction, the term entered the Civil Code and the Louisiana legal 
vocabulary.207 More importantly, it is submitted here that the two jurists 
also planted the seed for a comprehensive modern Louisiana theory of 
juridical acts that combines the practicality of the French acte juridique 
and the systematic elaboration of the German Rechtsgeschäft. The most 
noteworthy of many examples from each jurist follow.  
Professor Yiannopoulos chaired the committees of the Louisiana State 
Law Institute that revised the Preliminary Title208 and Title I of Book I209 
of the Louisiana Civil Code. In this revision, the redactors inserted the 
term “juridical act” in the rules on legality and capacity noted above. In 
particular, revised article 7 now states that “[p]ersons may not by their 
juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public 
interest.”210 Further, articles 27 and 28 provide a complete system of 
 
events, actes juridiques. The term ‘juridical acts’ has the advantage over the term 
‘legal transactions’ that it cannot be confused with the Louisiana contract of 
transaction or compromise, which is an agreement to end a dispute. It has the 
disadvantage that it is not really English, but the same may be said of much of the 
language of our brethren at common law.”) The term “transaction” is given a 
narrower meaning in certain situations. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2602(11) 
(defining “transaction” specifically for the purposes of the Louisiana Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act (LUETA)).  
 203. See Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in 
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31 (2012) [hereinafter Moréteau, 
De Revolutionibus] (surveying the history of revisions of the Louisiana Civil Code). 
 204. See Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1109 n.103. 
 205. Festschrifts for A.N. Yiannopoulos are found in 73 TUL. L. REV. 1017–
1413 (1999); 92 TUL. L. REV. i–338 (2017); 78 LA. L. REV. 1101–1288 (2018); 
64 LOY. L. REV. 281–460 (2018).  
 206. See ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAÚL LITVINOFF (Olivier Moréteau et al. eds., 2008). 
 207. Actually, the term “juridical act” first appeared in the property law 
revision of 1977. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (1976) (“Usufruct may be 
established by a juridical act inter vivos or mortis causa, or by operation of law. 
The usufruct created by juridical act is called conventional; the usufruct created 
by operation of law is called legal.”) (emphasis added). La. Acts 1976, No. 103, 
§ 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1977. See Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1109 n.103. 
 208. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1–14 (1987); La. Acts 1987, No. 124, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988. 
 209. Entitled “Natural and Juridical Persons.” LA. CIV. CODE arts. 24–31 
(1987); La. Acts 1987, No. 125 § 1, eff. Jan 1, 1988. 
 210. LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (1987) (emphasis added). As the revision comments 
note, “This provision is based on Articles 11 and 12 of the Louisiana Civil Code 
of 1870. It does not change the law.” Id. cmt. a. 




general legal capacity211 and capacity to make juridical acts.212 Thus, 
following the model of the German and Greek civil codes, general rules 
on capacity and legality governing all juridical acts now exist in Book I of 
the Louisiana Civil Code. Furthermore, the term “juridical act” appears 
regularly in Book II on property law, which was also revised under the 
chairmanship of Professor Yiannopoulos.213 In his book on the Louisiana 
civil law system, Professor Yiannopoulos discusses juridical acts based on 
the French model of acte juridique, but he also introduces several German 
concepts, such as the “quasi-juridical act,” the “material act,” and the 
classifications of juridical acts.214 In essence, Professor Yiannopoulos 
dispelled the French misconception that “juridical act” basically means 
“contract.” He has shown that it is a much broader concept that transcends 
contract law. At the same time, he wisely avoided importing obscure and 
complicated German concepts. The frequent appearance of the term 
“juridical act” in the revised provisions of the Civil Code and in his 
writings have impressed upon Louisiana lawyers a proper and systematic 
understanding of the term.  
Professor Litvinoff presided over several committees of the Louisiana 
State Law Institute, including the one charged with revising the laws of 
obligations in general and conventional obligations.215 In 1984—which is 
32 years before the similar revision of the French Civil Code216—the 
Louisiana Civil Code listed the sources of obligations in article 1757. This 
article states, “Obligations arise from contracts and other declarations of 
will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of 
 
 211. LA. CIV. CODE art. 27 (1987) (“All natural persons enjoy legal capacity 
to have rights and duties.”). The revision comments explain that this provision “is 
based on Article 33 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. It does not change the 
law.” Id. cmt. a. 
 212. LA. CIV. CODE art. 28 (1987) (“A natural person who has reached 
majority has capacity to make all sorts of juridical acts, unless otherwise provided 
by legislation.”). According to the revision comments, this provision “is based on 
Article 1782 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and on Articles 1918 and 1922 
of the same Code, as revised in 1984. It does not change the law.” Id. cmt. a. 
 213. The term “juridical act” first appeared in the property law revision of 
1977. See supra note 207. 
 214. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–81. 
 215. LA CIV. CODE arts. 1756–2057 (1984). La. Acts 1984, No. 331, § 1, eff. 
Jan 1, 1985. 
 216. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100 (2016) (Fr.) (“Obligations 
arise from juridical acts, juridical facts, or by the sole authority of the law. 
[Obligations] can arise by the voluntary performance or the promise of 
performance of a moral duty toward another.”); Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1757, 
1760 (1984). 




will, in instances such as wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of 
another, unjust enrichment and other acts or facts.”217 Furthermore, 
pursuant to article 1917, the general rules of contracts apply by analogy to 
other juridical acts,218 an approach also followed in Italy.219 Most notably, 
Professor Litvinoff’s scholarship on juridical acts is extensive and 
formative. Drawing from civilian sources and also from Anglo-American 
legal theory, he presented the concept of what he and his co-author W. 
Thomas Tête referred to as the “Louisiana Legal Transaction.”220 
Professor Litvinoff’s work helped dismiss another French misconception 
that the distinction between juridical act and fact primarily concerns the 
law of conventional obligations. While importing certain German and 
common law ideas, he was careful to maintain the practicality and 
simplicity of the French approach. At the same time, through his writings, 
he underlined the usefulness of general principles of Louisiana civil law. 
Today, the term “juridical act” appears throughout the text and 
revision comments of the Louisiana Civil Code,221 and courts often refer 
 
 217. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (1984) (emphasis added). See LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 1.6; Cf. CODICE CIVILE [C. C.] [CIVIL 
CODE] art. 1173 (1942) (It.) (“Obligations derive from a contract, from an 
unlawful act, or from any other act or fact which is capable of producing them in 
accordance with the legal system.”). See Tenenbaum et al., supra note 17, at 78. 
 218. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (1984) (“The rules of this title are applicable 
also to obligations that arise from sources other than contract to the extent that 
those rules are compatible with the nature of those obligations.”) As the revision 
comments explain, “Under the article, the general rules of contracts are applicable 
to declarations of will contained in unilateral acts.”). Id. cmt. b (emphasis added). 
 219. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 cmt. d (1984) (citing to Article 1324 of the 
Italian Civil Code of 1942). Cf. CODICE CIVILE [C. C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1324 
(1942) (It.). See supra note 183. 
 220. LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2.  
 221. Today, the term “juridical act” appears in LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (1987) 
(laws for the preservation of public interest); id. art. 27 cmt. b (1987) (general 
legal capacity); id. art. 28 (1987) (capacity to make juridical acts); id. art. 49 
(1990) (legal capacity of absent persons); id. art. 195 cmt. e (2005) (presumption 
of paternity by marriage and acknowledgment); id. art. 213 cmt. b (2008) (adult 
adoption); id. art. 222 cmt. a (2015) (parental authority—representation of minor) 
id. art. 359 cmt. (2018) (restriction on legal capacity—continuing or permanent 
tutorship); id. art. 361 cmt. b (2018) (contest of decree restricting legal capacity); 
id. art. 366 cmt. h (2008) (judicial emancipation); id. art. 368 (2008) (limited 
emancipation by authentic act); id. art. 371 (2008) (modification or termination 
of limited emancipation by authentic act); id. art. 392 (2000) (curators for 
interdicts); id. art. 394 (2000) (pre-interdiction juridical acts); id. art. 395 (2000) 
(interdict’s capacity to make juridical acts); id. art. 463 cmts. b, d (1978) 
(component parts of land); id. art. 465 cmt. c (1978) (things incorporated into an 





immovable); id. art. 469 cmt. c (1978) (transfer or encumbrance of immovable); id. 
art. 492 (1979) (separate ownership of part of a building); id. art. 493 cmt. c (1984, 
rev. 2003) (ownership of improvements); id. art. 495 (1979) (things incorporated in, 
or attached to, an immovable with the owner’s consent); id. art. 517 cmt. c (1979) 
(voluntary transfer of immovables); id. art. 544 (1976) (methods of establishing 
usufruct); id. art. 546 cmt. b (1976) (successive usufructs); id. art. 551 (1976) 
(fruits); id. art. 588 cmt. b (2010) (discharge of debt on encumbered property; 
usufruct inter vivos); id. art. 631 cmts. b, c (1976) (establishment and extinction of 
habitation); id. art. 639 cmt. b (1976) (right of use); id. art. 651 cmts. b, f (1977) 
(obligations of servient estate owner); id. art. 654 (1977) (kinds of predial 
servitudes); id. art. 697 cmt. b (1977) (right to establish predial servitudes); id. art. 
708 cmts. c, d (1977) (establishment of predial servitude); id. art. 709 cmt. c (1977) 
(establishment of predial servitude by mandatary); id. art. 722 (1977) (modes of 
establishment of predial servitudes); id. art. 731 cmt. b (1977) (charge expressly for 
benefit of estate); id. art. 740 cmt. b (1977) (acquisition of servitudes); id. art. 742 
cmt. e (1977) (acquisitive prescription of apparent servitudes); id. art. 775 cmt. d 
(1977) (building restrictions); id. art. 776 (1977) (establishment of building 
restrictions); id. art. 783 cmt. c (1977) (interpretation and application of building 
restrictions); id. art. 797 (1990) (ownership in indivision); id. art. 807 (1990) (right 
to partition; exclusion by agreement); id. art. 1609 (1997) (revocation of juridical 
act prior to testator’s death); id. art. 1767 cmt. d (1984) (suspensive and resolutory 
conditions); id. art. 1781 cmt. b (1984) (performance before end of term); id. art. 
1880 cmt. b (1984) (novation not presumed); id. art. 1918 cmt. a (1984) (contractual 
capacity); id. art. 1919 cmts. b, d (1984) (rescission of contract for incapacity); id. 
art. 1925 cmts. c, d (1984) (capacity of non-interdicted person deprived of reason); 
id. art. 1988 cmt. (1984) (judgment may stand for act); id. art. 2026 cmt. c (1984) 
(absolute simulation); id. art. 2045 cmt. b (1984) (determination of the intent of the 
parties); id. art. 2292 cmt. b (1995) (negotiorum gestio); id. art. 2297 cmt. b (1995) 
(obligations of the owner in negotiorum gestio); id. art. 2298 (enrichment without 
cause); id. art. 2347 cmt. c (1979) (alienation of community property); id. art. 2369.1 
(1990) (application of co-ownership provisions to former community property); id. 
art. 2781 cmt. b (2012) (annuity for life or time period); id. art. 2783 (2012) 
(assignable and heritable rights and obligations in annuity contract); id. art. 2787 
cmt. d (2012) (annuity charge); id. art. 2790 cmt. b (2012) (annuity charge); id. art. 
2985 (1997) (representation); id. art. 2987 (1997) (procuration); id. art. 2986 (1997) 
(authority of representative); id. art. 2988 cmt. (1977) (applicability of rules on 
mandate to representation); id. art. 2989 cmts. b, d, e (1997) (mandate); id. art. 3431 
cmt. d (1982) (civil possession); id. art. 3471 (1982) (limits of contractual freedom 
in prescription); id. art. 3483 (1982) (just title); id. art. 3484 cmt. d (just title to 
undivided part of immovable); id. arts. 3505, 3505.2 (2013) (acts extending 
liberative prescription); id. art. 3515 cmt. c (1991) (general and residual choice-of-
law rule); id. art. 3519 cmt. a (1991) (law applicable to status of natural persons); 
id. art. 3531 cmt. a (1991) (law applicable to interpretation of testaments); id. art. 
3535 cmt. b (1991) (law applicable to real rights in immovables); id. art. 3536 cmt. 
b (1991) (law applicable to real rights in corporeal movables); id. art. 3537 cmt. b 




to this term.222 As noted, contemporary Louisiana doctrine follows a mixed 
approach as to juridical acts. On the one hand, it has maintained the basic 
structure of acte juridique that it inherited from France. On the other hand, 
an elaborate and detailed reference to juridical acts appears routinely in 
the code and the jurisprudence. In this respect, Louisiana doctrine has 
moved closer to jurisdictions like Greece, Italy, Puerto Rico, and 
Argentina.223 Nevertheless, the lack of a comprehensive general theory of 
juridical acts leaves lawyers, judges, and law students with little or no 
guidance as to the precise meaning and function of this term of art.224 
Furthermore, the concept of juridical fact remains undeveloped in 
Louisiana doctrine.225 The need thus arises for a general Louisiana theory 
of juridical acts.226 The basic components of this theory are presented in 
Part II of this Article.  
 
(1991) (general choice-of-law rule for conventional obligations); id. art. 3540 cmt. 
b (1991) (party autonomy); id. art. 3541 (1991) (law applicable to other juridical 
acts and quasi-contractual obligations).  
 222. See Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation 
and Retranslation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223, 237 (2016) (explaining that the term 
“juridical act” “follow[s] the civilian tradition, and clearly demonstrate[s] 
Louisiana’s civil law roots.”). 
 223. See, e.g., Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana 
and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103 (2009) (comparatively surveying 
completed and ongoing recodifications in Louisiana and Latin America).  
 224. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at vii (explaining the practical value 
of studying a general theory of juridical acts). Cf. SOLANGE MIRABAIL, LA 
RÉTRACTATION EN DROIT PRIVÉ FRANÇAIS 17–40 (1997) (discussing the varying 
definitions of acte juridique and the difficulties in understanding this concept). 
 225. Notably, a definition of juridical act only appears in the revision 
comments to the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 395 cmt. b (2001) 
(“A juridical act is a lawful volitional act intended to have legal consequences. It 
may be a unilateral act, such as an affidavit, or a bilateral act, such as a contract. 
It may be onerous or gratuitous.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 492 cmt. b (1980) (“A 
juridical act is a manifestation of will intended to have legal consequences.”); LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3471 cmt. c (1983) (“A juridical act is a lawful volitional act 
intended to have legal consequences. It may be a unilateral act, such as an 
affidavit, or a bilateral act, such as contract. It may be onerous or gratuitous.”); cf. 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1100-1 (2016) (Fr.). 
 226. When introducing their discussion of this theory, Litvinoff and Tête 
noted:  
Through an examination of the theory of Louisiana juridical acts it is 
hoped that the student will learn two things. First, he should learn 
something of the substantive law of Louisiana, since a good deal of it 
will be discussed in connection with legal transactions. Second, through 
learning the principles of juridical acts he may develop some idea of the 




II. COMPONENTS OF A LOUISIANA GENERAL THEORY OF JURIDICAL 
ACTS  
The general notion of a juridical act is uniform across civil law 
systems. It is predicated on the idea that any change in a person’s legal 
position—which includes the acquisition, exercise, modification, transfer, 
or loss of a right—is produced either by that person’s lawful volitional act 
(juridical act) or directly by operation of law (juridical fact).227 This idea 
is not novel in France and Louisiana. For historical reasons discussed 
above, however, the idea of juridical acts has been unduly limited to the 
law of obligations.228 Under this approach, juridical acts are mostly 
perceived as a source of conventional obligations, whereas juridical facts 
give rise to delictual and other legal obligations.229 In short, “juridical act” 
basically means contract. And when it is something other than contract 
(for example, testament), then the rules of contract law230 still apply by 
analogy.231 “Juridical fact” refers to tort and quasi-contracts.232 This 
approach is a half-truth for two reasons. First, it is an inaccurate depiction 
of the sources of obligations. As one eminent comparativist very aptly 
 
technique by which specific rules in the Civil Code may be generalized 
into principles applicable to situations not directly covered by those 
rules, and reapplied in new cases, for it is in that manner that a civil code 
provides the living law of a people. 
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at vii.  
 227. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (2019); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] 
art. 1100 (2016) (Fr.). 
 230. Thus, the law of obligations applies by analogy to juridical acts. This 
includes primarily the rules on conventional obligations—requirements for a valid 
contract (capacity, consent, cause, and object), categories and formation of 
contract, vices of consent, interpretation, and nullities. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
1906–2057 (2019) (Book III, Title IV on “Conventional Obligations”). It also 
includes the rules on obligations in general—sources, categories, proof, transfer, 
and extinction of obligations. See id. arts. 1756–1905 (Book III, Title III on 
“Obligations in General”). 
 231. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (2019). Although the text of this provision 
calls for the analogous application of the rules of Title IV (conventional 
obligations), it should follow that the law of obligations in its entirety—including 
the principles of obligations in general—applies as the default rule to all kinds of 
juridical acts. See id. cmt. a. The same approach is followed in France and Italy. 
See id. cmt. c.  
 232. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (2019). See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, § 1.6 (explaining that juridical acts and facts extend 
beyond the realm of contract law). 




observed, the law of obligations is built on three traditional pillars—
contract, tort, and restitution or restoration—to which a fourth pillar may 
be added, reliance.233 Second, juridical acts and facts generate and modify 
all rights, real and personal; thus, the theory of juridical acts transcends 
the law of obligations.234  
Currently, the term “juridical act” is an established term of art in 
Louisiana law and legal practice. Juridical acts and facts permeate the 
Louisiana Civil Code and defy the Code’s tripartite structure.235 A juridical 
act can take the form of a contract, testament, renunciation of succession, 
adoption of a child, or notification, just to name a few examples.236 The 
category of juridical facts is vast, ranging from birth to death of a person 
and including numerous operative facts in between.237 All of these 
operative facts give rise to real and personal rights.238 Essentially, the 
Louisiana Civil Code, although faithful to the French tripartite model, has 
accepted useful transplants from other civil law and common law 
systems.239 This Article asserts that the frequent use of the term “juridical 
act” in Louisiana law is a transplant from the German theory of 
Rechtsgeschäft. Nevertheless, further elaboration on the notion and 
function of juridical acts and facts is not found in the Louisiana Civil Code. 
This task is left to civil law doctrine.  
 
 233. See Olivier Moréteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone Between Contract and 
Tort: The Role of Estoppel and Reliance in Mapping Out the Law of Obligations, 
in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004, at 60 (H. Koziol & B. Steininger eds., 2005). 
 234. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447. 
 235. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447. 
 236. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447. 
 237. Some facts become operative according to the circumstances. Death of a 
person, for instance, becomes an operative fact for the purposes of the law of 
successions or for bringing a wrongful death action. A strike of lightning or an 
earthquake can be operative facts when seen as fortuitous events making 
performance of a contract impossible. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38; 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–48. 
 238. NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, 
supra note 1, at 447–48. 
 239. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative 
Essay, 78 TUL. L. REV. 379 (2003) (discussing the revisions to the Louisiana Civil 
Code and their derivation); Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 203, at 31 
(surveying the history of revisions of the Louisiana Civil Code). Cf. Moréteau, 
Reflection, supra note 23, at 1139 (discussing several comparative codal drafting 
techniques). 




Thus, a general and comprehensive theory of juridical acts is useful 
because it presents the vast category of operative facts in a more 
intelligible way than the Louisiana Civil Code.240 This theory starts with a 
proper understanding of the term “juridical act” with reference to its place 
in the world of operative facts and its structure.241 The analysis then turns 
to the several categories of juridical acts that have been proposed by 
civilian doctrine in France, Germany, and Greece. Lastly, this theory fixes 
the boundary between juridical act and fact—a task that still bedevils 
French legal doctrine. As a mixed theory, the Louisiana theory of juridical 
acts is traditionally based on the French theory of acte juridique, which 
should be maintained as the primary theory. Indeed, the French binary 
system of acte juridique and fait juridique is noted for its simplicity and 
practicality. However, the French approach lacks the clarity and 
sophistication of the German approach. For this reason, several useful 
components—including methods of categorization of patrimonial juridical 
acts—are borrowed from the German theory of Rechtsgeschäft in order to 
craft the components of a workable Louisiana theory of juridical acts. 
 
 240. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at vii; NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37. 
 241. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 1.6; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 89, at 136 n.38. 




A. Juridical Acts as Operative Facts 
As a matter of civil law theory,242 most acts243 and events in everyday 
life are legally irrelevant, meaning that they produce no legal effect. These 
 
 242. This discussion, of course, does not involve issues of public law, although 
attempts have been made by French scholars to apply the theory of juridical acts in 
public law. See, e.g., DUGUIT, supra note 123, at 82–113. Under modern civil law, 
juridical acts are manifestations of will of a person acting in her private capacity. 
“Acts” of branches of government (e.g., judgments, laws, or executive orders) are 
governed by public law. See supra notes 123–24. Such “acts” are not juridical acts, 
although their structure resembles juridical acts. This resemblance in structure perhaps 
explains the similarity in the rules on interpretation of laws with the canons of 
construction of juridical acts. Compare LA. CIV. CODE arts. 9–13 (2019), with id. arts. 
2045–2057. See ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS. A PRÉCIS 113–17 (2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS] (discussing interpretation of contracts). This 
similarity, however, cannot be taken too far. Interpretation of a juridical act is the 
determination of the intent of the maker(s). LA. CIV. CODE art. 2045 (2019). 
Interpretation of the law primarily involves the search for the legislative intent. Pepper 
v. Triplet, 864 So. 2d 181 (La. 2004); Succession of Boyter, 756 So. 2d 1122 (La. 
2000); Cat’s Meow v. New Orleans, 720 So. 2d 1186, 1198 (La. 1998). Articles 10, 
12, and 13 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as supplemented by the indices of intent listed 
in LA. REV. STAT. § 24:177 (2019), furnish guidelines for the purposes of this search. 
See P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE LAW AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 2.2, 6.4, 7.2, 7.10, 7.11, in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (rev. 
2020). Likewise, judgments are not juridical acts, but they may stand for a juridical 
act for the purposes of specific performance of a conventional obligation. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 1988 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, 
at 85–86 (discussing various procedural devices for specific performance). Acts 
performed by litigants in the context of judicial proceedings (e.g., filing petitions or 
motions) are primarily governed by procedural law. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
arts. 682, 731 (2019) (requiring “procedural capacity” of the parties); FRANK L. 
MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4:3, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 
2008); Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 190–93. See also Jacques Héron, Réflexions sur 
l’acte juridique et le contrat à partir du droit privé, 71 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE THÉORIE 
JURIDIQUE [DROITS] 85 (1988) (arguing that procedural acts are unilateral juridical 
acts to which the general rules on juridical acts apply if there is a gap in procedural 
law); Fortin c. Chrétien, [2001] S.C.R. 500 (Can.) (characterizing a proceeding filed 
by a litigant as a juridical act, but noting several differences between such procedural 
acts and juridical acts of private law). See also State v. Pelas, 745 So. 2d 1215 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st Cir. 1999) (not excluding the possibility of a contract between the court and 
the defendant, provided such contract is proven and is not contrary to mandatory law). 
Procedural acts do entail private law consequences. For instance, filing suit for 
performance of an obligation interrupts liberative prescription and places the obligor 
in default. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1991, 3462 (2019). Certain acts require judicial 




acts and events are called “inoperative facts.”244 Some acts and events, 
however, are legally relevant—the civil law applies and legal 
consequences ensue.245 These are called “operative facts.”246 Operative 
 
authorization. See, e.g., id. art. 90B (marriage of collaterals by adoption); id. arts. 199–
214 (adoption); id. art. 967 (acceptance of succession by creditor); id. arts. 2355, 
2355.1, 2369.7 (exclusive management of community property). See also infra note 
343.  
 243. The term “act,” in its ordinary meaning, denotes a set of coordinated 
movements. In a more technical meaning, an act denotes a written instrument 
(instrumentum) executed by a person either privately—act under private 
signature—or before a notary and witnesses—authentic act. This instrument is 
usually a legal document memorializing a private agreement—e.g., a written 
contract—or achieving a public law function—e.g., a passport, certificate, or other 
legal document. In strictly legal terms, an act can be a legal act (negotium). A legal 
act is understood as a human act that entails legal consequences. For example, 
contracts are legal acts that can be made in writing, orally, or by action or inaction. 
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927 (2019). When a legal act is made in writing, negotium 
and instrumentum coexist. The substantive content of the contract is the legal act 
(negotium), whereas the paper on which it is written is the instrument 
(instrumentum). See POUND, supra note 33, at 409–12; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 
1–3; TANCELIN, SOURCES, supra note 190, at 17; JEAN LARGUIER, LA NOTION DE 
TITRE EN DROIT PRIVÉ Nos. 6–7 (1951); MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 258; 
RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, No. 560; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 2–3; 
PINEAU, supra note 37, at 15. 
 244. Frequently cited examples include friendly relations or simple everyday 
gestures. BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 139; FLUME, supra note 
13, at 82–83; BETTI, supra note 2, at 3–5. Inoperative facts are also known as 
“material facts” or “simple facts” in French doctrine. The term “inoperative facts” 
is borrowed from German theory and is deemed more precise. See VON TUHR I, 
supra note 10, § 48, at 103–05; see also supra notes 87 and 113. In a procedural 
context, a fact is opposed to law. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 25.  
 245. These legal consequences do not only concern the law of obligations, but 
also the civil law as a whole. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 41; BETTI, supra 
note 2, at 3–5. Thus, concubinage generally has no legal significance unless the 
law states otherwise. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 115 (2019). 
 246. French doctrine refers to these as “juridical facts in a broad sense.” 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 252; COLIN & CAPITANT I, supra note 112, No. 
73. Cf. BETTI, supra note 2, at 3–5; VITTORIO SCIALOJA, NEGOZI GIURIDICI Nos. 6–
14 (1933) (It.). The term “operative facts,” borrowed from German theory, is used 
consistently in this Article in order to avoid confusion with the French category of 
“juridical facts in the strict sense.” See POUND, supra note 33, at 411, 420; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 1.6; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 89, at 136 n.38; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 48, 
at 103–05. See supra notes 87 and 113. In the procedural context, a “cause of action” 
under the civil law refers to “the juridical or material fact which is the basis of the 




facts include acts that are voluntary, licit, and intended to produce legal 
consequences. In other words, the maker of such acts willfully and 
lawfully sets the civil law in motion;247 the civil law, in turn, causes such 
acts to produce the legal effects desired by the maker.248 These are juridical 
acts. All other operative facts are juridical facts.249 
Whether a fact is operative or inoperative is a question of law and may 
depend on events or human conduct, especially when such conduct is illicit. 
Death of a person, for instance, becomes an operative fact for the purposes 
of the law of successions or for bringing a wrongful death action.250 A strike 
of lightning or an earthquake can be operative facts when seen as fortuitous 
events making performance of a contract impossible.251 Juridical acts, 
however, present the unique feature that the law recognizes and enforces the 
intent of their maker through her licit acts.252 In other words, juridical facts 
 
right claimed, or the defense pleaded.” Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 
1976); Ryan et al. v. Gradison Trust, 504 So. 2d 844, 850 (La. 1987); Preis v. 
Standard Coffee Service Co., 545 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (La. 1989); 2 MARCEL 
PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, No. 54A (La. State L. Inst. trans., 1959) 
(11th ed. 1939) [hereinafter PLANIOL II]. 
 247. In other words, the maker of the act “effects a modification in the legal 
order.” CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 167. 
 248. See ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, A 
PRÉCIS 5 (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL]. Cf. 
CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, No. 230; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, 
No. 325. 
 249. See Schexnider v. McDermott Int’l Inc., 688 F. Supp. 234, 238 (W.D. La. 
1988) (defining juridical facts as “events having prescribed legal effects.”). See also 
LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 5–6. Juridical facts 
constitute a residual category that defies any further systematic classification. See 
NOOMAN M.K. GOMAA, THÉORIE DES SOURCES DE L’OBLIGATION, No. 236 (1968) 
(associating juridical facts with Gaius’s residual category of “various types of 
causes” as a source of obligations). Cf. DIG. 44.7.1 (Gaius, Aureorum 2). 
“Obligations arise either from contract or from [delict] or by some special right from 
various types of causes.” 4 THEODOR MOMMSEN & PAUL KRUEGER, THE DIGEST OF 
JUSTINIAN (Alan Watson trans., 1985) (emphasis added). See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] 
[CIVIL CODE] art. 1100 (2016) (Fr.) (“Obligations arise from juridical acts, juridical 
facts, or by the sole authority of the law. [Obligations] can arise by the voluntary 
performance or the promise of performance of a moral duty toward another.”); cf. 
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1757, 1760 (1984).  
 250. See POUND, supra note 33, at 410. 
 251. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–48. 
 252. See POUND, supra note 33, at 420–22. 




occur directly by operation of law,253 whereas juridical acts are given the 
force of law254 unless a mandatory law is violated.255 Juridical acts, 
therefore, are premised on the will of the maker and the act’s valid formation 
under law. If the juridical act is not properly structured, it will fail, and the 
law will not recognize its effect.256 Conversely, juridical facts do not fail 
because they apply by operation of law.257 Examination of the structure of a 
juridical act therefore becomes pertinent.   
B. Structure of Juridical Acts  
Contemporary civilian doctrine describes258 the juridical act as a 
licit259 volitional act—in the form of a manifestation of will—that is 
 
 253. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2019) (delict); id. art. 2292 
(negotiorum gestio); id. art. 2298 (enrichment without cause).  
 254. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2019) (“Contracts have the effect of law for 
the parties . . . .”); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 
79–80; cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1134 (1804) (Fr.).  
 255. Juridical acts can also displace suppletive rules of law. See, e.g., LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 875 (2019) (intestacy applies in default of a valid testament). 
 256. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 69, at 310–11 n.1 (cautioning the 
reader to resist the temptation of seeking a precise definition of juridical act); 1 
LOUIS JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF, No. 120 (3d ed. 1938); YVAINE 
BUFFELAN-LANORE, ESSAI SUR LA NOTION DE CADUCITÉ DES ACTES JURIDIQUES 
EN DROIT CIVIL 2–3 (1963) (discussing the several attempts made by scholars to 
define the concept of juridical act).  
 259. At first blush, the word “licit” here seems superfluous because the maker 
intends to produce legal consequences anyway. Technically, however, the word 
“licit” is necessary and precise. As Windscheid notes  
We should not say that the juridical act is merely a voluntary act intended 
to produce legal consequences. One could commit theft or battery 
intending to achieve the civil law consequences [of obtaining ownership 
of the stolen thing], or one could commit murder intending to inherit 
from his victim. These clearly are not juridical acts.  
WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 69, at 311 n.1a; see also MARTY & RAYNAUD I, 
supra note 106, at 272 (“For there to be a legal act, it is not enough that there is 
merely a voluntary act producing legal effects; this point is easily seen by 
reference to offenses, intentional injurious acts which give rise to legal effects in 
the form of civil liability; he who intentionally injures or kills others does a 
voluntary act which will have legal consequences. Obviously, however, this is not 
a juridical act, but a juridical fact: the legal result is independent of the will that 
led to the wrongful act.”). See also MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 258; 




intended to produce legal consequences.260 This description of juridical 
acts appears in the revision comments261 of the Louisiana Civil Code, to 
which some cases have cited.262 Admittedly, this description is not 
particularly insightful.263 Further commentary into the structure and types 
of juridical acts is necessary to understand this concept. 
From the above description, two elements of juridical acts are 
discerned—licit volitional act and legal consequences.264 The element of 
licit volitional act, described as manifestation of will, refers to the maker 
of the act265—her capacity to make the act and her consent to the ensuing 
 
MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, No. 17; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, 
supra note 147, No. 141.  
 260. See also Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1110 (adopting a 
similar description). This description also appears in French doctrine. See, e.g., 
FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, at 67. 
 261. LA. CIV. CODE art. 395 cmt. b (2001) (“A juridical act is a lawful 
volitional act intended to have legal consequences. It may be a unilateral act, such 
as an affidavit, or a bilateral act, such as a contract. It may be onerous or 
gratuitous.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 492 cmt. b (1980) (“A juridical act is a 
manifestation of will intended to have legal consequences.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 
3471 cmt. c (1983) (“A juridical act is a lawful volitional act intended to have 
legal consequences. It may be a unilateral act, such as an affidavit, or a bilateral 
act, such as contract. It may be onerous or gratuitous.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 
cmt. b (1983) (“a just title is a juridical act, that is, a licit act intended to have legal 
consequences.”); cf. Juridical Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(“Civil law. A lawful volitional act intended to have legal consequences.”).  
 262. See, e.g., Nature Conservancy v. Upland Properties, 48 So. 3d 1257, 1261 
n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010); Interdiction of Hymel, 833 So. 2d 482, 485 (La. 
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2002) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 395 cmt. b); St. John the Baptist 
Parish, et al. v. Louisiana Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, 943 So. 2d 1209, 1213 
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2006) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3471 cmt. c); Succession 
of Crute, 226 So. 3d 1161, 1173 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017) (citing Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). 
 263. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 53–54. 
 264. See id. at 79–82; BUFFELAN-LANORE, supra note 258, at 4–5; HEINRICH 
LEHMAN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES § 24, at 106–
08 (1947); GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 54; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 
147, No. 141. 
 265. The maker is a person in the legal sense, that is, a natural or juridical 
person. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 1–54 
(discussing the concept of legal personality). The maker is acting as a private 
person. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. c (2019) (discussing the dual personality 
of the state and its political subdivisions as public or private persons). See supra 
note 242. 




legal consequences.266 It also refers to the content of the act, which must 
be lawful and is sometimes subject to interpretation, formalities, and proof. 
The legal consequences refer to the object of the act.267 Usually, the 
desired legal consequences involve the acquisition, exercise, modification, 
or transfer of a right, or, more generally, a legal relationship or situation. 
Furthermore, especially in the case of patrimonial acts, the civilian 
doctrine of cause applies, pursuant to which a lawful reason must exist for 
a valid disposition of wealth.268 The legal consequences stemming from 
the act usually apply only to the makers of the act; in some cases, however, 
these legal consequences may also affect the rights of third parties.269 
An examination of these elements follows. It should be noted at the 
outset that this discussion refers to juridical acts in general. Special rules 
that apply to specific types of juridical acts—for example, donations and 
marriage—are mentioned in passing. The general discussion that follows 
will also not focus separately on issues of validity and perfection of certain 
juridical acts, for which more specific rules apply.270 
 
 266. See GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 49. 
 267. See LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 24, at 106–08. 
 268. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1966, 1967 (2019). 
 269. See MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, Nos. 267, 272. 
 270. In general, the requisites for validity of a juridical act are the same as 
those for contracts—that is, capacity, consent, object, and cause. See LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 29, 1918, 1927, 1966, 1971 (2019); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1779 (1870); 
DEMOGUE, supra note 113, No. 26 bis; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366 at 
422–24. These requirements, however, may differ according to the type of 
juridical act. Thus, the rules on conventional obligations apply only by analogy to 
juridical acts. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (2019). “Perfection” refers to the 
juridical act’s ability to produce the desired legal effects. Valid formation of a 
juridical act is the first condition of its perfection. But other requisites or 
conditions, subsequent to the formation, may exist for the perfection of act. For 
instance, a sale of an immovable becomes effective against third persons when 
the declarations of will of the parties are filed for recordation in the conveyance 
records. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447. See also 
Brenner, supra note 37, No. 88; DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID W. GRUNING, 
SALES, § 3.5, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2012). Parties relying on 
their juridical act normally have the burden of proving the existence, content, and 
effectiveness of the act. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1831–53 (2019); LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 12.1–12.149; AUBRY & RAU XII, 
supra note 113, § 749, at 72–81; id. § 754; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 42, 45. 
German and Greek legal doctrines distinguish between the requisites for validity 
of a juridical act (e.g., capacity, legality of cause and object, authority to make 
dispositive act) and the conditions for the perfection of a juridical act (e.g., judicial 
authorization, confirmation, ratification, recordation, arrival of term, fulfillment 
of condition). The practical significance of this distinction lies in the allocation of 




1. Manifestation of Will 
“Licit volitional act” essentially means manifestation—that is, 
externalization—of the maker’s will. This manifestation occurs by means 
of an outward communication, which can be oral, written, by action, or 
sometimes by inaction.271 The manifestation usually originates from the 
maker herself. The maker may use technical means of communication, 
including messengers.272 In such cases, it is still the maker’s own 
 
the burden of proof—once the declaration of will has been established, the 
requisites for validity are usually presumed, whereas the fulfillment of the 
conditions for perfection must be proven by the person who invokes the effect of 
the juridical act. See GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 374–75. 
 271. In this sense, juridical acts are “speech acts.” See VAN DER KAAIJ, supra 
note 4, at 59–135. For a further discussion of the concept of speech acts, see JOHN 
L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson ed., 1962); JOHN R. 
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS. AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969); 
ORDINARY LANGUAGE. ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (V.C. Chappell ed., 
1964). 
 272. A messenger (nuntius) is a person or device that simply transmits the 
message of the maker. Capacity and consent are examined with reference to the 
maker, not the messenger. In other words, persons who act as messengers are not 
representatives of the maker. Instead, they are animate devices that act as the 
mouthpiece of the maker. Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE 
L.J. 859, 867 (1920). Because animate messengers have no discretion, capacity is 
not required of messengers, and the rules on representation do not apply. Thus, 
messengers are not representatives because they do not manifest their own wills 
in the name of the principal, but rather they simply transmit the maker’s message. 
A traditional example in German and Greek doctrines is that of a merchant who 
sends her minor child to communicate terms of a contract to another merchant. 
Modern examples of messengers are all communication devices, interpreters, 
clerks, the mail, and courier services. Typically, the other party knows that the 
envoy is merely a messenger, not a representative. See BALIS, supra note 141, § 
108–09; 1 IOANNIS SPYRIDAKIS, ENCHIRIDION ASTIKOU DIKAIOU, GENIKES 
ARCHES [MANUAL OF CIVIL LAW, GENERAL PRINCIPLES] 256 (2d ed. 2004); 
GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 578; Seavey, at 867. In Louisiana, a messenger 
could be treated as a mandatary who is authorized to perform material acts for the 
principal and is thus not a representative. See Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 
30, at 1109. Mistakes in the transmission of the message are governed by the law 
of error. A mistake imputed to the maker, not the messenger, may be inexcusable. 
See, e.g., Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So. 2d 356 (La. 1987) (enunciating the 
factors in determining contractual negligence (culpa in contrahendo) in the law 
of error); Woods v. Morgan City Lions Club, 588 So. 2d 1196, 1200–01 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant’s unilateral error caused by a 
typographical mistake in a bingo game advertisement drafted by the defendant 
was inexcusable). With respect to the manner and medium of communication 




manifestation.273 When the maker is represented by another person, the 
representative is making the manifestation in the name of the principal.274 
In any event, the maker of the juridical act must be legally capable; her 
consent must be free of vices; and the content of her act must not run 
contrary to mandatory rules or to public order. 
a. Capacity 
“Capacity” refers to the maker’s legal capability to act.275 The 
Louisiana Civil Code contains general rules on capacity276 that apply 
unless otherwise provided by special rules.277 Under the general rules, 
there are two types of capacity—capacity of enjoyment and capacity to 
exercise. Capacity of enjoyment, also known as general legal capacity,278 
 
between offeror and offeree, as well as the reasonableness of such communication, 
see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1936 and 1938 (2019); Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, 
at 723–27; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 65, 68 (AM. L. INST. 
1981).  
 273. Thus, computers and other technical instruments and devices (e.g., 
vending machines) cannot make their own juridical acts. Instead, it is the 
proprietor of the machine who acts through the machine. Along these lines, the 
French Constitutional Court recently held that certain administrative acts issued 
on the basis of “self-learning algorithms” are considered acts of the state, not of 
the computer that produced the algorithm. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] 
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2018-765 DC, June 12, 2018, Nos. 65–72 
(Fr.), available at https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/2018-
12/2018765dc_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VLZ-J935] (July 23, 2019). For an 
interesting counterargument, see VAN DER KAAIJ, supra note 4, at 161–66. 
 274. See Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1091–1103. 
 275. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 451; LITVINOFF 
& TÊTE, supra note 2, at 56; BETTI, supra note 2, at 82–93; SCIALOJA, supra note 
246, No. 24; GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 49; SHELDON AMOS, THE HISTORY AND 
PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF ROME 132–34 (1882); LEHMAN, supra note 264, 
§ 28. Discussion of capacity is confined to substantive civil law and should not be 
confused with “competence” or “capacity” in the other contexts, as for example 
in civil procedure. See Grzegorczyk, supra note 104, at 53; Brenner, supra note 
37, Nos. 90, 92. See supra note 242. 
 276. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 27, 28 (2019). 
 277. See id. art. 28 cmt. b. 
 278. See id. art. 27 cmt. b; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 268; Monica 
Hof Wallace, A Primer on Natural and Juridical Persons in Louisiana, 64 LOY. 
L. REV. 407, 408 (2018) [hereinafter Wallace, Natural and Juridical Persons]. 




is a natural person’s279 capacity to have rights and to incur duties.280 
Incapacity of this type is exceptional and special.281 
Capacity to exercise is a natural person’s capability to make juridical 
acts.282 The default rule is that a person who has attained the age of 
majority283 is capable of making juridical acts.284 This rule admits several 
 
 279. “Capacity” of juridical persons is a more limited concept that is subject 
to special legislation according to the type of juridical person. By necessity, 
several acts, especially extrapatrimonial juridical acts, are not available to a 
juridical person. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 cmt. d (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, 
supra note 2, at 58–59; See Wallace, Natural and Juridical Persons, supra note 
278, at 418–19; cf. Brenner, supra note 37, No. 94. 
 280. On the concept of “duty,” see LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 87, § 1.1. 
 281. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2447 (2019) (sale of litigious rights); id. art. 
945 (successor declared unworthy); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 60–63; 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, § 14:5; Scalise, Rethinking 
Nullity, supra note 12, at 688, 690 n.193, 692 n.212. 
 282. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 63–104; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra 
note 37, No. 268; PIERRE GASSE, LES EFFETS DE L’ALIÉNATION MENTALE SUR 
L’ACTE JURIDIQUE (1941). 
 283. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 29 (2019) (“Majority is attained upon reaching the 
age of eighteen.”) See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 451; 
John A. Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules, Standards 
and Hybrid Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REV. 923, 929, 936–38 
(2012) (discussing the rationales for the rules on capacity). This rule ought to be 
read in pari materia with the rules on full emancipation of minors. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 365–67, 369–70 (2019); see Wallace, Natural and Juridical Persons, supra 
note 278, at 408. On the issue of computation of time in the civil law, see infra 
note 857. 
 284. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 28 (2019). See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 451. The revision comments under this provision 
indicate that this rule is a general rule compared to rules on contractual capacity. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 28 cmt. b (2019). Nevertheless, because the rules on 
conventional obligations apply by analogy to all juridical acts, it should follow 
that the rules on contractual capacity constitute the default rule. See id. arts. 1917, 
1918. Therefore, under the combined application of articles 28 and 1918 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code, unemancipated minors, interdicts, and persons deprived of 
reason are generally incapable of making juridical acts. See id. art. 28 cmt. b. 
“Capacity to alienate,” in particular, refers to the legal capability of a holder of a 
thing or a right to make acts of disposition. The default rules on contractual 
capacity generally govern onerous dispositions. When the alienation is made by 
donation, special rules of capacity apply. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1470–84 
(capacity to give or receive donations inter vivos or mortis causa). “Capacity to 
alienate” should not be confused with “power to alienate.” The former refers to a 
person’s legal capability to make a juridical act disposing of her own property or 




exceptions, such as the capacity to make or receive donations285 and the 
capacity to enter into marriage.286 Capacity to exercise must not be 
confused with authority. Authority is a person’s legal power to acquire, 
 
of the property of another whom she represents. The latter denotes a person’s 
authority to make a legally binding disposition of property. See 1 JOSEPH 
HÉMARD, PRÉCIS DE DROIT CIVIL No. 88 (1934); cf. POUND, supra note 33, at 93–
106 (discussing the concept of “power”). As a rule, a person has power to dispose 
of her own property but must be authorized to dispose of the property of another. 
See, e.g., YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:16–6:17 
(discussing capacity and power to alienate in the context of conventional predial 
servitudes); PLANIOL I, supra note 153, No. 2715; PLANIOL II, supra note 246, 
No. 702 (discussing the issue of capacity and power to renounce prescription); 
BETTI, supra note 2, at 227–29. See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 229–31 (2019); LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4501 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:572 (administration of 
minor’s property by persons exercising parental authority); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
arts. 4262–75 (2019) (administration of minor’s property by tutor); id. art. 4566 
(administration of interdict’s property by curator); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3290 (2019) 
(power to mortgage); id. art. 3151 (power to pledge); infra notes 287–91 and 
accompanying text.      
 285. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1470–84 (capacity to give or receive donations 
inter vivos or mortis causa); KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, Successions and 
Donations, §§ 9:1–9:6, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 2009). 
 286. Capacity to enter marriage is distinguishable from the impediments to 
marriage. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 28 cmt. c (2019). Capacity is also distinguishable 
from the legal age to marry. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 74. An 
impediment of age was recently added to the Louisiana Civil Code. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 90.1, 94, 96, 2333 (2019); La. Acts 2019, No. 408, § 1. This new provision 
of article 90.1 in fact imposes two impediments—minimum age of 16 and age 
difference of three years or greater if one of the purported spouses is 16 or 17. See 
also LA. CHILD. CODE arts. 1547, 1548 (2019). The term “impediment” is 
understood differently across civilian jurisdictions. In Louisiana, minimum age 
and age difference qualify as impediments to marriage. See KATHERINE SHAW 
SPAHT & JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, FAMILY LAW IN LOUISIANA 73–74 (2009). In 
France, minimum age constitutes a natural condition (condition naturelle) for the 
validity of the marriage, whereas impediments refer to moral conditions 
(conditions de moralité). See GABRIEL MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL, 
LES PERSONNES Nos. 69, 71, 81 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter MARTY & RAYNAUD 
II]. In Greece, minimum age refers to the qualities of the spouse and is therefore 
an issue of capacity of that spouse; impediments refer to the relationship of one 
spouse with the other spouse—e.g., close family relation or age difference—or 
with third parties, such as bigamy. See 1 GEORGIOS DASKAROLIS, PARADOSEIS 
OIKOGENEIAKOU DIKAIOU [COURSEBOOK ON FAMILY LAW] 86 (1992) (Greece). 
Because lack of capacity and violation of an impediment result in absolute nullity 
of the marriage, these different legal characterizations among civil law systems 
have little, if any, practical significance.  




transfer, or extinguish real or personal rights and to be bound to 
obligations.287 While capacity concerns a person’s aptitude to make a 
juridical act in her own name and on her own behalf, authority is a question 
of whether a certain act can be made by a particular person.288 In the law 
of obligations, persons with capacity to exercise usually enjoy freedom of 
contract and a corresponding authority to bind themselves to obligations 
within the bounds of mandatory law.289 In property law, the disposition of 
a real right normally must be made or authorized by the holder of such 
right.290 Authority—which includes the power to dispose—can be 
transferred to representatives. The authority of the representative to bind 
the principal is delineated by law or juridical act.291  
 
 287. See MARTY & RAYNAUD II, supra note 286, No. 504; YVAINE BUFFELAN-
LANORE & VIRGINIE LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION, BIENS, 
PERSONNES, FAMILLE No. 1094 (21st ed. 2019); STORCK, supra note 133, No. 168; 
Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 96–100.  
 288. See MARTY & RAYNAUD II, supra note 286, No. 504; WEILL & TERRÉ I, 
supra note 84, No. 66. These two concepts do not overlap perfectly. Indeed, there 
are cases where an incapable person may have authority to act. For instance, 
persons of limited capacity may act as mandataries. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2999 
(2019); Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1133–34. Naturally, more often 
are cases that an otherwise capable person lacks authority to act. An example is 
the unauthorized sale of a thing of another. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 (2019); ALEX 
WEILL & FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS No. 218 (3d ed. 1980) 
[hereinafter WEILL & TERRÉ III]. Certain rights are nontransferable as a matter of 
mandatory law. For instance, strictly personal rights (intuitu personae) cannot be 
transferred by juridical act (e.g., sale), nor by operation of law (e.g., intestate 
succession). LA. CIV. CODE art. 1766 (2019); WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, 
No. 344; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 4.11–4.15; 
LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 29–30. 
 289. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1971 and 1983 (2019); cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL 
CODE] art. 1134 (1804) (Fr.); WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 53, 58.  
 290. This principle is expressed in the long-standing maxim, “Nemo plus iuris 
ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet” (no one can transfer a greater right 
than one has), also known as “Nemo dat quod non habet” (no one can give 
something that one does not own). DIG. 50.17.54 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 46). See 
WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 347; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 
250; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 443; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 3.26; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2015 (1870); 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 517 cmt. b (2019). 
 291. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2986 (2019); Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 
30, at 1091–1103. Disposition by a person lacking authority frequently results in 
a relatively null dispositive act. Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 99–100; PHILIPPE 
MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS, & PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, DROIT CIVIL. DROIT 
DES OBLIGATIONS No. 701 (10th ed. 2018) [hereinafter MALAURIE ET AL., 




Incapacity of enjoyment precludes the making of a juridical act. 
Incapacity to exercise is generally remedied by the concept of legal 
representation; a capable person, however, can confer her authority to 
another by means of contractual representation.292 “Representation” refers 
to the mechanism by which a person—the representative—performs a 
juridical act in the name and on behalf of a second person—the 
principal.293 Legal representation is established by law294 or by 
judgment,295 whereas contractual (or voluntary) representation is 
established by juridical act, such as the unilateral juridical act of 
 
OBLIGATIONS]. The principal can validate this act by the unilateral juridical act of 
ratification. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1843 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 12.58–12.60.  
 292. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 554–609; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, Nos. 52–
55; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 169; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 
426–30; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, Nos. 596–602; Brenner, supra 
note 37, Nos. 96, 98; BRETHE DE LA GRESSAYE & LABORDE-LACOSTE, supra note 
126, at 218–19; Michel Storck, Contrats et obligations – Représentation dans les 
actes juridiques Nos. 14–16, JurisClasseur Civil (Art. 1119 - Fascicule unique, 
June 2, 2015) (updated Nov. 27, 2018); STORCK, supra note 133, at 59–240. 
Louisiana and Scotland have also adopted the concept of undisclosed agency. See 
Laura Macgregor, Empire, Trade, and the Use of Agents in the 19th Century: The 
“Reception” of the Undisclosed Principal Rule in Louisiana Law and Scots Law, 
79 LA. L. REV. 985 (2019). 
 293. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2985 (2019); Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 
30, passim; Storck, supra note 292, No. 24; STORCK, supra note 133, at 127–44; 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 426–27. In certain instances, the 
representative can contract with herself, in which case there is a bilateral juridical 
act. Thus, the representative of a seller can, under certain circumstances, enter 
into a contract as a buyer. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2998 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, 
supra note 2, at 144–45; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 
448; Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1131–33; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 
105, No. 430. See also YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, §§ 
6:16–6:19 (discussing capacity and representation of the grantor and grantee of a 
predial servitude). Representation in juridical acts ought to be distinguished from 
representation in the law of successions, whereby a successor, by legal fiction, is 
put into the place of another successor. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 881 (2019); LORIO, 
supra note 285, §§ 2:5–2:7. In the representation discussed here, the 
representative acts on behalf of the principal who remains party to the act. In the 
law of successions, the representative successor replaces the represented and is 
now a principle participant in the succession. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2985 cmt. c 
(2019).  
 294. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 222 (2019) (parents are legal representatives 
of unemancipated minors). 
 295. See, e.g., id. art. 392 (curator is the legal representative of an interdict). 




procuration296 or the contract of mandate.297 The law or act instituting the 
representative also provides for the extent of the representative’s 
authority.298 Certain strictly personal acts, such as marriage and the 
making of a testament, are insusceptible of representation.299 
Capacity is not only a necessary element, but also a distinguishing 
factor that separates juridical acts from juridical facts. Capacity is always 
required for a juridical act,300 and it is never required for a juridical fact.301  
 
 296. See id. art. 2987; Succession of Hunt, 135 So. 3d 654 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir. 2012); Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1109–11. By virtue of a 
procuration, the representative can make juridical acts, which include the creation, 
modification, or termination of “legal relations.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2987 cmt. c 
(2019). See Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1108–1109 (defining “legal 
relations” as “acts of a juridical nature.”).  
 297. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989 (2019); Holloway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 
861 So. 2d 763 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the various types of 
voluntary representation); Brenner, supra note 37, No. 97; Holmes & 
Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1112–58. 
 298. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2986 (2019). 
 299. See id. art. 222 cmt. b; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 98. 
 300. See MARTY & RAYNAUD II, supra note 286, No. 508; BETTI, supra note 
2, at 82–93, 218–20; GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 49; AMOS, supra note 275, at 
132–34; BRETHE DE LA GRESSAYE & LABORDE-LACOSTE, supra note 126, at 216. 
 301. See MARTY & RAYNAUD II, supra note 286, No. 508; ALAIN A. 
LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN QUASI-CONTRACTS 30 
(1991) [hereinafter LEVASSEUR, UNJUST ENRICHMENT] (“The reason why neither 
consent nor capacity is a valid requirement for a valid quasi-contract is simply 
because the obligation is created on the patrimony of the obligor in such a manner 
that the patrimony is bound rather than the obligor himself.”). But see LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2296 (1996) (“An incompetent person or a person of limited legal 
capacity may be the owner of an affair, but he may not be a manager.”) (emphasis 
added). Such a provision did not exist in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, but, 
according to the revision comments, it was “implied.” See id. cmt. b.; Cheryl L. 
Martin, Louisiana State Law Institute Proposes Revision of Negotiorum Gestio 
and Codification of Unjust Enrichment, 69 TUL. L. REV. 181, 199–200 (1994); cf. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2300 (1870); LEVASSEUR, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, at 29–30; 
Leland H. Ayres & Robert E. Landry, Comment: The Distinction Between 
Negotiorum Gestio and Mandate, 49 LA. L. REV. 111, 118 (1988) (arguing that 
article 2300 of the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code did not impose a requirement of 
capacity). To be precise, when the manager makes juridical acts in the course of 
her management (e.g., enters into a contract with a third party to repair a 
neighbor’s building), contractual capacity is required by necessity; however, 
when the manager merely performs a material act (e.g., puts out a fire in a 
neighboring building), there seems to be no need for a requirement of capacity. 
Nevertheless, French doctrine views negotiorum gestio as a “quasi-contract of 
mandate” and requires contractual capacity of the manager. See, e.g., 





“Consent” refers to the volitional character and licit content of the 
juridical act.302 In bilateral juridical acts, such as contracts, it also refers to 
the process of formation of a contract through offer and acceptance, which 
is a topic of the law of conventional obligations.303 The rules on 
conventional obligations constitute the default rules on this topic.304 With 
respect to juridical acts in general, consent focuses on the subjective 
element of will and the objective element of manifestation.305 Because 
juridical acts are volitional, their legal effects depend on the intention of 
the maker.306 Thus, a discrepancy between declaration and will may impair 
the validity of the act.307 Furthermore, juridical acts must be licit to 
produce legal effects.308 
i. Existence of Consent: Will 
“Will” has two meanings. First, it means freedom to act in general. As 
a rule, persons enjoy the fundamental freedom to make or to refuse 
juridical acts. The principle of freedom of contract, therefore, extends into 
the theory of juridical acts.309 Second, “will” refers to the subjective 
 
CARBONNIER II, supra note 135, No. 1214; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, 
Nos. 795, 800. French jurisprudence steadily accepts that the legal consequences 
stemming from negotiorum gestio are produced by the very act of management 
and by the law—not by the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 18, 1872, D.P. 1872, 1, 471 
(Fr.). Cf. PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 87–91 (discussing the legal nature of 
negotiorum gestio). See infra note 841.   
 302. See BRETHE DE LA GRESSAYE & LABORDE-LACOSTE, supra note 126, at 
221. 
 303. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 129–35. 
 304. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (2019). 
 305. “Will” refers to the maker’s intent. Manifestation mostly concerns how 
others understand the maker’s expressed will. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2045 cmt. b 
(2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 109–13.  
 306. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37. 
 307. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 113–27. 
 308. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–48. 
 309. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, Nos. 575–77; Brenner, supra 
note 37, Nos. 71, 75; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 413. There 
are instances in which a person may be compelled to perform a juridical act, but 
usually this is only because of a preexisting contractual or legal obligation. See, 
e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1986 (2019) (specific performance due to breach of 
contract); id. art. 141 (obligation to pay child support).  




element of consent310—the person’s intention to make an act that has legal 
consequences.311 To be effective, the will must be firm, unequivocal, and 
display sufficient precision.312 In principle, it is not necessary that all 
aspects of the intended act have been specially considered. It is sufficient 
that the intention to see the fulfillment of the intended act’s characteristic 
object be clearly manifested. In other words, the “essential elements” of 
the juridical act must be gleaned from the manifestation of will.313 A will 
that remains internal has no legal effect.314 To be legally effective, the will 
has to be externalized—communicated to the outside world.315 
ii. Communication of Consent: Manifestation 
Manifestation (or declaration) of will is the objective element of 
consent.316 An express manifestation of will involves deliberate processes 
 
 310. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 105–13; MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, 
supra note 112, No. 206. 
 311. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 78; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 
366, at 422–23. 
 312. See, e.g., Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 706 (discussing the necessary 
elements for a complete offer). See also FLUME, supra note 13, at 412–15 (explaining 
that, in principle, declarations of will made in jest have no legal consequences); 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 118 (2019) (Ger.).  
 313. Parties to a nominate juridical act must agree to the essential elements 
(essentialia negotii) for such act. For example, a contract of sale must contain a 
thing and a price. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439 (2019). Suppletive law furnishes 
default rules for all non-essential elements (natural elements—naturalia negotii), 
from which the parties may derogate by agreement (accidental elements—
accidentalia negotii). Thus, delivery of the thing sold is made at the place where 
the thing is located unless agreed otherwise. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2484 (2019). See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764 (1870); BETTI, supra note 2, at 184–89; SCIALOJA, supra 
note 246, No. 32; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 24, at 120–21; THOMAS ERSKINE 
HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 124 (13th ed. 1924). Parties may 
elevate a non-essential element by making it a condition. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1767 
(2019); Clark Warehouse & Implement Co. v. Jacques & Edmond Weil, Inc., 94 
So. 326, 326–27 (La. 1922); HOLLAND, at 125. The legal effects of a juridical act 
are accordingly classified as essential, natural, or accidental. See BETTI, supra 
note 2, at 244–48. See also YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, 
§§ 1:9–1:10 (discussing the essential and non-essential features of predial 
servitudes). 
 314. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 274; BONNECASE II, supra 
note 25, No. 390; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 14. 
 315. See LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 24, at 102. 
 316. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 109–13. 




of communication, such as oral or written communication, gestures, or, in 
some cases, inaction.317  
On the contrary, a tacit manifestation of will (“de facto juridical act”) 
occurs when any process manifests—indirectly but certainly—a legal 
will.318 In the law of obligations, Louisiana and French courts have 
identified implied in fact contracts (“de facto contracts”) as tacit 
manifestations of will.319 Examples from the jurisprudence include tacit 
renewal or extension of contracts of a long duration, or de facto 
employment contracts.320 Voluntary performance of an obligation arising 
from a relatively null contract may cure the nullity by tacit confirmation.321 
Tacit manifestations of will also appear in other areas of the law. For 
instance, disposition of property or the exercise of succession rights 
normally amounts to tacit acceptance of the succession.322 Acts, omissions, 
 
 317. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927 (2019); Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 
702–03. 
 318. See Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 703–04; BETTI, supra note 2, at 
138–50; PIERRE GODÉ, VOLONTÉ ET MANIFESTATIONS TACITES (1977). 
 319. Implied in fact contracts are also called de facto contracts, or contrats 
réels. See Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 
569, 573 (La. 1989) (defining such contract as “one which rests upon consent 
implied from facts and circumstances showing mutual intention to contract . . . 
[and] not different in their legal effect from express, written agreements.”); LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 1816 (1870) (“actions without words, either written or spoken, are 
presumptive evidence of a contract, where they are done under circumstances that 
naturally imply a consent to such a contract.”); Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. 
Ann. 294, 295 (1871). In the area of the conflict of laws, the parties to a contract 
may choose the applicable law to their contract—this choice may be express or 
implied. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3540 cmt. e (2019).  
 320. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
com., May 9, 1985, JurisData 1232 (Fr.) (involving a de facto lease in which the 
lessee remained in the property after the termination of the lease); Cour d’appel 
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch., May 22, 1984, JurisData 23657 (Fr.) 
(concerning a de facto employment contract in which the employee continued 
working despite the invalidity of the original employment contract). 
 321. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1842 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, § 12.56. 
 322. For tacit (now informal) acceptance of succession, see LA. CIV. CODE art. 
958 (2019); Reed v. Taylor, 552 So. 2d 1262 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Bradley 
v. Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 359 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1978); 
Succession of Menendez, 115 So. 2d 829 (La. 1959); McClelland v. Clay, 444 So. 
2d 639 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1984); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 6:4–6:5; GODÉ, 
supra note 318, Nos. 54–59. Likewise, the possibility of a tacit dispensation from 
collation has been accepted in the Louisiana jurisprudence. See, e.g., Succession 




or other circumstances evidencing abandonment of the benefits of 
prescription amount to a tacit renunciation.323 The obvious difficulty in 
these types of de facto juridical acts lies in proving the subjective elements 
of the acts—the capacity and consent of the parties.324 Deciphering these 
elements becomes even more challenging in certain other fact-intensive 
situations that fall somewhere between juridical act and fact.  
As discussed previously, German doctrine classifies certain voluntary 
acts as “quasi-juridical”; these are gestures, actions, or expressions of 
emotion having legal consequences that are not necessarily intended. 
Some of these acts are usually express, such as putting in default and 
establishment of voluntary domicile, which were examined above.325 
Other such acts may more often be tacit (de facto) acts. Examples include: 
(1) reconciliation326 extinguishing the cause of action for divorce;327 
 
of Gomez (Gomez I), 67 So. 2d 156 (La. 1953); Succession of Skye, 417 So. 2d 
1221 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982); LORIO, supra note 285, § 7:17. 
 323. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3450 (2019). Tacit renunciation of acquisitive 
prescription with regard to immovables has no effect. Id. 
 324. Usually, there is no required formality for these acts. Therefore, 
testimonial proof may be available to prove these acts. See LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 12.81–12.109; cf. AUBRY & RAU 
XII, supra note 113, §§ 761–65. Solemn juridical acts cannot be made tacitly. For 
example, confection of common law marriages is precluded in Louisiana. See LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 87 cmt. d (2019).  
 325. See supra notes 83–87, 133–148 and accompanying text. 
 326. Reconciliation is a bilateral act aimed at the reestablishment of a 
relationship. Forgiveness is a unilateral act of the injured party releasing the 
culpable party. Reconciliation requires a common intent of the parties, and it 
entails an element of forgiveness. Forgiveness is an internal process, which may 
or may not lead to reconciliation. See LEWIS B. SMEDES, FORGIVE AND FORGET: 
HEALING THE HURTS WE DON’T DESERVE 1–38 (1984, reprt. 1996).  
 327. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 104 (2019); cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] 
art. 244 (2019) (Fr.). French doctrine has not definitively characterized 
reconciliation of the spouses as a juridical act. Scholars have admitted, however, 
that reconciliation supposes an accord of the wills of the spouses to reinstate the 
marital bond. Specifically, it entails forgiveness on the part of the spouse not at 
fault and remorse on the part of the spouse at fault. The same scholars also agree 
that forgiveness only on the part of one spouse without remorse and acceptance 
by the other spouse does not suffice. Thus, it is submitted here that reconciliation 
is a bilateral juridical act. Cf. ALEX WEILL & FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, DROIT CIVIL, LES 
PERSONNES, LA FAMILLE, LES INCAPABLES No. 419 (5th ed. 1983) [hereinafter 
WEILL & TERRÉ II]; MARTY & RAYNAUD II, supra note 286, No. 284; PHILIPPE 
MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNÈS, DROIT CIVIL. DROIT DE LA FAMILLE Nos. 725–26 
(6th ed. 2017). A similar approach is followed in Louisiana. See Woods v. Woods, 
660 So. 2d 134 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995); Orihuela v. Orihuela, 184 So. 3d 182 





(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015). In Louisiana, reconciliation also extinguishes the 
cause of action for a no-fault divorce. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 102, 103(1) (2019); id. 
art. 104 cmt. Therefore, a mutual intent of reestablishing the marital relationship 
to a point where the couple no longer “lives separate and apart” should suffice in 
such cases. See Lemoine v. Lemoine, 715 So. 2d 1244 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998). 
Courts agree that the determination of reconciliation in any case is a question of 
fact. Millon v. Millon, 352 So. 2d 325 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977). See also 
Rivette v. Rivette, 899 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
manifest error standard of appellate review applies). One could validly question 
whether reconciliation is indeed a juridical act. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, 
Persons, 46 LA. L. REV. 613, 621 n.43 (1984). In any event, courts also accept 
that the consent to reconcile can be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress. See 
Hickman v. Hickman, 227 So. 2d 14 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, 
the forgiving spouse can impose conditions on her consent to reconcile. Tablada 
v. Tablada, 590 So. 2d 1357 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1991). When reconciliation is 
tacit or implied, it is a de facto juridical act. The defendant must raise the 
exception of reconciliation and prove the existence of this act.  




(2) reconciliation with, or forgiveness of, an unworthy successor,328 a 
disinherited forced heir,329 or an ungrateful donee;330 (3) tacit revocation 
 
 328. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 943 (2019). This provision first appeared in the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 969 (1825); 1 LA. LEGAL 
ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, 121 (1937) (1823) (citing 
Pothier’s successions treatise as the source for this provision); LA. CIV. CODE art. 
975 (1870). Although article 943 of the Louisiana Civil Code lists reconciliation 
and forgiveness as defenses to a claim of unworthiness, in essence, forgiveness 
by the decedent suffices. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Successions and Donations, 
46 LA. L. REV. 707, 713–14 (1986). Forgiveness, when made impliedly or tacitly, 
is a de facto unilateral juridical act of the decedent. It need not be expressed to the 
successor; it can be conditional but must be unequivocal; and it cannot be revoked. 
The provisions on capacity and vices of consent with regard to testaments apply 
by analogy. See PAPACHRISTOU, supra note 20, at 127–30; Nikos Koumoutzis, 
Commentary to Article 1861 Nos. 2–7, in 2 APOSTOLOS GEORGIADES, SYNTOMI 
ERMINEIA TOU ASTIKOU KODIKA [SHORT COMMENTARY TO THE CIVIL CODE] 
(2013); Michael P. Stathopoulos, Commentary to Article 1861 Nos. 7–13 in 6 
ERMINEIA TOU ASTIKOU KODIKOS. KLIRONOMIKON DIKAION. ARTHRA 1716–
1955 [6 COMMENTARY TO THE CIVIL CODE. SUCCESSIONS LAW. ARTICLES 1716–
1955] (Alexandros Litzeropoulos et al. eds., 1971) (Greece). Whether forgiveness 
has occurred is a matter of fact. Reconciliation of the parties constitutes sufficient 
proof of forgiveness. See 8 PHILIPPE-ANTOINE MERLIN, RÉPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL 
ET RAISONNÉ DE JURISPRUDENCE 22 (5th ed. 1827); 7 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, 
TRAITÉ DES SUCCESSIONS, DES DONATIONS TESTAMENTAIRES, DES DONATIONS 
ENTRE-VIFS, DES SUBSTITUTIONS, DES PROPRES 34 (A. Dupin ed., 1825). 
Testimonial evidence is admissible. Successions of Lissa, 3 So. 2d 534 (La. 1941); 
LEONARD OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS, § 62, in 10 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (1973). Under basic principles of civil law, it is apparent 
that forgiveness can be granted only after the act giving rise to unworthiness has 
been committed. See Successions of Lissa, 3 So. 2d at 539 (“Yet we find that if 
the parent does not die from the attempt on his life by his child, the [Louisiana 
Civil] Code [of 1870] in Article 975 provides that a suit cannot be maintained 
against such child if there is a reconciliation or pardon of the injury by the injured 
parent.”) (emphasis added); Stathopoulos, No. 7. Thus, this provision can only 
apply to cases of a failed attempt to take the decedent’s life. In any event, a 
juridical act by which the decedent forgives a mercy killer or acknowledges an 
assisted suicide would be invalid as contra bonos mores. LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 
(2019). Unworthiness does not occur automatically; the heirs must bring an action 
to declare the unworthiness. Louisiana, as well as a number of other civilian 
jurisdictions including Spain and Greece, follows the Roman law in this respect. 
In France, under the Code Napoléon, unworthiness occurs by operation of law, 
and forgiveness does not constitute a valid defense. See 1 FRANÇOIS-ANTOINE 
VAZEILLE, RÉSUMÉ ET CONFERENCE DES COMMENTAIRES DU CODE CIVIL SUR LES 
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS ET TESTAMENTS 23–26 (1837); GABRIEL MARTY & 
PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL. LES SUCCESSIONS ET LES LIBÉRALITÉS Nos. 41–





42 (1983); 7 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & ALBERT WAHL, TRAITÉ 
THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL. DES SUCCESSIONS. PT. 1 No. 291 (3d ed. 
1905); 9 FRANÇOIS LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS Nos. 9–11 (3d 
ed. 1878); ERNEST ROGUIN, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ. LES SUCCESSIONS. 
PT. 1: GÉNÉRALITÉS. LA SUCCESSION AB INTESTAT No. 199 (1908). Thus, under 
Louisiana law, if the decedent is slain and an action to declare the slayer unworthy 
is not brought in the succession proceedings, then the slayer will inherit for that 
reason—not because of the decedent’s forgiveness. LA. CIV. CODE art. 941 
(2019). But see Mark Glover, A Social Welfare Theory of Inheritance Regulation, 
2018 UTAH L. REV. 411, 453 n.267 (“Relatedly, Louisiana’s slayer rule does not 
prevent a killer from benefitting from the donor’s estate if “he proves 
reconciliation with or forgiveness by the decedent.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 943 
(2017). Reconciliation or forgiveness “perhaps can be shown by proof of the 
decedent’s consent to the slaying,” citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. 
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 137 (9th ed. 2013)); Nili Cohen, The 
Slayer Rule, 92 B. U. L. REV. 793, 799 n.46 (2012) (including Louisiana as one 
of the “systems allowing mercy killers to inherit.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Text and 
Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 621 
(2009) (citing Louisiana Civil Code article 943 as “allowing the slayer to inherit 
if he or she ‘proves reconciliation with or forgiveness by the decedent’”); Anne-
Marie Rhodes, Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving From Rules to 
Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975, 980 (2007) (arguing that under Louisiana 
law, “[r]econciliation appears to be possible only with cases of attempted murder, 
where the victim and heir would have the time and opportunity to reconcile after 
the failed attempt. Appearances can be deceiving.”); Mark Adam Silver, Vesting 
Title in a Murderer: Where Is the Equity in the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
Interpretation of the Slayer Statute in Levenson?, 45 GA. L. REV. 877, 888 n.68 
(citing Louisiana Civil Code article 943 as “permitting a slayer to recover if the 
individual ‘proves reconciliation with or forgiveness by the decedent’”). 
Naturally, the claim of unworthiness will fail if termination of the decedent’s life 
is justified. LORIO, supra note 285, § 5:3. See, e.g., Perrier v. Bistes, 650 So. 2d 
786 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (denying claim of unworthiness in a case of 
medical determination to terminate life support to a comatose patient).   
 329. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1625 (2019). The term “reconciliation” here 
should not be construed differently than the same term in the provision on 
unworthiness. See Successions of Lissa, 3 So. 2d at 534 (holding that the 
provisions on disinherison ought to be read in pari materia with those on 
unworthiness); OPPENHEIM, supra note 328, § 63; Katherine Shaw Spaht, Kathryn 
Venturatos Lorio, Cynthia Picou, Cynthia Samuel, & Frederick W. Swaim, Jr., 
The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable “Revolution,” 50 LA. L. 
REV. 409, 491–92 (1990). See also La. Acts 2001, No. 573 § 1 (citing article 975 
of the 1870 Civil Code—current article 943, which is discussed in the preceding 
note—as one of the sources for current Civil Code article 1625). Thus, forgiveness 
by the decedent suffices to extinguish a cause for disinherison of a forced heir. 
The rationale for this rule is found in the natural parental love and affection that 





is presumed in the law and constitutes the very basis for the existence of a forced 
portion. See 6 PHILIPPE-ANTOINE MERLIN, RÉPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET RAISONNÉ 
DE JURISPRUDENCE 368 (5th ed. 1827); DENIS LEBRUN, TRAITÉ DES SUCCESSIONS 
573–74 (1692). Affirmative acts of forgiveness on the part of the decedent, rather 
than passive acceptance or acts of kindness, must be shown. Succession of 
Chaney, 413 So. 2d 936, 941 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982). Forgiveness is effective 
only if given after the act giving rise to disinherison has been committed. 
Forgiveness can also be granted after the decedent has disinherited the forced heir. 
In the latter case, however, courts ought to scrutinize the intent of the forgiving 
decedent, particularly in instances where the decedent could have easily amended 
or revoked her prior will disinheriting the forced heir. See GEORGIOS BALIS, 
ENCHIRIDION KLIRONOMIKOU DIKAIOU [MANUAL OF SUCCESSIONS LAW] § 210 
(4th ed. 1938); ALPHONSE RIVIER, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DES SUCCESSIONS EN 
DROIT ROMAIN § 34, at 222 (1878); Note, Successions. Testimony Disinherison. 
Effect of Reconciliation, 3 LA. L. REV. 653 (1941). There is no mandatory form 
for forgiveness. It may be tacit and need not be expressed toward the forced heir. 
Testimonial evidence is admissible. See Successions of Lissa, 3 So. 2d at 540. In 
any event, the most recent amendment to article 1625 of the Louisiana Civil Code 
gives added probative value to a “writing signed by the testator that clearly and 
unequivocally demonstrates reconciliation.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1625(B) (2001). 
Practically, this writing will most likely be a unilateral declaration in the form of 
an act under private signature; this declaration is not subject to the formal 
requirements for making a testament. This requirement of proof is not mandatory. 
Thus, a letter from a parent to the child that evidences an intent to forgive should 
suffice. See Spaht, Lorio, Picou, Samuel, & Swaim, at 493–94. In both cases of 
unworthiness and disinherison, the court should examine the capacity of the 
forgiving decedent. See, e.g., Succession of Chaney, 413 So. 2d at 941 (finding 
that the decedent’s ill health would not permit him to conscientiously forgive his 
son for striking him). Greek scholars also argue that forgiveness is divisible. Thus, 
the decedent may partly forgive—or partly disinherit—a forced heir by 
bequeathing to that forced heir a portion of the estate that is less than his legitime. 
See Koumoutzis, supra note 328, No. 5. This view does not seem incompatible 
with the Louisiana provisions on disinherison. As in the case of unworthiness, the 
Louisiana rules on disinherison derive from the Roman law. Modern French law 
deviates from these rules. See Successions of Lissa, 3 So. 2d at 535–39; A REPRINT 
OF MOREAU LISLET’S COPY OF A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN 
THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808). THE DE LA VERGNE VOLUME 232–33, 236–
37 (1971); Spaht, Lorio, Picou, Samuel, & Swaim, at 484–91; OPPENHEIM, supra 
note 328, §§ 64–67; 3 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, Nos. 
1733–36 (La. State L. Inst. trans., 1959) (11th ed. 1938) [hereinafter PLANIOL III]; 
1 JEAN-MARIE RICARD, TRAITÉ DES DONATIONS ENTRE-VIFS ET TESTAMENTAIRES 
644 (1754) For a detailed discussion of the several amendments to this and other 
provisions on disinherison, see LORIO, supra note 285, § 10:14.   
 330. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1558 (2019). According to prevailing French 
doctrine, the short, one-year prescriptive period for the action of revocation of a 




of a testament by its physical destruction;331 and (4) tacit permission by 
the owner giving rise to precarious quasi-possession of a servitude.332 
When examining the elements of such tacit, de facto juridical acts, 
recourse to underlying legislative policies or to available legal 
 
donation for ingratitude is justified under the theory of a “presumed forgiveness” 
of the ingratitude upon the lapse of the prescriptive period. Furthermore, if the 
donor or her successors expressly or tacitly forgive the donee’s ingratitude within 
the one-year prescriptive period, the action of revocation is extinguished 
immediately. See 11 CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS. 
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSIONS AND GRATUITOUS DISPOSITIONS § 708, at 412, in 
3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS (La. State L. Inst. trans., 1969) (P. Esmein ed., 6th 
ed. 1956); PLANIOL III, supra note 329, No. 2651. In any event, revocation of the 
donation upon forgiveness of the donee would be estopped as an abuse of right 
pursuant to the long-standing civilian maxim, venire contra factum proprium non 
valet (no one is allowed to go against the consequences of one’s own acts). See 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 88, at 135 n.32; BASIL MARKESINIS 
ET AL., THE GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT. A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 123–25 (2d 
ed. 2006); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 545–57.    
 331. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1607(1) (2019). Implied revocation by the 
physical destruction of the testament is a de facto unilateral juridical act. Capacity 
and intent to revoke on the part of the testator must be established in all cases, 
even when the testator directs another person to destroy the testament. See BALIS, 
SUCCESSIONS, supra note 329, § 96; LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 14:3, 14:6; 
PLANIOL III, supra note 329, No. 2843, at 387–88; K.A. CROSS, A TREATISE, 
ANALYTICAL, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ON SUCCESSIONS 104 (1891). 
 332. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3421, 3437 (2019). Here, the owner of an 
immovable may tolerate her neighbor’s minor encroachments, by allowing 
passage to the nearest public road. Delineating the property and possessory rights 
potentially created by such factual situations is a tall order. See Boudreaux v. 
Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015) (holding that a 64-year quasi-possession 
of a pathway through neighboring land was precarious due to the neighbor’s tacit 
permission). For further discussion of this issue, see infra note 418.  




presumptions can prove useful.333 Silence is normally not indicative of 
consent, but there are notable exceptions.334 
Manifestation of will usually entails communication between parties 
to a juridical act.335 When both parties are present, manifestation of the 
will is immediate and instantaneous. When, however, the parties 
communicate from a distance, the issue of the means and effectiveness of 
communication become pertinent.336 Likewise, most juridical acts are 
concluded in one act, whereas others involve successive acts.337 
 
 333. For instance, the revised provision on unworthiness did not preserve the 
presumption of forgiveness that existed in the old law. Compare LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 943 (2019), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 975 (1870). Furthermore, the revisions to 
the law of forced heirship and disinherison have shifted the burden of proof and 
show preference for written evidence of reconciliation or forgiveness. See LORIO, 
supra note 285, § 10:14; Spaht, Lorio, Picou, Samuel, and Swaim, supra note 329, 
at 484–96; Max Nathan, Jr., Forced Heirship: The Unheralded “New” 
Disinherison Rules, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1027 (2000). In the law of servitudes, a legal 
presumption exists in favor of the servient estate. LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 (2019); 
Palomeque v. Prudhomme, 664 So. 2d 88, 93 (La. 1995). See YIANNOPOULOS, 
PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:25, at 418–20. Likewise, any doubt as 
to a tacit confirmation or ratification of a contract must be resolved in favor of the 
party to whom the act is opposed. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1842–43 (2019); Breaux v. 
Savoie, 1 So. 614 (La. 1887). 
 334. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1942 (2019); id. art. 1890 (presumption of 
acceptance of remission by silence); id. art. 962 (presumption of acceptance of 
succession). See Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 704; GODÉ, supra note 318, 
Nos. 158–62; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 395. 
 335. A miscommunication between the parties may raise issues of 
interpretation or a vice of consent. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2045 cmt. b (2019); see 
also infra note 354 and accompanying text. 
 336. The rules on conventional obligations apply by analogy. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 1927–47 (2019). In general, under the knowledge theory—which is the 
default rule—the communication must reach the senses of the recipient. Until that 
time, the act is freely retractable by the maker. Under the reception theory, the 
communication becomes effective when received, regardless of whether the 
recipient has knowledge of the communication’s content. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1938 
(2019). Under the transmission or dispatch theory—also known by its common 
law name of “mailbox rule”—the communication becomes effective once it is 
transmitted. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1935 (2019). See Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 
48, at 725–27; cf. 2 ALEXANDROS LITZEROPOULOS, STOICHEIA ENOCHIKOU 
DIKAIOU [ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS] 238 (1960) (Greece).  
 337. An example of successive acts is preparatory agreements, that is, unilateral 
or bilateral “agreements to agree,” such as option contracts and bilateral promises 
to contract in the future. See Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 745–57.  




As a rule, there are no formal requirements for a manifestation. In 
other words, the default rule is informality of juridical acts.338 The law 
imposes some exceptions to this general rule, requiring mandatory forms, 
such as the act under private signature339 or the authentic act,340 in some 
circumstances. Parties to a juridical act may agree to a heightened 
formality for their otherwise informal act.341 For instance, they may decide 
to reduce their agreement for the sale of a movable to writing. In such a 
case, care must be taken to ascertain whether the parties intended a 
 
 338. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 
127–28; Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 705–06; BETTI, supra note 2, at 
127–30; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 31; GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 55; BRETHE 
DE LA GRESSAYE & LABORDE-LACOSTE, supra note 126, at 220. Thus, in the 
absence of any statutory requirement of form, the mother’s concurrence to her 
husband’s acknowledgment of paternity may be oral or even implied. See LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 195 cmt. e (2019); John Randall Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of 
Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 387 (2007) [hereinafter Trahan, Filiation] (citing 
numerous Louisiana and French sources on this subject). Conversely, formal 
concurrence of the spouse is required in an act of adult adoption. LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 213 (2019).  
 339. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1836–38 (2019). See, e.g., id. art. 1839 (transfer 
of immovable property); id. art. 2440 (sale of immovable property); id. art. 963 
(renunciation of succession); id. art. 3450 (renunciation of acquisitive prescription 
with respect to immovables); id. art. 3038 (suretyship); id. art. 3072 
(compromise); id. art. 3287 (conventional mortgage). Execution of an authentic 
act satisfies this requirement of form. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 87, § 12.26.  
 340. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1833 (2019). See, e.g., id. arts. 1541, 1543 
(donation inter vivos); id. arts. 195, 196 (acknowledgment of child). Special 
provisions apply for the formal validity of testaments. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1570, 
1574–83 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 12:1–12:6. Heightened formalities in 
donations serve a cautionary and evidentiary function. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, 
supra note 2, at 129; John Denson Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. 
REV. 2, 5–6 (1951); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 8:2, 12:1; Brenner, supra note 37, 
No. 86; cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–
801 (1941). For a more detailed discussion of the types of writings recognized in 
Louisiana, see TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 6:11–6:15; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 12.1–12.38; cf. 
LARGUIER, supra note 243, Nos. 87–98; MARIE-ANTOINETTE GUERRIERO, 
L’ACTE JURIDIQUE SOLENNEL 322–53 (1975); AUBRY & RAU XII, supra note 113, 
§§ 754–60. Special formalities also exist for contracts of marriage. LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 87 (2019); Lovett, supra note 283, at 941–43. 
 341. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1947 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, § 12.12. 




mandatory or merely probative effect of such formality.342 The perfection 
of the juridical act may require additional formalities, such as recordation 
or judicial authorization.343 The rules on formal validity of juridical acts 
are closely associated with the requirement of proof of juridical acts.344 
The rules on substantive validity require proper interpretation of the 
juridical act, which may reveal discrepancies between the declaration and 
the will.345 
iii. Correspondence Between Manifestation and Will  
Normally, the maker’s declaration corresponds perfectly with her will. 
Minor differences between the two are usually resolved by application of 
 
 342. Under the default rule, a mandatory effect is presumed. See LA. CIV. 
CODE ART. 1947 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 
12.12. 
 343. For instance, a juridical act purporting to transfer real rights in 
immovables produces civil effects against third persons once it is filed for registry 
in the conveyance records. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447. Some juridical acts can only be 
exercised in court. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 101–03 (divorce); id. art. 308 
(judicial appointment of tutor); id. art. 132 (consent decree for child custody); LA. 
CHILD. CODE art. 1180 (2019) (adoption of minor children). Other juridical acts 
require prior court approval. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 230 (2019); LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. art. 4501 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:572 (2019) (court approval for 
certain dispositions of child’s property); LA. CIV. CODE art. 967 (2019); LORIO, 
supra note 285, § 6:8 (acceptance of succession by creditors of heir); LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 2355, 2355.1, 2369.7 (2019); ANDREA CARROLL & RICHARD D. 
MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, §§ 5:8, 7:20 in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (4th ed. 2013) (exclusive management of community property). Cf. 
Brenner supra note 37, Nos. 103, 108. Disavowal of paternity was previously only 
available judicially. Now, it is also available extrajudicially in the case of a three-
party acknowledgment. LA. CIV. CODE art. 190.1 (2018).  
 344. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 135–38; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 
386. Parties relying on their juridical act must prove the existence and content of 
the act. Generally, when the law or the parties establish a mandatory form, written 
proof is required unless the written instrument has been destroyed, lost, or stolen. 
Testimonial proof is usually admissible in all other cases. Testimonial proof is 
also admissible to establish a vice of consent or simulation. Of course, these 
general rules admit several exceptions. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1831–53 (2019); 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 12.1–12.149 (proof of 
obligations); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 14:6–14:7 (proof of testament); cf. 
AUBRY & RAU XII, supra note 113, § 749, at 72–81; id. §§ 754–68; Brenner, 
supra note 37, Nos. 42, 45.   
 345. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 109–13. 




the rules on interpretation of juridical acts.346 There are instances, 
however, where there is a conflict between the real will and the declared 
will. The maker of the act may have intentionally made a false declaration, 
such as a simulated transaction. Alternatively, the maker may have 
mistakenly made a declaration that does not correspond to her actual will. 
Scholars in Europe and the United States have advanced several theories 
in the realm of contract law where this topic is fully discussed.347 As a 
matter of general theory of juridical acts, a discrepancy between 
declaration and will can be intentional or unintentional.348 
When the declared act intentionally does not express the true intent of 
the parties, the act is either made in jest349 or is a simulation.350 A 
 
 346. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1917, 2045–57 (2019); LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 113–117; BETTI, supra note 2, 
at 329–73; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 393–421; AMOS, supra note 275, 
at 140–41; MICHEL DAGOT, LA SIMULATION EN DROIT PRIVÉ Nos. 306–348 
(1967). See further infra, notes 354, 364–68 and accompanying text.  
 347. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 109–13; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 135; 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH 
ON CONTRACTS § 3.06 (Zachary Wolfe ed., 4th ed. 2019) (discussing the 
subjective and objective theories of contract). 
 348. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 113–27; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 135. Cf. FLUME, supra note 13, at 398–402. In 
solemn acts, especially of extrapatrimonial nature (e.g., marriage), the objective 
declaration takes precedence. Therefore, there is very little room, if any, for 
annulment of solemn contracts on the grounds of error, fraud, or simulation. See 
Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So. 2d 356, 362 (La. 1987). For contracts of 
marriage, see Deplit v. Young, 25 So. 547 (La. 1899) (restricting error and fraud 
only to mistakes of physical identity); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law 
of Marriage: One Baby Step Forward, 48 LA. L. REV. 1143–47 (1988); Roy L. 
Wood, Note, Nullity of Marriages Because of Simulated Consent, 29 LA. L. REV. 
579 (1969); WEILL & TERRÉ II, supra note 327, No. 210.   
 349. See HOLLAND, supra note 313, at 121–22; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 34, 
at 187–93; FLUME, supra note 13, at 412–15. Cf. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 
[BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 118 (2019) (Ger.). 
 350. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2025 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 
113–14; LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 81–84; 
BETTI, supra note 2, at 403–20; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 34, at 187–93; FLOUR 
ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 381–92; DAGOT, supra note 346, Nos. 12–53. If, in 
a bilateral juridical act, the declaration of will of one of the parties is simulated, 
the declared will prevails as to the other innocent party. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, 
supra note 2, at 113–14; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2057 (2019). The rules on simulated 
contracts equally apply to unilateral juridical acts. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2025 
cmt. c (2019); Brenner, supra note 37, No. 83. However, simulations are rare 




simulation is relative when another transaction (counterletter) is hidden 
behind the simulated act, whereas a simulation is absolute when no 
transaction was ever intended.351 As between the parties, their true intent 
is given effect.352 As to third parties who in good faith rely on the simulated 
act, such as creditors of one of the parties to the act or bona fide purchasers 
of the object of the act, the declared intent usually takes precedence.353 
Unintentional discrepancies between the declaration and the will 
denote a potential vice of consent.354 In the case of error, for example, the 
 
occurrences in unilateral juridical acts. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 
112, Nos. 244–46; DAGOT, supra note 346, Nos. 224–26.  
 351. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 116–20; LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 81–84; DAGOT, supra note 346, 
Nos. 71–131; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2026–27 (2019). “Thus, the sale of a plantation 
for a dollar is not a sale, though it may be a donation in disguise.” Id. art. 2464. 
Also, “[w]hen the thing sold remains in the corporeal possession of the seller the 
sale is presumed to be a simulation.” Id. art. 2480. Furthermore, “[a] sale with 
right of redemption is a simulation when the surrounding circumstances show that 
the true intent of the parties was to make a contract of security.” Id. art. 2569.  
 352. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2026 cmt. b. (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 81–84. 
 353. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2027 cmt. c, 2028 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, 
supra note 2, at 119–20; LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 
242, at 81–84. 
 354. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 420–67; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, Nos. 63–
94; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 34, at 193–209; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, 
No. 168; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 268; RIPERT & BOULANGER, 
supra note 37, Nos. 569–74; HOLLAND, supra note 313, at 122–23; JOSSERAND, 
supra note 258, No. 127. More precisely, there is an unintentional discrepancy 
between the declaration and the will in two situations. The first circumstance 
occurs when the declared will by mistake does not correspond to the real will. 
Here, there is a miscommunication of the real will or the declaration does not 
correspond to the actual will. For instance, a seller by mistake quotes a lower price 
to the buyer for the object that she actually wants to sell (miscommunication), or 
she delivers the wrong item to the buyer (non-correspondence). In such cases, the 
rules on interpretation of the juridical act may correct a miscommunication, 
especially if the mistake was negligent and the other party reasonably relied on 
the miscommunication. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 114–15; LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2057 (2019). The second situation occurs when the declared will does 
correspond to the “real” will, but this “real” will was based on an erroneous belief. 
Here, the will was correctly declared; however, this declaration would not have 
been made if the truth were known. For instance, the buyer purchases a house 
believing that she would be employed in that city. For more detail, see JACQUES 
GHESTIN, LA NOTION D’ERREUR DANS LE DROIT POSITIF ACTUEL Nos. 2–6 (1971); 
SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 172–76. The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code 




declaration made by mistake does not correspond to the real will of the 
party in error.355 Fraud and duress are actually cases of an induced or 
forced discrepancy between the declaration and the true will of the 
victim.356 This topic is fully discussed in the law of conventional 
obligations, the provisions of which apply to juridical acts in default of 
other more specific rules.357 A declaration that corresponds with the actual 
will must also have licit content. 
iv. Licit Content 
The content of the act—for example, the terms of a contract or the 
legacies in a will—must be licit, that is, not contrary to mandatory law or 
public policy.358 Within these boundaries, the maker enjoys freedom to 
 
wisely avoided these distinctions and adopted a general notion of error that 
potentially covers all instances of discrepancies between the declaration and the 
real will. The rules on error, therefore, seek to strike “a balance . . . between the 
following two considerations: protect all parties to a contract and ensure the 
security of transactions.” LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 
242, at 34. See also LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 120–27. 
 355. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1821 (1870). Of course, not all mistakes are 
actionable. Whether the error may lead to rescission of the act may also depend 
on additional requirements. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1949 (2019); Saúl 
Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 
LA. L. REV. 1, 11–49 (1989) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Vices of Consent]; 
LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 35–36. Consent to 
solemn contracts, especially of extrapatrimonial nature (e.g., marriage) is usually 
not vitiated by error. See Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So. 2d 356, 362 (La. 
1987); LA. CIV. CODE art. 93 (2019); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 91 ¶ 3 (1870) 
(providing the vice of “error as to the person”). See GUERRIERO, supra note 340, 
at 129–30. 
 356. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1953, 1959 (2019). See Litvinoff, Vices of 
Consent, supra note 355, at 6–7; LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, 
supra note 242, at 44–51. 
 357. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1948–64 (2019) (error, fraud, and duress in the 
law of obligations); Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 355, passim; 
LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 33–51. But see LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 93 (2019) (vices of consent for marriage); id. arts. 1478–79 (vices 
of consent for donations); LORIO, supra note 285, § 9:5; PLANIOL III, supra note 
329, Nos. 2518, 2879. Cf. Brenner supra note 37, No. 91; BONNECASE II, supra 
note 25, No. 366, at 424–25. For vices of consent concerning unilateral juridical 
acts in particular, see MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 206–38. 
 358. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (2019); Holliday v. Holliday, 352 So. 2d 618 
(La. 1978); BETTI, supra note 2, at 114–24, 156–61; GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 




act,359 which means liberty to choose the form of the act; to adopt a 
nominate or innominate type of act;360 to insert modalities, such as terms 
and conditions;361 and to regulate in detail the terms of the act or to rely on 
the application of suppletive law.362 As a general rule, if the content is licit, 
the court may not make modifications that were not stipulated by the 
parties.363  
 
56; JOSSERAND, supra note 258, No. 137; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, 
Nos. 578–82. 
 359. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 161–62. Thus, contractual and 
testamentary freedom in the field of property law is more limited by rules of 
mandatory law, as compared to the field of the law of obligations. See A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights: Limits on Contractual and Testamentary Freedom, 30 
LA. L. REV. 44 (1969); YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:1, 
at 350; BETTI, supra note 2, at 101–14; LEHMAN supra note 264, § 24, at 103. 
Usually, in areas such as family law, labor law, and civil procedure, mandatory rules 
exist not only with respect to the formation of a juridical act, but also concerning 
the content of the act. Cf. Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 77, 217. 
 360. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1914 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 
33, §§ 113–15; LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 11.  
 361. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1767, 1777 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra 
note 2, at 155–59; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 5.1–
6.23; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 31–58. BETTI, 
supra note 2, at 514–54; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, Nos. 33–51; LEHMAN, supra 
note 264, § 35; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, Nos. 610–24; AMOS, supra 
note 275, at 141–42. Certain juridical acts—e.g., marriage or acknowledgment of 
a child—are insusceptible of conditions or terms. See CLAUDE BUFNOIR, THEORIE 
DE LA CONDITION DANS LES DIVERS ACTES JURIDIQUES SUIVANT LE DROIT ROMAIN 
103–11 (1866). Acceptance of a succession under former law was either 
unconditional or with benefit of inventory. See CROSS, supra note 331, at 337, 
341–42. Under the new law, acceptance of all or part of the succession is 
unconditional with limited liability. See LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 6:2, 6:5; see 
also id. §§ 11:1–11:9 (discussing conditional legacies). 
 362. The parties’ legal characterization of an act is indicative, but not binding 
on the court. See TERRÉ, QUALIFICATIONS, supra note 131, No. 55. Thus, the rules 
peculiar to donations may or may not apply in certain cases, regardless of the 
intent of the parties. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1526, 1527 (2019). An act may also 
produce incidental legal effects. For instance, a life insurance policy may give rise 
to an indirect donation in favor of the beneficiary. See Brenner, supra note 37, 
No. 116. Nevertheless, the rules peculiar to donations do not apply to the 
gratuitous benefit derived from a life insurance policy. See LORIO, supra note 285, 
§§ 7:14, 8:8.   
 363. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 118–19; BETTI, supra note 2, at 250–
51. A related question in France and Louisiana is whether the judge can adapt a 
contract that has become burdensome on one or all the parties because of 
unforeseen circumstances (imprévision). See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 




Insofar as the parties to a juridical act have the possibility of freely 
arranging the act’s content, any obscurities regarding the parties’ declared 
intentions, or any gaps resulting from the parties’ silence with regard to 
some details of the act, may give rise to questions of interpretation of the 
juridical act.364 The rules on interpretation of contracts apply as default 
rules for the interpretation of all juridical acts.365 These rules strive to 
achieve a balance between the subjective will and the objective declaration 
 
GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 16.71–16.97; RENÉ DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND 
FRENCH LAW 119–25 (1980). A provision on this matter now appears in the 
French Civil Code as a result of the recent revision of the French law of 
obligations. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1195 (2016) (Fr.). 
 364. As a rule, however, acts that present no ambiguities do not require further 
interpretation. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046 (2019). See, e.g., Keeley v. 
Schexnailder, 708 So. 2d 838, 841–42 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998) (finding that 
when act establishing servitude is clear, no further interpretation is warranted).  
 365. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 329–73; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 
393–421; AMOS, supra note 275, at 140–41. In Louisiana, the rules on 
interpretation of contracts constitute the default rules for interpretation of juridical 
acts. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1917, 2045–57 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 113–17. These rules—also known as canons of 
construction of contracts—operate as guidelines in what ought to be a flexible 
judicial process of interpretation. Cf. RIEG, supra note 46, No. 365. These rules 
are supplemented by more special rules of interpretation for certain types of 
juridical acts. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 730–734, 749–750 (2019) 
(interpretation of predial servitudes); id. art. 783 (interpretation of building 
restrictions); id. art. 642 (extent of servitude of right of use); YIANNOPOULOS, 
PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:25–6:30 (discussing interpretation of 
contracts creating predial servitudes). However, according to prevailing doctrine 
interpreting article 1134 of the Code Napoléon, judges may resort to explanatory 
or corrective interpretation, but they may not attempt creative or constructive 
interpretation. See FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 405–21; MAZEAUD ET AL. 
I, supra note 37, No. 250; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, Nos. 168–69; BRIERLEY 
& MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 106. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 
1134 (1804) (Fr.) (“Agreements legally formed have the force of law over those 
who have made them.”); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2019) (“Contracts have the 
effect of law for the parties . . . .”); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, 
supra note 242, at 79–81. Scholars have also identified similarities between 
interpretation of a juridical act and interpretation of the law. Compare, e.g., LA. 
CIV. CODE arts. 2046–50 (2019), with id. arts. 9–13. See generally EMILIO BETTI, 
INTERPRETAZIONE DELLA LEGGE E DEGLI ATTI GUIRIDICI (1949). See also supra 
note 242. 




of the parties.366 In specific cases, however, the subjective367 or 
objective368 approach takes precedence. 
The lawful and volitional elements of the act—analyzed as a 
manifestation of will having a lawful content—refer to what the maker 
does. The next element is the legal consequences of the act, which is what 
the maker intends to accomplish with the act and why she acted. 
2. Legal Consequences 
The intended legal consequences of a juridical act constitute the act’s 
object369 and purpose.370 The object of the act refers to the intended legal 
consequence—the change in legal position that the maker wishes to 
achieve. This change normally involves an acquisition, exercise, 
modification, transfer, or extinction of a right.371 The cause concerns the 
principal reason for the act. Cause is particularly significant in patrimonial 
 
 366. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2045 (2019) (“Interpretation of a contract is 
the determination of the common intent of the parties.”), with id. cmt. b (“Under this 
Article, the parties’ common intent is objective in nature, which means that in some 
cases it may consist of a reconstruction of what the parties must have intended, given 
the manner in which they expressed themselves in their contract. In this manner, a 
party’s declaration of will becomes an integral part of his will . . . . Nevertheless, 
when there is a manifest difference between a party’s intent and the pertinent 
declaration of that intent, the rules governing error may apply.”) (emphasis added). 
Cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1156 (1804) (Fr.) (“In agreements it is 
necessary to search into the mutual intention of the contracting parties, rather than 
to stop at the literal sense of terms.”). See DEMOLOMBE, supra note 107, No. 3 
(referring to this provision as “la règle des règles”); RANOUIL, supra note 105, at 
73; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 399, 421; BETTI, supra note 2, at 255–56. 
 367. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1611 (2019) (“The intent of the testator 
controls the interpretation of his testament.”) (emphasis added); Carter v. 
Succession of Carter, 332 So. 2d 439 (La. 1976); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 12:1, 
13:9. 
 368. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 87 (2019) (“The requirements for a contract 
of marriage are: . . . [t]he free consent of the parties to take each other as [spouse], 
expressed at the ceremony.”) (emphasis added). See also Rhodes v. Miller, 189 
La. 288, 299–300 (1938) (“The status or relation thus created [by the contract of 
marriage] has always been subject to legislative control, independent of the will 
of the parties”) (emphasis added). 
 369. See CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 168 (“[the object] is that upon 
which the will is focused”). 
 370. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 172–84; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 
168; 1 GÉRARD CORNU, DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION, LES PERSONNES, LES BIENS 
Nos. 132–33 (11th ed. 2003); Brenner, supra note 37, No. 21. 
 371. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447. 




juridical acts372 as a lawful justification for the transfer of wealth.373 Object 
and cause must be licit. The law thus gives legal effect to the will of parties 
within the boundaries of mandatory law and public policy.374  
a. Object 
In a material sense, the object of a juridical act refers to the specific 
items of the transaction. Thus, the house sold or leased, and the money 
paid as price or rent, constitute the objects of a contract of sale or lease of 
a house; additionally, the testatrix’s assets constitute the object of the 
legacies in her testament. As a rule, parties are free to make juridical acts 
for any object that is lawful, possible, and determined or determinable.375  
In the legal sense, the object is the legal effect that the parties intend 
to achieve or actually achieve by acting. In this sense, the object of a sale 
is the transfer of property, and the object of a legacy is the transmission of 
property by reason of death.376 The term “intended legal consequences” 
 
 372. Patrimonial juridical acts are acts that involve legal relations of a 
pecuniary nature. Juridical acts in the law of obligations and property are frequent 
examples. Such acts, however, can also be found in the law of persons (e.g., 
matrimonial property agreements) or successions and donations (e.g., testaments). 
See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 140–42.  
 373. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 196–399; Saúl 
Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48 LA. L. REV. 3 (1987) [hereinafter 
Litvinoff, Cause]; Smith, supra note 340, at 2–5. 
 374. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (2019); MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, 
at 273; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 168. As is characteristically said, the 
juridical act “sets the law in motion.” BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 
427–28. 
 375. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1971 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, §§ 28–38. Cf. CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMMERCIAL DE LA NACION [CÓD. CIV. 
Y COM.] [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 259 (2015) (Arg.); ALBERTO J. 
BUERRES, OBJETO DEL NEGOCIO JURÍDICO (2d ed. 1998) (Arg.); Brenner, supra 
note 37, No. 101. Things outside of commerce, especially common things, cannot 
be the objects of juridical acts. LA. CIV. CODE art. 449 (2019). Juridical acts over 
other public things are also regulated by mandatory provisions. See id. art. 450 
cmts. b–e, g; YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, §§ 3:8–3:14. Likewise, 
as noted, the object of extrapatrimonial acts is also restricted by mandatory law. 
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 87 cmt. c (2019); Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 
299–300 (1938); Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877 (1919); Zwikel v. Zwikel, 154 La. 
532 (1923); Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488 (1933); Cormier v. Cormier, 185 
La. 968 (1936). 
 376. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 54–55. The distinction between material 
and legal object is not merely an academic exercise. In a contract, for instance, 
the obligations of the parties—legal objects—are a concept separate from the 




refers to this legal object of the juridical act.377 The parties need not 
expressly state this legal object, as long as their intent to achieve this legal 
object can be gleaned from the content of the act.378 The usual legal objects 
of juridical acts are legal relationships, rights, and juridical situations. The 
legal effect of juridical acts is confined to the parties.  
i. Legal Object: Legal Relationships, Rights, Juridical Situations 
Examples of legal objects abound and defy categorization,379 ranging 
from instances of change in personal status (marriage, adoption, 
acknowledgment of a child) to patrimonial displacements (sale, exchange, 
donation) and estate planning devices (testament and trust).380 In general, 
when describing the types of legal consequences that juridical acts may 
 
items of the parties’ performances—material objects. Legal characterization of 
the contract is made with reference to its legal object. See TERRÉ, 
QUALIFICATIONS, supra note 131, No. 378. Destruction of the item of 
performance, on the other hand, may or may not affect the obligations of the 
parties. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1873 (2019). Remedies for breach of the 
contract enforce the obligations of the parties. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1758 (2019); 
SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS BOOK 2, §§ 6–11, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (1975) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II].  
 377. See JOSSERAND, supra note 258, No. 120, at 94. The legal consequences 
stemming from juridical acts can be direct or indirect, involving other legal 
consequences that were not intended by the party. BONNECASE II, supra note 25, 
Nos. 433–49. Thus, when a lessor sends a written demand to the lessee for 
payment of rent that is past due, the lessee is also put in default. LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1991 (2019).   
 378. In fact, most, if not all, parties to everyday transactions do not have the 
legal object in mind. A purchaser of goods is interested in the goods and not the 
obligation of the seller to transfer ownership of the goods. Nevertheless, this 
purchaser, by entering a contract of sale, knows, or ought to understand, that she 
has made a legally binding agreement. In essence, the legal effect is “the juridical 
signification of the will.” See JOSSERAND, supra note 258, Nos. 123–24. See also 
supra notes 74, 131 and accompanying text.  
 379. Some juridical acts constitute mere notifications with varying legal 
consequences—positive or negative. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:261–62 (2019) 
(opposition to marriage); id. §§ 355.4, 355.7 (notice of relocation of principle 
residence of child and opposition thereto). Cf. MIRABAIL, supra note 224, at 83–86.  
 380. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–48; 
NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38. 




have, scholars frequently refer to the creation, modification, transfer, and 
extinction of legal relationships,381 rights,382 or juridical situations.383 
Juridical acts can create legal relationships384 between persons;385 for 
example, contracts create obligations386 between the parties,387 a marriage 
contract creates a legal relationship between the spouses,388 and 
acknowledgment of paternity establishes a legal relationship between 
father and child.389 Juridical acts also create legal relationships between a 
 
 381. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 251. 
 382. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, No. 230; PLANIOL I, supra 
note 153, No. 275; JOSSERAND, supra note 258, No. 120, at 94; MARTY & 
RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 149; TANCELIN, SOURCES, supra note 190, No. 
10.1; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140. 
 383. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 251, 366; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, 
supra note 37, No. 258. 
 384. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1756 (2019) (defining an obligation as a 
“legal relationship” between obligor and obligee). Synonyms include “juridical 
relations” and “legal relations.” See FRIEDICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF 
THE ROMAN LAW 269–334 (W. Holloway trans., 1867) (English translation of 2 
FRIEDICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 
(1840)); BETTI, supra note 2, at 7; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, Nos. 1–5. This 
concept also appeared in American legal theory. Compare ALBERT KOCOUREK, 
JURAL RELATIONS (1927, reprt. 1998) and Albert Kocourek, Hohfeld System of 
Fundamental Legal Concepts, 15 ILL. L. REV. 24 (1920) (advocating a theory of 
juridical relations based on German legal doctrine), with Arthur L. Corbin, Jural 
Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 228 (1920–1921) (defending a 
theory of juridical relations based on American legal realism). The term “legal 
relation” appears in Louisiana doctrine. See, e.g., YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447 (using the term “legal relations” in the definition of 
juridical act). The term “legal relations” is also used in the law of representation 
and mandate. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2985, 2987 (2019); Holmes & Symeonides, 
supra note 30, at 1108–09. In modern civilian doctrine, the concept of “legal 
relationship” is gradually replacing the concept of “right” as a point of analysis. 
See SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 49. Conversely, most human relations and 
interactions have no legal significance. See FLUME, supra note 13, at 82–83. 
 385. Legal relationships may involve natural as well as juridical persons. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 24 (2019). Juridical persons can be a product of juridical act. For 
instance, a partnership is a juridical person created by contract. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2801 (2019).  
 386. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1756 (2019) (defining an obligation as a legal 
relationship between obligor and oblige); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 87, § 1.1; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 1–3. 
 387. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2019). 
 388. See id. art. 87. 
 389. See id. art. 196. 




person and a thing,390 as, for instance, a conventional usufruct391 creates a 
legal relationship between the usufructuary and a thing consumable or 
nonconsumable.392 The legal relationships created by juridical act 
contemplate several real and personal rights.393 For example, contracts 
create credit rights and corresponding obligations;394 marriage gives rise 
to rights and obligations of the spouses;395 and juridical acts can create 
 
 390. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366. More accurately, legal 
relationships exist only between persons. Thus, in the case of ownership of a 
thing, the legal relationship is between the owner and all other persons who must 
respect her ownership. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 
1.1; BALIS, supra note 141, § 22, at 73. This distinction, however, seems too 
technical. It is therefore acceptable in modern civilian doctrine to state that a 
person can have a legal relation to a thing (e.g., ownership in that thing). See 
YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:13.  
 391. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2019). The term “conventional usufruct” 
denotes usufructs created by juridical act. Courts and scholars further distinguish 
“contractual usufruct,” created by contract or other inter vivos juridical acts, and 
“testamentary usufruct,” created by mortis causa juridical acts. See A.N. 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, §§ 1:10, at 23, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL 
SERVITUDES]. 
 392. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2019). The usufructuary is thus given a real 
right that is effective against the naked owner for enjoyment of the thing. This 
right derives from the ownership of the grantor or the naked owner. See 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 1:1, 1:11, 3:21–
3:25; Pilcher v. Paulk, 228 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 3d. Cir. 1969). A consumable 
thing may be extinguished by its physical consumption, or as a result of a juridical 
act, such as the payment of money. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 
62, § 2:17, at 52. 
 393. Exercise of a right may be an operative or an inoperative fact. For 
instance, when the owner of land exercises her own usus by a series of physical 
acts, usually no legal consequences attach to such acts. However, when the owner 
does certain acts that extend or affect her ownership, such as making 
improvements to her land, these acts result in certain legal consequences (e.g., 
ownership rights may extend to the component parts of the land by juridical fact). 
Lastly, exercise of a right may be a juridical act, as in the case of an obligee who 
places the obligor in default. See infra note 409. For a more detailed discussion of 
the concept of right in the civil law, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, 
supra note 1, at 435–44. See also supra note 60. 
 394. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, § 7; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 1.2–1.3; 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 358, 366.  
 395. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 98 (2019). 




limited real rights.396 Juridical acts, however, cannot give rise to an 
original acquisition397 of ownership.398  
 
 396. Thus, personal servitudes and limited personal servitudes can be 
established by juridical act. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2019) (conventional 
usufruct); id. art. 631 cmt. b (habitation established solely by juridical act); id. 
arts. 639, 645 (rights of use established primarily by juridical act). See 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 1:10, 8:3, 8:12. All 
types of conventional predial servitudes may be established by “title,” meaning 
any juridical act sufficient to establish a real right. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 654, 697, 
708, 739, 740 (2019). See also LARGUIER, supra note 243, Nos. 6–7. Apparent 
predial servitudes can also be established by a special type of tacit juridical act 
termed “destination of the owner.” This juridical act must be formal—that is, must 
constitute “title”—if the servitude is non-apparent. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 739–41 
(2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, §§ 6:1, 6:9, 6:39. 
Conventional servitudes may also be established by acquisitive prescription. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 710, 742 (2019). Nevertheless, possession—or, in this case, quasi-
possession—and the resulting acquisitive prescription are juridical facts. 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360; STARCK, supra note 112, Nos. 373–76. 
Building restrictions may be established only by juridical act. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
776 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 10:3. 
 397. Acquisition of ownership and other real rights can be original or 
derivative. An original acquisition of a real right entails the creation of a new real 
right that is independent of any preexisting real rights over the same thing. 
Accession, occupancy, and acquisitive prescription are examples. Cf. LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 482, 3412, 3446 (2019). Derivative acquisition, on the other hand, 
involves a transfer of a preexisting real right from one person—referred to as the 
predecessor, transferor, author, or ancestor in title—to another, referred to as the 
successor, transferee, or acquirer. Examples include the juridical acts of sale and 
donations. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1467, 2439 (2019). Derivative acquisition can also 
take place by operation of law, as in the case of intestate succession. Cf. LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 875, 880 (2019). The validity of a derivative acquisition usually 
depends on the existence of the predecessor’s real right. In other words, the 
predecessor must ordinarily be the true holder of the real right that is transferred 
to the successor. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, Law of, in 15 THE NEW 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 1974), reprinted in YIANNOPOULOS’ 
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY COURSEBOOK 251–54 (Dian Tooley-Knoblett, Jeanne 
Louise Carriere, & John Randall Trahan eds., 10th ed. 2014); YIANNOPOULOS, 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 442–43. Derivative acquisition entails a 
transfer from a predecessor to a successor (ayant cause). Universal successors 
substitute the predecessor as to her entire patrimony, whereas particular 
successors succeed to stipulated juridical relations. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506(28); 
JEAN-LOUIS GOUTAL, ESSAI SUR LE PRINCIPE DE L’EFFET RELATIVE DU CONTRAT 
Nos. 11–31, 246–47; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 342–47; MARTY & 
RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, Nos. 171–72. The parties to a transfer of a right may 




Juridical acts can modify or transfer existing legal relationships or 
rights. Thus, contracts can modify obligations;399 juridical acts of the 
owner can modify the legal nature of a thing;400 juridical acts can also 
modify conventional servitudes;401 and juridical acts may, in certain cases, 
modify prescriptive periods.402 Juridical acts can transfer403 existing real 
 
act through representatives, as provided by law or juridical act. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2985 (2019); Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1091–1103. 
 398. A derivative acquisition of a real right can be the direct result of a juridical 
act. Conversely, a juridical act can never result directly in an original acquisition 
of ownership. See WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 343; BONNECASE II, 
supra note 25, Nos. 360, 366, 449; STARCK, supra note 112, Nos. 373–76; Storck, 
supra note 292, No. 11. Acquisition of ownership of an immovable as a result of 
a 10-year acquisitive prescription may involve a juridical act (“just title” under 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. b (2019)). The acquisition, however, is made by 
direct operation of law, not by the juridical act. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, 
supra note 62, § 11:10; LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. b (2019) (“A just title need 
not be derived from the true owner because if that were the case, prescription 
would have no place. The law merely requires an act which, if it had been 
executed by the true owner, would have conveyed ownership or established 
another real right.”) (emphasis added). Original acquisition of rights of 
intellectual property and patents are governed by special legislation. See 
YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 2:15.  
 399. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2019). For example, the unilateral juridical 
act of choosing one of the items in a contract with an alternative obligation 
modifies the obligation into pure and simple. See id. arts. 1808–09; LEVASSEUR, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 79; cf. LITZEROPOULOS, supra note 
336, at 221.   
 400. Thus, an owner may by juridical act deimmobilize component parts of an 
immovable. LA. CIV. CODE art. 468 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra 
note 62, § 7:22. 
 401. Contractual and testamentary freedom allow such modification within the 
permissible bounds of mandatory law. See YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL 
SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:2, at 350.  
 402. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3471, 3505–3504.4 (2019); Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., 
For Whom the Clock Tolls? Louisiana’s New Law on Tolling Agreements, 61 LA. 
B.J. 182–85 (2013). 
 403. This type of transfer is also referred to as a transfer by particular title. See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506(28). Acquisition of an existing right is also known as 
derivative acquisition. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 443. 
Transfer or encumbrance of a composite or principal thing includes its component 
parts or accessories. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 469 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, 
PROPERTY, supra note 62, §§ 2:21, 2:25. Pursuant to the “principle of specificity,” 
a transfer of an aggregate of things technically entails separate transfers of each 
individualized thing. See id. at § 2:22; see also infra note 599. Sufficient 
description of the property transferred, either in the act or by reference to another 




or personal rights unless otherwise provided by law.404 Usually, for the 
validity of such transfer, the transferor must be the lawful holder of the 
right or must be duly authorized by the holder.405 Thus, a juridical act of 
 
act, is required. Nitro Energy, L.L.C. v. Nelson Energy, Inc., 34 So. 3d 524, 527 
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2010); Hargrove v. Hodge, 121 So. 224, 225 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir. 1928). Specificity of title is not required in the case of boundary tacking, which 
is a juridical fact. See Loutre Land and Timber Co. v. Roberts et al., 63 So. 3d 120 
(La. 2011). An existing juridical act serves as a valid cause for the enrichment of 
one party to the act and for the corresponding impoverishment of the other party. 
Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 122–23 (La. 1974).  
 404. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1765, 1766, 1984 (2019); LEVASSEUR, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 27–30. WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra 
note 84, No. 334. Question arises as to whether restraints on alienation of property 
can be imposed by juridical act. Traditional civilian doctrine is positioned 
negatively toward such acts, recognizing only a personal obligation of the parties. 
Thus, a transfer of property in violation of a contractually imposed restraint on 
alienation is valid, especially if the transferee is a third person. The transferor is 
liable for the breach of the promise not to alienate. This traditional approach 
cannot be taken too far. In exceptional cases, reasonable restraints on alienation 
that protect a legitimate interest of the party enforcing it ought to be enforceable 
against third parties. Of course, enforceable restrictions of alienation of 
immovables can be imposed by means of a resolutory condition. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 1767, 1775, 2021 (2019). Also, a contractual prohibition of assignment of a 
right may have effect against assignees in good faith under the public records 
doctrine. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2653 cmt. b (2019). For more detail, see 
YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:28; Comment, Restraints on the 
Power of Conventional Alienation of Immovables in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 
262 (1934); cf. Michelle Cumyn, Les restrictions à la liberté d'aliéner dans le 
Code civil du Quebec, 39 MCGILL L.J. 877 (1994). See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
805, 807 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1112 (2019); Symeon C. Symeonides & 
Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. 
REV. 69, 142–14, 146–47, 153–57 (1993) (discussing agreements restraining 
alienation or partition of a co-owned thing).   
 405. This principle is expressed in the long-standing maxim, “Nemo plus iuris 
ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet” (no one can transfer a greater right 
than one has), also known as, “Nemo dat quod non habet” (no one can give 
something that one does not own). DIG. 50.17.54 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 46). See 
WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 347; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 
250; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 443; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 3.26; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2015 (1870); 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 517 cmt. b (2019). 




the owner406 may result in derivative acquisition of ownership;407 a 
conventional assignment of a personal right transfers that right to the 
assignee.408 
Lastly, juridical acts can extinguish legal relationships and related 
rights. Contracts, as well as performance, extinguish obligations, and the 
exercise of a credit right may lead to extinction of the right;409 divorce 
dissolves the marriage,410 while reconciliation extinguishes certain causes 
of divorce;411 reconciliation or forgiveness are valid defenses to the action 
for unworthiness of a successor,412 and they set aside a disinherison of a 
forced heir;413 juridical acts can extinguish limited real rights;414 and 
renunciation of prescription extinguishes the right prescribed.415  
 
 406. In effect, the legal relationship between the transferor and the thing passes 
to the transferee. Furthermore, an owner can establish limited real rights, such as 
servitudes in favor of another. Capacity and power to alienate are also required 
here. See YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:16–6:17; see 
also supra note 284. 
 407. See supra note 397. 
 408. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2642 (2019); ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID W. 
GRUNING, LOUISIANA LAW OF SALE AND LEASE. A PRÉCIS 23–28 (3d ed. 2015). 
 409. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1854, 1906 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 13.1–13.16; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 248, at 132–37. Likewise, exercise or satisfaction of a credit right may 
lead to extinction of that right. Thus, the act of exercising an existing right can 
also be a juridical act. For instance, exercising the right of option or first refusal 
or choosing one of many items in an alternative obligation are juridical acts. 
Usually, exercising a right is a unilateral juridical act. When the right stems from 
a contract, the legal characterization and the onerous or gratuitous cause of the 
contract also control the characterization and cause of the unilateral act exercising 
the right. See infra note 511. 
 410. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 101 (2019). 
 411. See id. art. 104. See supra notes 327, 328. 
 412. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 943; LORIO, supra note 285, § 5:3; see also supra 
notes 327–28. 
 413. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1625 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, 10:14. See 
supra notes 327–29. 
 414. Servitudes can be extinguished by agreement. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 610, 766 (2019). Servitudes can also be extinguished unilaterally by 
renunciation. See id. arts. 626, 771; YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, 
supra note 391, §§ 6:5, 6:9; YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 
87, §§ 8:12–8:13.  
 415. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3449 (2019). Renunciation of acquisitive 
prescription in particular does not transfer the thing back to the owner. Instead, 
the adverse possessor forfeits her right to the thing, which, by operation of law, 
remains in the patrimony of the owner. See id. cmt. d. Capacity to alienate is 




Juridical acts also give rise to, alter, or extinguish juridical situations, 
a relatively recent—and debated—French concept.416 In oversimplified 
terms, under modern civilian doctrine, a juridical situation generally refers 
to the relationship of a person not with another person, but with the law. It 
essentially concerns the legal status or position of a person in the civil law, 
through which rights and obligations are contemplated. Thus, in a contract 
of sale, the seller has a legal relationship with the buyer and is in a juridical 
situation of a seller. In a contract of marriage, the spouse has a legal 
relationship with the other spouse while being in a juridical situation of a 
married person.417 An example from property law is precarious possession. 
Thus, a person who uses property with the owner’s permission, or who 
acknowledges the owner’s rights, is placed in the juridical situation of 
precarious possession.418 In the same vein, acknowledgment of the right of 
 
required for a valid renunciation. Id. art. 3451; id. art. 3464 cmt. c; 3 MARCEL 
PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 
748 (M. Picard ed., 2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter PLANIOL & RIPERT III]; see also 
supra note 284.  
 416. In French doctrine, situation juridique was originally proposed by Duguit 
as an alternative to droit subjectif. See ROUBIER, supra note 60, at 60–73; MARTY 
& RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, Nos. 134, 137; MICHEL VILLEY ET AL., LE DROIT 
SUBJECTIF EN QUESTION, in 9 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1964); 
OCTAVIAN IONESCU, LA NOTION DE DROIT SUBJECTIF DANS LE DROIT PRIVÉ (2d ed. 
1978). See supra note 123.  
 417. Juridical situations focus on the legal position of a person within a given 
legal relationship, rather than on the person’s legal relation with other persons or 
things. Thus, assignment is the legal relationship between assignor and assignee; 
subrogation is the modification of the juridical situation (substitution) of the 
obligee. See ROUBIER, supra note 60, at 60–78 (distinguishing between situation 
juridique subjective and objective); BETTI, supra note 2, at 5–7; MAZEAUD ET AL. 
I, supra note 37, No. 155 n.1; 1 CHRISTIAN LARROUMET, DROIT CIVIL, 
INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT PRIVE No. 530 (4th ed. 2004); GEORGIADES, 
supra note 60, at 256; RÉMY CABRILLAC, L’ACTE JURIDIQUE CONJONCTIF EN 
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 15 (1990); Brenner, supra note 37, No. 16. See also 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1825 (2019); LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra 
note 248, at 107–19; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 
11.31–11.34 (discussing the differences and similarities between subrogation and 
assignment of rights). 
 418. Precarious possession, as a juridical situation, can be established by 
operation of law (e.g., legal usufruct) or usually by juridical act. Establishment of 
precarious possession by juridical act is possible in three situations. First, it may 
occur via nominate bilateral juridical acts. This is the most usual and 
straightforward method. Examples include lease, loan for use, deposit, and 
contractual usufruct. In all of these acts, permission by the owner or possessor and 
corresponding acknowledgment by the precarious possessor is either express or 





implicit in the contract. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 12:20; 
PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, Nos. 160, 961; 28 GABRIEL BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & ALBERT TISSIER, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT 
CIVIL No. 303, in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS (La. State L. Inst. trans., 1972) 
(4th ed. 1924). Second, establishment of precarious possession may arise through 
unilateral juridical act when an adverse possessor acknowledges the rights of the 
owner, thus interrupting acquisitive prescription. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3464 (2019). 
Upon acknowledgment, the former adverse possessor who still detains the thing 
is now a precarious possessor. This method does not appear as often in practice, 
but it still is a theoretical possibility. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Possession, 46 
LA. L. REV. 655, 685–87 (1986); BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, Nos. 309, 
528, 550; but see PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, No. 734. Third, 
establishment of precarious possession by juridical act may occur with tacit or 
implied permission, as when the owner merely tolerates her neighbor’s 
encroachments and the neighbor implicitly recognizes the owner’s rights. See 
YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:36. This tacit and 
revocable concession of the owner is a de facto bilateral juridical act. It is more 
likely to appear in cases of precarious quasi-possession of predial servitudes, 
which do not involve a complete eviction of the owner. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 742, 
3421 (2019); see also JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY. A 
PRÉCIS 176 (2012); GABRIEL MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL, LES 
BIENS Nos. 28, 154, 187 (2d ed. 1980); PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, 
No. 961; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, Nos. 269, 282–86; 2 CHARLES 
AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS. PROPERTY § 180, at 97–98, in 
2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS (La. State L. Inst. trans., 1966) (P. Esmein ed., 7th 
ed. 1961). A juridical act, express or tacit, establishing precariousness must be 
proven in court by the party claiming it. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1831 (2019). Once 
the existence or inexistence of such a juridical act is proven, further judicial 
determination of the character of the possession is assisted by recourse to 
rebuttable presumptions that refer to the inception of the possession. Id. arts. 3427, 
3438; YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 12:21. In the case of quasi-
possession of servitudes, in particular, the law furnishes an additional 
presumption, resolving all doubts as to the existence of the servitude in the favor 
of the servient estate. LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 (2019). See YIANNOPOULOS, 
PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:25, at 418–20. Determination is not 
always easy, as was displayed in Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 
2015), which held that a 64-year quasi-possession of a pathway through 
neighboring land was precarious due to the neighbor’s tacit permission. See 
YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:36, n.3 (Supp. 2016). 
For further discussion, see John A. Lovett, Precarious Possession, 77 LA. L. REV. 
617 (2017); Cody J. Miller, Boudreaux v. Cummings: Time to Interrupt an 
Erroneous Approach to Acquisitive Prescription, 77 LA. L. REV. 1143 (2017).  




the owner by an adverse possessor is a unilateral juridical act that 
interrupts prescription, thus terminating the juridical situation of adverse 
possession.419  
From the above examples, it is apparent that juridical acts can 
effectuate a change in a person’s legal position in a number of ways. 
Juridical acts empower the maker to create or alter operative facts. This 
power, however, should not impair the rights of others. Thus, the effect of 
most juridical acts is limited to the parties.420 
ii. Relative Effect 
Pursuant to the principle of privity (relativity) of contract, bilateral 
juridical acts normally have effects only between the parties.421 This is a 
topic further discussed in the law of conventional obligations.422 In 
essence, the contract constitutes a juridical act for the parties alone. For 
 
 419. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3464 (2019). Such acknowledgment may be 
formal or informal, express or tacit. It also requires capacity to alienate. Id. art. 
3464 cmt. c; see supra note 284. The owner’s acceptance of such 
acknowledgment is not required. PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, No. 733; 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 418, No. 528; Robert E. Blum, 
Interruption of Prescription by Acknowledgment in Louisiana, 14 TUL. L. REV. 
430 (1940). 
 420. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1983, 1985 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 79–81. 
 421. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 264–77; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 
169; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 422–24; JOSSERAND, supra note 258, 
No. 155; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, Nos. 594–95, 607–09; WEILL & 
TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 338–39. Personal obligations constitute a foreign 
affair (res inter alios acta) for third parties. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1983, 1985 
(2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:28, at 507 n.3; 
LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 80; DAVID, supra 
note 363, at 115–16. 
 422. See GOUTAL, supra note 397, No. 9; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 1.1–1.8. 




third persons,423 the contract is, at best, a juridical fact.424 Especially 
certain juridical acts, such as extrapatrimonial acts—for example, 
marriage, adoption, or acknowledgment of child—or recorded transfers of 
real rights or leases, may be effective against third parties according to 
law.425 At first blush, the principle of privity seems incompatible with the 
notion of a unilateral juridical act, where, by definition, only one party is 
involved.426 Unilateral acts, nevertheless, usually have recipients who may 
be bound by the terms of the act if they so choose.427  
It follows that the autonomy of the will operates within the bounds of 
mandatory law, which may limit the effect of a juridical act to the parties. 
Mandatory law also requires a lawful cause for every juridical act.428 
b. Cause  
In the law of conventional obligations, cause is the reason why a party 
to a contract obligated herself.429 In the context of a general theory of 
 
 423. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506(32) (2019) (defining third persons to a 
contract or judgment as “all who are not parties to it.”). Thus, third persons are 
strangers to the contract and to the contracting parties. Successors (ayants cause) 
of the parties may substitute the parties in the juridical act, if the juridical relation 
created by the act is heritable. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1765, 1766, 1984 (2019); 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 4.1–4.15; LEVASSEUR, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 27–30. Universal successors 
substitute the party as to her entire patrimony, whereas particular successors 
succeed to stipulated juridical relations. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506(28); GOUTAL, 
supra note 397, Nos. 11–31, 246–47; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 342–
47; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, Nos. 171–72; PHILIPPE DELMAS 
SAINT-HILAIRE, LES TIERS À L’ACTE JURIDIQUE (2000).  
 424. See RIEG, supra note 46, at 10–11; HAUSER, supra note 66, No. 160; Petit 
& Rouxel, supra note 163, No. 7. Third parties can use any means of proof to 
prove a contract. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 45. 
 425. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, No. 609; Brenner, supra note 
37, Nos. 125–26; GOUTAL, supra note 397, Nos. 32–45. 
 426. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 121, 162–170. 
 427. See GOUTAL, supra note 397, Nos. 394–96. The maker of a unilateral 
juridical act, on the other hand, may be bound toward an obligee who is 
unspecified at the time of the making of the act. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1944 
(2019) (“An offer of a reward made to the public is binding upon the offeror even 
if the one who performs the requested act does not know of the offer.”) (emphasis 
added); Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 718.  
 428. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1966–70 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 53–62. 
 429. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967 (2019). 




juridical acts, “cause” refers to the reason for the manifestation of will430 
or, perhaps more accurately, the justification of the legal efficacy of the 
will.431 As discussed in the law of obligations,432 this reason can be 
understood objectively—pursuant to the nominate type of the act433—or 
subjectively—according to the parties’ motivations.434  
In theory, the requirement of cause applies to all types of juridical 
acts.435 The intricacies surrounding cause, however, manifest themselves 
in the cases of patrimonial juridical acts436 and, more specifically, 
 
 430. Cf. id.  
 431. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 172–84; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, No. 31; 
PETROPOULOS, supra note 36, at 508–11; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 
545–50. A valid cause—be it objectively or subjectively determined—essentially 
refers to a practical purpose that justifies the act. PETROPOULOS, supra note 36, at 
508–09. The civilian doctrine of cause, therefore, gives legal effect to the will, 
regardless of whether the parties expressly referred to a legal object. Thus, to 
revisit a debate discussed earlier, see supra notes 74, 131 and accompanying text, 
when one purchases groceries, indeed one does so for the practical purpose of 
consumption. Nevertheless, under the doctrine of cause, this practical purpose 
justifies the legal effect of the transaction.  
 432. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 196–399; Litvinoff, 
Cause, supra note 373, at 3; Smith, supra note 340, at 2; George M. Snellings, 
Cause and Consideration in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 178 (1933–1934).  
 433. See Litvinoff, Cause, supra note 373, at 14–15. For instance, in a bilateral 
contract, the obligation of one party constitutes the cause for the obligation of the 
other party. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1908 cmt. b (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, 
supra note 33, § 222; HENRI CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS 18–19 
(3d ed. 1927) [hereinafter CAPITANT, CAUSE]. 
 434. See Litvinoff, Cause, supra note 373, at 16–18. Express conditions on a 
contract supply additional subjective causes of the parties. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
1767 (2019); WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, §§ 97, 98; 2 ANDREAS VON TUHR, DER 
ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS Pt. 2, § 72, at 74–80 
(1918) [hereinafter VON TUHR II]; CHRISTOS FILIOS, E AITIA STIS ENOCHIKES 
SYMVASEIS [THE CAUSA CONTRAHENDI] 135–49 (2007) (Greece); LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 250. Inner motivations of a party that remain 
subsidiary cannot give rise to a claim of error. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950 cmt. f 
(2019)  
 435. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 203; Héron, supra note 
242, at 88. Thus, the concept of abstract juridical acts is uncommon in Louisiana 
law. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449–51; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 234, 244–48. 
 436. Thus, it is more accurate to state that “the theory of cause covers all 
obligations that originate in a juridical act.” LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, § 239, at 434. 




conventional obligations.437 Traditional civilian theory has categorized the 
types of cause most often encountered in patrimonial juridical acts. A party 
makes a patrimonial juridical act to engage another party and receive a 
counterperformance,438 to fulfill an existing obligation,439 or out of 
liberality.440 On the other hand, extrapatrimonial juridical acts are more 
regulated—their cause usually appears in the solemnity of the act.441 
The preceding analysis illustrates that juridical acts can produce 
several legal consequences across a wide range of topics in the civil law. 
This plethora of legal objects is perhaps the best evidence of the doctrinal 
validity and practical utility of a theory of juridical acts. Indeed, the wide 
 
 437. See id. (distinguishing between “cause of the contract” and “cause of the 
obligation”). Bilateral as well as unilateral contracts are governed by the doctrine 
of cause. See, e.g., Union Bank of La. v. Beatty, 10 La. Ann. 378 (1855) 
(discussing cause of the unilateral contract of suretyship). Unilateral juridical acts 
are also governed by the theory of cause. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, § 239, at 434. In a conventional obligation created by contract, the 
objective cause is usually found within the contract—for example, the cause of 
the seller’s obligation is the buyer’s counter-obligation. In unilateral juridical acts, 
cause is usually found outside the premise of the act. Several unilateral acts—e.g., 
payment, execution of documents, and conveyances—are performed within the 
framework of a preexisting contract. In such cases, the contract furnishes the 
cause. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, No. 238; Brenner, supra note 
37, No. 168; CAPITANT, CAUSE, supra note 433, at 79–80. See infra note 511. The 
doctrine of cause also applies to legacies, although rescission on the account of 
error is a rare occurrence. See PLANIOL III, supra note 329, Nos. 2518, 2879.   
 438. Causa credendi (or acquirendi). Thus, a seller enters into a contract of 
sale—or to sell—in order to receive payment of the price from the buyer. LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 2439, 2623 (2019). See VON TUHR II, supra note 434, § 72, at 69–74; 
2 ERNST IMMANUEL BEKKER, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN PANDEKTENRECHTS § 100, 
at 148–51 (1889); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449–451; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 245, 248.   
 439. Causa solvendi. Thus, a seller in a contract to sell conveys the thing sold 
to the buyer in order to discharge the conventional obligation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2623 (2019). See VON TUHR II, supra note 434, § 72, at 67–69; BEKKER, supra 
note 438, § 100, at 148–151; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, 
at 449–51; YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:35; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 245, 248; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, 
supra note 270, §§ 5:6–5:11. 
 440. Causa donandi. Donative cause characterizes gratuitous juridical acts, 
such as donations inter vivos and mortis causa. See VON TUHR II, supra note 434, 
§ 72, at 74–80; BEKKER, supra note 438, § 100, at 148–51; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL 
LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449–51; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, 
§§ 245, 248. 
 441. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 58. 




availability of juridical acts is an expression of the principle of the 
autonomy of the will. Mandatory law polices this freedom by limiting the 
effect of juridical acts in certain instances. This analysis also attempts to 
elucidate the general definition of juridical act. It should follow from the 
above that a juridical act is an intentional declaration of will that is 
performed in order to acquire, exercise, modify, transfer, or extinguish 
rights; when such act is done by competent persons and in the prescribed 
manner, the law recognizes the act and carries out the intent.442 This 
concept transcends the law of obligations and permeates the entire civil 
law. Thus, several aspects of the law of obligations—for example, vices 
of consent, cause, object, interpretation, and proof—apply by analogy to 
juridical acts concerning other areas of the law, such as testaments or acts 
within the scope of the law of persons.443 This notion of juridical acts is 
illustrated further by examining the various classifications of juridical 
acts.444  
B. Classification of Juridical Acts 
Civilian doctrine classifies juridical acts according to various factors, 
such as the number of parties to the act, the type of legal object, and the 
patrimonial nature of the transaction. These classifications, although 
useful,445 should be seen as more descriptive rather than systematic.446 
 
 442. See POUND, supra note 33, at 420–21; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–48. 
 443. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 1.10, 12.24. 
 444. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448–51. 
 445. Characterization of a juridical act, in a more technical sense, is an 
important function in the field of conflict of laws. Generally, the choice-of-law 
rules on conventional obligations also apply to juridical acts other than contracts. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3541 (2019). Nevertheless, particular juridical acts are 
governed by more specific choice-of-law rules. Examples include testaments, 
marriage and divorce, matrimonial regimes, and property. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
3541 cmt. a (2019); Symeon C. Symeonides, Private International Law 
Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Louisiana Experience, 57 RABELS 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 460, 
495 (1993); PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & 
CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 3.3–3.4 (6th ed. 2018) 
(discussing the problem of characterization in the conflict of laws).  
 446. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 133; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448–49; BETTI, supra note 2, at 281; Jean-Jacques 
Bienvenu, Actes juridiques et classifications, 71 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE THÉORIE 
JURIDIQUE [DROITS] 21 (1988). With regard to the difficulties in classifying 




Classification of juridical acts also provides helpful illustrations of the 
notion and function of juridical acts across a broad spectrum of legal 
relations. 
The discussion proceeds according primarily to the French theory of 
acte juridique. Components from the German theory of Rechtsgeschäft 
will be employed when useful. Two broad classifications are examined. 
The first classification concerns the familiar—and sometimes 
misunderstood—distinction between bilateral and unilateral juridical acts. 
The second classification focuses on the category of patrimonial acts and 
distinguishes several subcategories. As will be seen, the existing French 
subcategories are not as accurate as the German equivalent subcategories, 
with the exception of the familiar and successful French distinction 
between conservatory, administrative, and dispositive acts. Finally, 
civilian doctrine identifies several other categories of juridical acts that 
will be mentioned in passing. 
1. Unilateral and Bilateral Juridical Acts 
The classification of unilateral and bilateral juridical acts is familiar447 
because it resembles the well-known distinction between bilateral and 
unilateral contracts.448 Nevertheless, the two classifications must be 
distinguished. Unilateral juridical acts should not be confused with 
unilateral contracts.449 Unilateral juridical acts comprise a single 
 
contracts, see Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Classifying and Clarifying Contracts, 76 LA. 
L. REV. 1063 (2016); BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, No. 49. 
 447. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 144 (“[this classification is] the 
most important one. However, it is the least useful of all”). Nonetheless, the term 
“unilateral juridical act” appears in the definition of procuration. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 2986–87 (1998). See Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1109–11. 
Previously, the term appeared in the revision comments in the law of property. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 517 cmt. c (1980); id. art. 654 cmt. b (1978). This classification 
appears in the revised French Civil Code. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 
1100–01 (Fr.). A definition of unilateral acts does not appear in the revised French 
Civil Code, although the draft revision presented by the “Catala committee” (one 
of the committees preparing the draft of revised civil code articles of the French 
law of obligations) did provide such a definition. See Becqué-Ickowicz, supra 
note 121, Nos. 12–13. 
 448. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1907, 1908 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 4–5. The term “unilateral contract,” in turn, is 
understood differently at common law. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 
33, § 97; Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1109 n.102. 
 449. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 144, 150; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL 
LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448 n.2; Petit & Rouxel, supra note 163, No. 10.  




declaration of will, such as a testament or a procuration.450 Unilateral 
juridical acts of whatever kind are not contracts.451 Conversely, in a 
unilateral contract, such as a donation inter vivos, there is only one obligor 
and one obligee; however, the contract was formed by the concurring 
wills—offer and acceptance—of the donor and donee. Therefore, all 
contracts—including unilateral contracts—are bilateral juridical acts.452  
The factor for determining whether a juridical act is unilateral or 
bilateral is the number of the parties453 to the act, or more accurately, the 
number of wills forming the act.454 Thus, a unilateral act is the product of 
the will of a sole author. A sole author can be one or more persons jointly 
expressing a common interest—one common will. Thus, an offer made by 
two co-owners of property is considered a unilateral juridical act.455 A 
bilateral act is formed by the wills of two or more parties.456 All other 
 
 450. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 310–11; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 
489; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 24, at 110; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 
37, No. 567. 
 451. See Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1109 n.102 (“It is equally 
clear that a unilateral contract as defined in article 1907 differs from a unilateral 
juridical act in that the former is a contract, while the latter is not. According to 
article 1906, a contract is an ‘agreement by two or more parties.’ Id. art. 1906 
(emphasis added). In a unilateral act there is only one party, and thus there is no 
‘agreement’ and no ‘contract.’”). 
 452. See TANCELIN, SOURCES, supra note 190, No. 356.4; Becqué-Ickowicz, 
supra note 121, No. 15. 
 453. The term “party” does not equate to number of persons. Thus one “party” 
to a transaction could be several co-owners or co-lessees. Likewise, one person 
can act for two parties in one bilateral transaction. An example is a contract of a 
representative with herself. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2998 (2019). See LITVINOFF & 
TÊTE, supra note 2, at 144–45; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 
1, at 448; Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1131–33; FLOUR ET AL., supra 
note 105, No. 430. 
 454. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 48; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, No. 25. 
This distinction refers to the formation of the act. Upon their formation, however, 
certain juridical acts can have legal effects on others. For example, a testament is 
unilateral as to its formation with legal effects that subsequently occur for the 
legatees. See STORCK, supra note 133, at 15–58.  
 455. See CABRILLAC, supra note 417, No. 45; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 144. Other 
examples include “a procuration issued jointly by several principals naming the 
same representative or a joint renunciation of a servitude by the co-owners of a 
dominant estate.” Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1110 n.105. 
 456. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448; BETTI, 
supra note 2, at 310–11; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 24, at 110–12. 




persons to the act are third parties.457 When counting wills to determine 
whether an act is unilateral or bilateral, it is important to focus on the will 
creating the legal effect of the act.458 This means that the concurrence of 
other persons—such as notaries or witnesses in an authentic act or 
representatives or mandataries of the parties—does not determine the 
unilateral or bilateral character of the act.459 Thus, a notarial testament, 
signed by the testatrix, the notary, and the competent witnesses, remains a 
unilateral juridical act.460 
To determine the time of effectiveness of unilateral acts, civilian 
theory further classifies unilateral acts as receptive or non-receptive.461 
Most unilateral acts are receptive. Receptive unilateral juridical acts must 
be communicated to those concerned to produce legal effect.462 The 
content and effects of these acts are addressed to the recipient.463 Examples 
 
 457. See WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 339; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra 
note 37, No. 271; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 431–35; see in general 
SAINT-HILAIRE, supra note 423, passim. 
 458. Heritable rights and obligations established by the juridical act pass to the 
parties’ successors. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1765, 1766, 1984 (2019). The distinction 
between universal and particular successors is well-established in Louisiana 
doctrine and jurisprudence. See id. art. 3506(28). Cf. MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 
37, Nos. 272–77; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 339; FLOUR ET AL., supra 
note 105, Nos. 436–53; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, Nos. 603–06.  
 459. The same applies with respect to juridical acts requiring authorization or 
approval. See CABRILLAC, supra note 417, Nos. 45–52. 
 460. See GUERRIERO, supra note 340, at 281–321; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 
105, No. 425; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 49. Third persons who are directly 
affected by a juridical act are not parties to the act, unless they become parties 
voluntarily or by application of law—e.g., universal successors of the parties, 
assignees of contracts. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 50. Furthermore, a 
signature to a deed is not a separate juridical act. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 
39; cf. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 12.19. 
 461. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 181–82. See also 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448 (using the German 
terminology of “juridical acts addressed to a particular person and juridical acts 
address[ed] to anyone”); Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1110 n.107.  
 462. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 181, 196–97; FLOUR 
ET AL., supra note 105, No. 494; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 
1, at 448; Jamal Rbii, L’acte unilatéral réceptice, in METAMORPHOSES DE L’ACTE 
JURIDIQUE 87 (Marc Nicod ed., 2018); Brenner, supra note 37, No. 167. 
 463. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 198–99; 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448. 




include putting in default;464 procuration;465 offer;466 acceptance;467 notice 
of termination of contract;468 exercising an option or right of first 
refusal;469 exercising choice in an alternative obligation;470 waiver of a 
right;471 confirmation;472 ratification;473 and actions, demands, and 
defenses, such as judicial or extrajudicial remedies for breach of 
contract.474 When communicated, these unilateral acts are usually 
irrevocable unless otherwise provided.475 To determine the time of 
communication, the relevant provisions of the law of conventional 
obligations are pertinent in default of more specific rules.476 Conversely, 
 
 464. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1989–93 (2019); SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS. PUTTING IN DEFAULT AND DAMAGES, § 2.2, at 31, in 6 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (1999) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, DAMAGES].  
 465. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2987 (2019); See Holmes & Symeonides, supra 
note 30, at 1110 n.107. 
 466. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1928, 1930 (2019); Litvinoff, Consent, supra 
note 48, at 706. 
 467. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1934–43 (2019); Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 
48, at 724–25. Acceptance and renunciation of a succession are also unilateral 
receptive juridical acts. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 957, 963 (2019); LORIO, supra note 
285, §§ 6:4, 6:5, 6:7.  
 468. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 149. 
 469. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1933, 2620, 2625 (2019); Litvinoff, Consent, 
supra note 48, at 745–57; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 
5:20–5:22, 5:26–5:27.  
 470. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1808–14 (2019); See Moore, supra note 135, at 
296. 
 471. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 176. Renunciation of 
prescription for immovables must be express; in all other cases it can be tacit. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3450 (2019); id. art. 3449 cmts. c, d. Acknowledgment interrupting 
prescription can likewise be express or tacit. Id. art. 3464 cmt. c. 
 472. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1842, 1844 (2019); Moore, supra note 135, at 
296; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 12.52. 
 473. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1843–45 (2019); STORCK, supra note 133, No. 
53; Moore, supra note 135, at 296; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra 
note 87, § 12.58. 
 474. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, No. 181. 
 475. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1930 (2019) (revocable offers constitute a 
residual category); Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 714. Also, acceptance 
and renunciation of a succession are irrevocable, unless nullified by a change in 
circumstances. LA. CIV. CODE art. 952 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, § 6:1. 
 476. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 200–04; Litvinoff, 
Consent, supra note 48, at 725–27. Certain juridical acts have retroactive effect 
once communicated. For instance, acceptance or renunciation of a succession 




certain unilateral acts are non-receptive. These acts are not addressed to 
anyone in particular, and they take effect either immediately or at a time 
in the future, according to the terms of the act or the law.477 Until they take 
effect, non-receptive unilateral acts are freely revocable. Upon their effect, 
such acts may be revoked if this option is still available. Usually, they are 
also subject to formal requirements.478 Examples include offers of reward 
to the public,479 acknowledgment of paternity,480 and testaments.481 
In any event, unilateral juridical acts are, in principle, not binding on 
the recipient, at least not without the recipient’s choice.482 The question 
 
have effect that is retroactive to the time of death of the decedent. LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 954 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, § 6:1. 
 477. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 182, 192–95; 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448. 
 478. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448; Brenner, 
supra note 37, No. 170. 
 479. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1944–46 (2019). An offer of reward or its 
subsequent revocation must be made to the public, that is to say, it must be 
publicized; however, it is not addressed to a certain recipient. See Litvinoff, 
Consent, supra note 48, at 745. 
 480. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 163, 231. Acknowledgment of paternity 
can be made by authentic act in a variety of situations. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
190.1 (2019) (three-party acknowledgment); id. art. 195 (presumption by 
marriage and acknowledgment); id. art. 196 (formal acknowledgment). These acts 
are not addressed to anyone in particular, and they normally take effect 
immediately. The authentic act of acknowledgment can be revoked or annulled. 
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:406 (2019). Nevertheless, revocation of the act is not 
sufficient to refute the presumption of paternity created by the act—a timely 
disavowal action must be brought. LA. CIV. CODE art. 196 cmt. a (2016).  
 481. Testaments are not addressed to the legatees, meaning that a testament 
need not be communicated to the legatees by the testator. A testament takes effect 
at the death of the testator. Until then, it is freely revocable. See LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 1469, 1606 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, § 12:1. The legatees can by 
unilateral (and receptive) act accept or renounce the succession in whole or in 
part. See LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 6:4, 6:5, 6:7; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 
2, at 146; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 77, at 114–15. See also 
MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 57–53 (disproving older theories 
that proposed a “contractual” nature of testaments). Revocation of a testament is 
a non-receptive act, usually formal. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1607–1610.1 (2019). 
Implied revocation by the physical destruction of the testament is also a non-
receptive and de facto unilateral juridical act. Intent to revoke must be established. 
See LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 14:3, 14:6; PLANIOL III, supra note 329, No. 2843, 
at 387–88; CROSS, supra note 331, at 104. See also supra note 331.  
 482. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 164; Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 
30, at 1110. Of course, parties can agree by contract to give binding effect to a 




whether a person can bind herself legally through a unilateral commitment 
was once a hotly debated topic in France, but it is now settled in the 
affirmative.483 The same applies with respect to Louisiana law.484 In 
default of the many special rules that apply to special types of unilateral 
acts, the rules on conventional obligations apply, along with the necessary 
adaptations to the unilateral nature of the act.485  
A juridical act containing declarations of will of two or more parties 
is bilateral.486 Most agreements, especially contracts,487 are bilateral 
 
future unilateral act. Options contracts constitute an example. See LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 1933, 2620–21 (2019); Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 745–53; 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 5:13–5:14.  
 483. See Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 19–21; Brenner, supra note 
37, No. 165; Petit & Rouxel, supra note 163, No. 14; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 
105, Nos. 499–503; JOHN-GABRIEL CASTEL, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM OF THE 
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 249–51 (1962); BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, No. 42; 
PINEAU, supra note 37, at 125–26. For a thorough comparative discussion of this 
issue, see LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 77–88. 
 484. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1944 cmt. b (2019); Litvinoff, Consent, supra 
note 48, at 718–19 (arguing, on the one hand, that the obligation of the offeror of a 
reward to the public is legal rather than contractual; but also accepting, on the other 
hand, that the provisions on conventional obligations apply by analogy).  
 485. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (2019); See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 
168–69; MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, Nos. 217–35; TANCELIN, 
SOURCES, supra note 190, Nos. 362–364.16. For instance, unilateral juridical acts 
are also governed by the theory of cause. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, § 239 at 434. In bilateral juridical acts, such as contracts, the objective 
cause is usually found within the act—for example, the cause of the seller’s 
obligation is the buyer’s counter-obligation. In unilateral juridical acts, cause is 
usually found outside the premise of the act. Several unilateral acts—e.g., 
payment, execution of documents, and conveyances—are performed within the 
framework of a preexisting contract. In such cases, the contract furnishes the 
cause. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, No. 238; Brenner, supra note 
37, No. 168; CAPITANT, CAUSE supra note 433, at 79–80. See also infra note 511. 
The doctrine of cause also applies to legacies, although rescission on the account 
of error is a rare occurrence. See PLANIOL III, supra note 329, Nos. 2518, 2879. 
 486. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448; BETTI, 
supra note 2, at 310–11; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 24, at 110–12. 
 487. Under traditional French doctrine, the term “agreement” (convention) is 
broader than the term “contract” (contrat). Agreements are the genus of all 
bilateral juridical acts, including contracts. Contracts are a species of agreements 
that create, modify, or extinguish obligations. Thus, a bilateral juridical act 
establishing a conventional servitude is technically an agreement, not a contract. 
This distinction has faded, however, and today the two terms appear 
interchangeably. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 145; FLOUR ET AL., 




juridical acts.488 The bilateral nature of a contract is attributed to the 
method of its formation through two concurring acts—offer and 
 
supra note 105, Nos. 79–80; BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, No. 48. This 
older terminological difference no longer appears in the revised French law of 
obligations. See Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 14. At common law, the 
term “promise” prevails. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. 
L. INST., 1981); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 90, at 141–42. 
Scholars have challenged the primacy of promise in contract law, proposing a 
“consent theory of contract.” See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract 
as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1027 (1992). The consent theory closely 
resembles the civilian theory of juridical acts. See James R. Maxeiner, When Are 
Agreements Enforceable? Giving Consideration to Professor Barnett’s Consent 
Theory of Contract, 12 IUS GENTIUM 92 (2006). For a detailed and comparative 
approach to the concept of promise, see Martin A. Hogg, Promise: The Neglected 
Obligation in European Private Law, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 461 (2010); MARTIN 
A. HOGG, PROMISES AND CONTRACT LAW, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2011). 
Promises, as well as contracts, are characterized as “acts that have legal effect” in 
the Second Restatement of Contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
1 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981). A promise in particular is a “manifestation of 
intention to act or to refrain from acting in a specified way.” Id. § 2.  
 488. Some juridical acts are triangular in form, such as third-party beneficiary 
agreements. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1978–82 (2019); John Denson Smith, Third 
Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11 TUL. L. REV. 
18 (1936). Other juridical acts are plurilateral, such as a contract of lease with 
several lessees. See CABRILLAC, supra note 417, No. 16; Brenner, supra note 37, 
No. 174. French doctrine also distinguishes a separate category of collective 
juridical acts. Here, several persons declare one common will in pursuance of a 
common goal. See FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 504–12; Léon Duguit, 
Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 753 (1918) (E. 
Lorenzen trans.); GABRIEL ROUJOU DE BOUBÉE, ESSAI SUR L’ACTE JURIDIQUE 
COLLECTIF 169 (1961); TANCELIN, SOURCES, supra note 190, Nos. 359–361.3. 
Partnership agreements, articles of association or incorporation, and binding 
majority decisions of shareholders are examples of such acts. See Becqué-
Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 22; Petit & Rouxel, supra note 163, Nos. 17–18. 
Because these acts are a product of a union of wills, they are sometimes likened 
to unilateral juridical acts. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 176; MARTY & 
RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, at 273; TANCELIN, SOURCES, supra note 190, No. 
361. French doctrine refers to collective acts as “complex juridical acts” (actes 
juridiques complexes) because they often entail situations in which the majority 
decision is binding on all members. On the contrary, in simple acts (actes 
juridiques simples), there is correspondence between the number of parties and 
the number of wills declared. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 175–79; Jacques 
Moreau, A la recherche de l’acte complexe: l’exemple du droit public, 71 REVUE 
FRANÇAISE DE THÉORIE JURIDIQUE [DROITS] 75 (1988).    




acceptance.489 In cases of instantaneously formed contracts, such as a cash 
sale, offer and acceptance constitute an indistinguishable whole.490 
Conversely, a standing offer not yet accepted constitutes a unilateral 
juridical act.491 Equally, acceptance of such an offer is a unilateral juridical 
act.492 When a standing offer is accepted, a contract, which is a bilateral 
juridical act, is formed.493 
The distinction between unilateral and bilateral juridical acts is 
important for the delineation of the relative effects of a juridical act that 
are normally limited to the parties. Additionally, this distinction has some 
practical significance because it highlights the existence of unilateral 
juridical acts, which are not contracts and appear on several occasions in 
 
 489. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927 (2019). 
 490. Several unilateral juridical acts can appear within the framework of a 
contract. For example, putting in default and remedies for breach of contract 
presuppose the existence of a contract. Likewise, unilateral acts, such as notices, 
waivers, renunciations, and payments, are performed routinely within the frame 
of contract. In such cases, legal characterization of such acts—e.g., onerous or 
gratuitous—is made with reference to the main contract. See FLOUR ET AL., supra 
note 105, No. 490; see also infra note 511. Unilateral juridical acts can also 
become bilateral. An example is a procuration that is accepted by the 
representative. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2987 cmt. d (2019); Holmes & Symeonides, 
supra note 30, at 1110–11. 
 491. Such an offer entails legal consequences, such as its irrevocability in 
certain cases. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1928–32 (2019); LITZEROPOULOS, supra 
note 336, at 221. Prevailing French doctrine agrees that a standing offer 
constitutes a unilateral juridical act. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, 
Nos. 25, 313–19; Moore, supra note 135, at 300–07; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra 
note 2, at 149. Other approaches in French doctrine characterize an offer as a fait 
juridique. For a critical review of French doctrine on this issue, see JEAN-LUC 
AUBERT, NOTIONS ET ROLES DE L’OFFRE ET DE L’ACCEPTATION DANS LA 
FORMATION DU CONTRAT 79–122, 157–96 (1970).  
 492. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448; 2 RENÉ 
DEMOGUE, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS EN GÉNÉRAL. SOURCES DES OBLIGATIONS, 
No. 554 ter, at 172 (1923). Not all French scholars agree with this 
characterization. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 37, No. 37; AUBERT, supra note 
491, at 301–07 (arguing that acceptance of an offer is not a distinct unilateral 
juridical act). Cf. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the 
Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 181–82, 199 (1916–1917); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 50 (AM. L. INST. 1981) 
(characterizing offer and acceptance as “acts”). German and Greek scholars 
characterize offer and acceptance constitute as “unilateral declarations of will.” 
See supra note 48.  
 493. See AUBERT, supra note 491, at 255. 




transactional practice. Unilateral and bilateral contracts, in turn, can be 
patrimonial or extrapatrimonial. 
2. Patrimonial and Extrapatrimonial Juridical Acts 
Patrimonial juridical acts involve the creation, modification, and 
extinction of rights of a pecuniary nature494—that is, real or personal 
rights.495 The majority of juridical acts are patrimonial in nature.496 
Conversely, extrapatrimonial juridical acts involve rights that are 
insusceptible of pecuniary evaluation—that is, rights of personality.497 
Examples include marriage, adoption, emancipation, and acknowledgment 
of a child.498  
The value of this distinction lies in the extent of the freedom of the 
parties to adapt the content of the act to their needs.499 Most patrimonial 
juridical acts—especially those in the field of the law of obligations500—
 
 494. See LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 23–25; 
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 140; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 1. 
 495. For a detailed discussion of real and personal rights, see YIANNOPOULOS, 
PROPERTY, supra note 62, §§ 9:2–9:37; A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in 
Louisiana and Comparative Law: Part I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963); A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law: Part II, 23 LA. L. 
REV. 518 (1963); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 1.5; 
Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp. et al., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011). 
 496. Patrimonial juridical acts usually involve transferable rights. There are 
exceptions, however. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1766 (2019) (strictly personal 
rights); LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 29–30; 
Brenner, supra note 37, No. 159. Furthermore, patrimonial juridical acts can be 
found in the provisions of the law of persons. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 111 
(spousal support); id. art. 141 (child support). 
 497. See FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 1. Extrapatrimonial acts usually 
have effect against third parties. Thus, an existing contract of marriage precludes 
a bigamous marriage to a third party. LA. CIV. CODE art. 88 (2019). The oblique 
and revocatory actions, however, are not applicable to extrapatrimonial juridical 
acts. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2036, 2044 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 120–21, 124; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 197–
98; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, Nos. 271–77; BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra 
note 163, Nos. 742–69. 
 498. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 140.  
 499. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 297–302. 
 500. The German theory of Rechtsgeschäft refers to these juridical acts as 
“personal juridical acts”—having as their object the creation, modification, 
transfer, or extinction of a personal right. Conversely, “real juridical acts” involve 
the creation, modification, transfer, or extinction of real rights. See infra note 605. 
Because real rights are in principle limited in number, contractual freedom is more 




can be tailored to the transactional needs of the parties within the 
boundaries of mandatory law.501 Conversely, the power of the will is 
restricted in extrapatrimonial juridical acts.502 Essentially, most 
extrapatrimonial rights are based on juridical fact—they are established by 
operation of law. Juridical acts in this area are heavily regulated by 
mandatory law.503 Patrimonial juridical acts constitute the vast majority of 
everyday transactional life; thus, civilian theory has further classified these 
acts into several subcategories. 
a. Onerous and Gratuitous Patrimonial Juridical Acts 
Onerous juridical acts are made in view of receiving an advantage.504 
Most juridical acts in everyday transactional life are onerous.505 The maker 
of a gratuitous juridical act looks forward to no advantage or return for the 
act.506 The distinction between onerous and gratuitous acts is pertinent in 
the law of conventional obligations, where it is discussed thoroughly.507  
With the exception of testaments, which are gratuitous by nature,508 
this distinction is not as straightforward in the case of unilateral juridical 
acts.509 Reference to the cause of the juridical act is necessary to make a 
characterization.510 In the case of unilateral acts, the cause is usually found 
 
limited in this category of acts. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmt. d (2019); 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 247. 
 501. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 7, 1971 (2019). 
 502. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 140–41. 
 503. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 198. 
 504. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1909 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 
142–44; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 99–103. 
 505. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 321–23; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, No. 26. 
 506. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1910 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 
142–44; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 99–103; JEAN-JACQUES 
DUPEYROUX, CONTRIBUTION A LA THEORIE GENERALE DE L’ACTE A TITRE 
GRATUIT (1955). 
 507. LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 142; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, 
supra note 33, §§ 99–103. 
 508. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1469 (2019); CAPITANT, CAUSE, supra note 433, 
at 88–89. 
 509. Problems of characterization can also involve contracts, such as 
suretyship. Brenner, supra note 37, No. 202; CAPITANT, CAUSE, supra note 433, 
at 76–78. See also Union Bank of La. v. Beatty, 10 La. Ann. 378 (1855) 
(discussing cause of the unilateral contract of suretyship). 
 510. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 143–44. 




outside the area of the act.511 Several unilateral juridical acts can appear 
within the framework of a contract. For example, unilateral acts, such as 
notices, waivers, renunciations, and payments, are performed routinely 
within the premise of a contract. Likewise, putting in default and remedies 
for breach of contract presuppose the existence of a contract. In such cases, 
legal characterization of such acts as onerous or gratuitous is made with 
reference to the main contract.512 
The civil law enforces gratuitous acts but looks upon them with some 
suspicion.513 Thus, donations are subject to heightened formalities514 and 
special rules of capacity;515 they are revocable in some cases;516 they may 
 
 511. Unilateral juridical acts are also governed by the theory of cause. See 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 239, at 434. In a conventional 
obligation created by contract, the objective cause is usually found within the 
contract. Thus, the cause of the seller’s obligation is the buyer’s counter-
obligation. In unilateral juridical acts, however, cause is usually found outside the 
scope of the act. For instance, an obligee of a solidary obligation may—by 
unilateral juridical act—renounce solidarity in favor of one of the solidary 
obligors. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1802 (2019). The underlying cause—onerous or 
donative—that prompted the obligee to renounce solidarity is not found within 
the act of renunciation. Furthermore, several unilateral acts—such as payment, 
execution of documents, and conveyances—are performed within the framework 
of a preexisting contract. In such cases, the contract furnishes the cause for these 
unilateral acts. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, No. 238; Brenner, 
supra note 37, No. 168; CAPITANT, CAUSE, supra note 433, at 79–80. Thus, if the 
obligee and one of the solidary obligors agree by contract to a partial payment and 
release of that obligor, the cause for this contract extends to the ensuing unilateral 
act of renunciation. See David W. Gruning, Reading Release: How to Extinguish 
a Solidary Obligation, 64 LOY. L. REV. 365, 379–81 (2018) [hereinafter Gruning, 
Reading Release].  
 512. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 168; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 
490; BETTI, supra note 2, at 322–23; CAPITANT, CAUSE, supra note 433, at 79–80. 
In any event, these unilateral acts are usually governed by special rules concerning 
their formality. Thus, putting in default may be made orally in front of two 
witnesses even if the contract in question is subject to a heightened formality of 
authentic act. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1991, 2015 (2019).  
 513. For a comparative overview of the enforceability of gratuitous acts, see 
JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES. CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW 
COMPARED (1980). 
 514. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1541, 1570 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, 
§§ 8:2–8:10, 12:1–12:6 (formal validity of donations inter vivos).  
 515. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1470–84 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 
9:1–9:6 (capacity to make and receive donations).  
 516. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1469, 1556–67, 1606–1610.1 (2019); 
LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 8:12, 14:1–14:8 (revocability of donations). 




be set aside or reduced by third parties or collated among successors;517 
and the threshold for vices of consent—particularly error—is lower.518 
Furthermore, a less demanding standard of care applies in the case of 
gratuitous rendition of services.519 The French classification of onerous 
and gratuitous acts is familiar and useful, but the same cannot be said with 
reference to the classification of constitutive, translative, and declarative 
acts.  
b. Constitutive, Translative, and Declarative Juridical Acts 
The distinction among constitutive, translative, and declarative acts is 
used commonly in French doctrine and is more descriptive rather than 
systematic. This distinction is broad—sometimes encompassing 
extrapatrimonial acts. The categories of constitutive and translative acts 
frequently overlap, and there are no clear distinguishing factors for a 
practically useful categorization.520 In comparison, the German 
classifications of attributive and non-attributive acts on the one hand and 
promissory and dispositive acts on the other seem more methodical and 
accurate, primarily because the German categories focus solely on 
patrimonial acts. As such, they should be adopted by the Louisiana theory 
of juridical acts. A further discussion of the French and German categories 
should illustrate this point.  
 
 517. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2019) (reduction of donations 
impinging upon legitime of forced heirs); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 10:5–10:10; 
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2036, 2039 (revocatory action); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 119–25. Donations as well as other gratuitous 
“advantages” may also be subject to collation among descendants of the donor. 
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1227, 1248 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 7:1–7:19.  
 518. See WEIL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 315 (explaining that error as to 
the identity and quality of the person is usually actionable in gratuitous acts); cf. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950 cmt. d (2019) (“if the contract is gratuitous, the 
presumption obtains that the person of the intended obligee was the reason why the 
obligor bound himself.”); Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 355, at 20–22. 
 519. For example, gratuitous service providers are held to a lower standard of 
care as compared to compensated service provides. See WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra 
note 84, No. 315; cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2930 (2019) (standard of care in onerous 
and gratuitous contracts of deposit). 
 520. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 218.  




i. French Categories  
Constitutive521 juridical acts give rise to a new right, legal relationship, 
or juridical situation.522 This category is vast, ranging from extrapatrimonial 
acts—such as marriage,523 adoption,524 and acknowledgment of a child525—
to the patrimonial acts in the law of obligations, such as contracts that create 
obligations.526 Some acts of property law are also constitutive—such as the 
creation of conventional servitudes527 and building restrictions.528 Creation 
of a juridical person is also a constitutive act.529 Constitutive acts normally 
produce their effects prospectively.530 Freedom of contract allows the parties 
to assign retroactive effect to their relationship; this retroactivity, however, 
only has relative effects.531 This category is too vast to serve any practical 
purpose. 
Comparatively, translative juridical acts is another broad category, 
comprising acts that transfer real, personal, or other rights from an author 
(ancestor in title) to a particular successor.532 Examples include sale,533 
assignment,534 exchange,535 donations inter vivos, and donations mortis 
causa.536 This category involves only patrimonial rights because 
 
 521. Otherwise known as “creative acts” or “generative acts.” See TRAHAN, 
supra note 418, at 106. 
 522. See MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 261-2; Brenner, supra note 37, 
No. 219. 
 523. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 87 (2019). 
 524. See id. art. 199. 
 525. See id. art. 196. 
 526. See id. art. 1906. 
 527. See id. arts. 544, 708.  
 528. See id. art. 776. 
 529. See id. art. 24. 
 530. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 220. 
 531. See MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, Nos. 262-2, 263. 
 532. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 221. Successors (ayants cause) substitute 
a party to a juridical relation, if the juridical relation is heritable. Cf. LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 1765, 1766, 1984 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 87, §§ 4.1–4.15; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 
248, at 27–30. Universal successors substitute the party as to her entire patrimony, 
whereas particular successors succeed to stipulated juridical relations. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 3506(28); GOUTAL, supra note 397, Nos. 11–31, 246–47; WEILL & 
TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 342–47; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, Nos. 
171–72. 
 533. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2349 (2019). 
 534. See id. art. 2642. 
 535. See id. art. 2660. 
 536. See id. arts. 1468–69. 




extrapatrimonial rights are normally inextricably linked to the person and 
are thus nontransferable.537 The right is transmitted from the author to the 
successor with its qualities, accessories, and defects.538 The transferor 
must have capacity to alienate and must be the holder of the right or 
authorized by the holder.539 Louisiana lawyers are especially familiar with 
a subset of this category—acts translative of ownership, which under 
certain circumstances can constitute just title for the purposes of 
acquisitive prescription.540 This category, however, overlaps significantly 
with the previous category of constitutive acts. Acts of transfer generally 
constitute rights and obligations, such as the obligation for a 
counterperformance.541 Moreover, any transfer of a right gives rise to a 
new juridical situation—therefore, it is also constitutive.542 
A subset of translative acts is the category of abdicative juridical acts. 
The legal object of these acts is to extinguish a right by voluntary 
abandonment.543 Renunciation of succession,544 renunciation of 
prescription,545 and abandonment of real rights546 are abdicative acts par 
 
 537. See id. art. 1766. See WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 217, 344; 
CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 184; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 198; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 4.11–4.15; LEVASSEUR, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 29–30. 
 538. French doctrine identifies this as the “principle of conservation.” See 
CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 184.  
 539. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 222; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, 
No. 347. “Capacity to alienate” and “power to alienate” are discussed supra note 
284. 
 540. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2502, 3483 (2019); Symeonides, One Hundred 
Footnotes, supra note 84, at 116–20; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 
270, §§ 10:34–10:36.  
 541. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 222. 
 542. See MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 262-2. 
 543. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 233, 237; FRÉDÉRIQUE DREIFUSS-
NETTER, LES MANIFESTATIONS DE VOLONTÉ ABDICATIVES (1985).  
 544. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 963 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, § 6:7. 
 545. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3449 (2019); TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 96–97; 
NICOLAS SIBICIANO, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES RENONCIATIONS EN DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS, No. 64 (1932); PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, at 748. Except 
in the case of immovables, renunciation can be tacit. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3450 
(2019); GODÉ, supra note 318, Nos. 133–40; McPherson v. Roy, 390 So. 2d 543, 
551 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Blackstone Investments v. Strother, No. 2010 
CA 1163, 2011 WL 1938671 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. May 6, 2011). 
 546. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:14, at 468; SIBICIANO, 
supra note 545, Nos. 37–51, 114–19 (discussing unilateral abandonment of real 
rights). Abandonment of ownership of movables is generally governed by the 
rules of occupancy. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3412 (2019). Abandonment of 





ownership of an immovable usually appears in the context of the laws of 
servitudes, co-ownership, and “real obligations.” See, e.g., id. art. 582 
(abandonment of usufruct); id. art. 679 (abandonment of common wall); id. arts. 
746 and 770 (abandonment of servient estate); id. art. 1764 (abandonment of a 
thing charged with a real obligation); Symeonides & Martin, supra note 404, at 
144–46 (discussing abandonment of a co-owner’s share). Unilateral abandonment 
of full ownership of an unencumbered immovable is theoretically possible in the 
civil law, but a very rare occurrence. See J. INST. 2.1.47; DIG. 41.7.1 (Ulpian, 
Edict 12); id. 41.7.2 (Paul, Edict 54) (discussing abandonment of ownership). The 
result of such abandonment—whether the thing becomes res nullius or it escheats 
to the state—seems to be unresolved among French civilian scholars. See Yvan 
Desjardins, L’abandon d’immeuble, 112(2) REVUE DU NOTARIAT 247 (2010). Cf. 
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, arts. 934 and 936 (Can.); BÜRGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 928 (2019) (Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] 
[CIVIL CODE] art. 972 (2019) (Greece) (abandoned immovables revert to the 
state); Sena v. U.S., 189 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1903) (discussing abandonment of 
land which becomes res nullius under the old Spanish law). This issue has not 
appeared in the Louisiana jurisprudence. See L. David Cromwell & Chloe M. 
Chetta, Divining the Real Nature of Real Obligations, 92 TUL. L. REV. 127, 176–
77 (2017). Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
355 (2010); Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 191 (2010) (debating the existence of a right to abandon real property at 
common law); but see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND No. 9 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2016) (9th ed., Richard Burn ed. 1783) 
(acknowledging the right to abandon real and personal property based on 
“principles of universal law”). See also JOHN G. SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF PROPERTY 337–39 (2014) (comparative discussion of abandonment of 
ownership). For special legislation concerning blighted property, see LA. REV. 
STAT. §§ 9:5633, 13:2575, and 33:1374(1). The relinquishment of possession, 
however, is a fact. When possession is relinquished with the intent to give up 
ownership, the thing is abandoned. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3418 cmt. c (2019). 




excellence.547 These acts are unilateral548 and usually irrevocable.549 
Conversely, voluntary unilateral abandonment of an obligation or a credit 
right is not possible.550 An agreement, such as a remission of debt, is 
required.551 Remission of debt and compromise are examples of bilateral 
abdicative acts.552 In all of the above examples of abdicative acts, there is 
 
 547. See SIBICIANO, supra note 545, Nos. 75–84; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 
105, No. 496. 
 548. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3449 cmt. d (2019) (“the renunciation of 
prescription is not an act translative of ownership. It is a unilateral act that does 
not require acceptance by the other party; moreover, it does not require any 
formality.”). Capacity to alienate is required. Id. art. 3451; see supra note 284. 
See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:14, at 468; Brenner, supra 
note 37, No. 234; PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, at 748. See also 
Cromwell & Chetta, supra note 546, at 190–98 (discussing abandonment as a 
unilateral juridical act in the context of real obligations). Unilateral written 
renunciation of a servitude by the owner of the dominant estate is also 
contemplated. LA. CIV. CODE art. 771 (2019). Abandonment of the servient estate 
is a written unilateral juridical act which the dominant estate owner is “bound to 
accept.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 770 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, 
supra note 87, §§ 8:11–8:12. 
 549. See SIBICIANO, supra note 545, Nos. 98–105. These acts, however, can 
be annulled. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 952 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, § 
6:1 (nullification of acceptance or renunciation of succession). 
 550. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:14, at 468. 
Renunciation of solidarity is a unilateral abdicative act, pursuant to which the 
obligee releases the solidary obligor from the bonds of solidarity. LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1802 (2019). Nevertheless, the obligor is not released from the obligation 
completely; a contract of remission is required to cancel the debt. See Gruning, 
Reading Release, supra note 511, at 379–81. 
 551. Thus, a “unilateral” act of remission is properly characterized as an offer 
to remit the obligor. Acceptance of remission by the obligor is then presumed. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 1890 (2019). 
 552. See 4 CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS. 
OBLIGATIONS § 323, in 1 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS (La. State L. Inst. trans., 
1965) (E. Bartin ed., 6th ed. 1942) [hereinafter AUBRY & RAU IV]. Remission is 
gratuitous in nature. An onerous renunciation (or release) of the obligor is legally 
characterized as a transaction or compromise. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3071 (2019). 
See Gruning, Reading Release, supra note 511, at 384–85; 1 JACQUES DE GAVRE, 
LE CONTRAT DE TRANSACTION EN DROIT CIVIL ET EN DROIT JUDICIAIRE PRIVÉ. LA 
TRANSACTION NON-JUDICIAIRE, No. 3 (1967) (Belgium). But see LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 18.6 (discussing gratuitous and 
onerous remission of debt). In Germany and Greece, remission of debt is an 
abstract and dispositive juridical act that merely fulfills an underlying promissory 
juridical act, which can be onerous (e.g., compromise) or gratuitous (e.g., 
donation). See MICHAEL P. STATHOPOULOS, GENIKO ENOCHIKO DIKAIO 




neither a creation nor a transmission, but a voluntary disclaimer of a 
right.553 Abdication is nonetheless a form of disposition. Thus, the 
requirements of authority and capacity to alienate are applicable here.554 
Also, by logical necessity, abdicative acts can only apply to existing 
rights.555 
Finally, translative acts are normally juxtaposed with declarative acts. 
These acts merely reveal the existence of a preexisting right or juridical 
situation.556 The category of declarative acts is also broad, applying to 
patrimonial rights and transcending into extrapatrimonial rights. 
Declarative acts are not meant to create or transfer a right, although such 
declaration might in certain instances enhance the efficacy of a right.557 
Declarative acts, therefore, are normally given retroactive effect to the 
time when the declared right came into existence.558 A classic French 
example of a declarative juridical act is the act of partition.559 Because 
declarative acts do not amount to a transfer, they cannot constitute just title 
 
[GENERAL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS] 1249 (5th ed. 2018). Assignment of rights is 
likewise an abstract dispositive juridical act. Id. at 1670–72. See infra notes 606, 
696.  
 553. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 236. 
 554. Abdicative acts are considered translative because they encompass a 
change in a person’s patrimony, even though the act may not effect a transfer. For 
instance, renunciation of acquisitive prescription does not transfer the thing back 
to the owner; however, the prescribed right does exit the renouncing person’s 
patrimony. This is why capacity to alienate is still required for this act. See 
PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, at 748; LA. CIV. CODE art. 3449 cmt. d 
(2019); id. art. 3451. See also LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 
87, § 18.6 (explaining that a “gratuitous remission requires legal capacity to 
donate on the part of the creditor, and legal capacity to accept a donation on the 
part of the debtor. Moreover, a gratuitous remission is subject to those rules of 
donations that govern matters such as reduction, collation, and revocation for 
ingratitude.”). Capacity and power to alienate are discussed supra note 284.  
 555. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 237. 
 556. See generally MARC DESSERTEAUX, ESSAI D’UNE THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DE 
L’EFFET DÉCLARATIF EN DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS (1908). 
 557. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 224. Judgments also have declarative 
effect, although judgments are not juridical acts. See supra note 242. For instance, 
a judgment of possession has declarative effect because it merely recognizes the 
rights of the successors. Nevertheless, finality of the judgment of possession gives 
rise to legal consequences that also extend to third parties. See, e.g., LA. REV. 
STAT. § 9:5630 (2019) (actions by unrecognized successors against third parties); 
LORIO, supra note 285, § 15:21; TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 105 (referring to the 
example of a judgment of possession as a declarative act).  
 558. See MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 262-2.  
 559. See id.  




for the purposes of acquisitive prescription.560 Judgments—albeit not 
juridical acts per se—can be declarative of rights,561 or, in some cases, 
judgments can be constitutive or abdicative, as in the examples of adoption 
or divorce.562 Compromise contracts constitute an example of a juridical 
act that can have declarative563 as well as abdicative effects.564 
A variety of declarative acts are recognitive juridical acts.565 Their 
legal object is to admit and confess the existence of a right or a situation 
so that the attached legal consequences may ensue.566 Examples include 
acknowledgment of a child567 and acknowledgment of real or personal 
rights that interrupts prescription.568 
 
 560. See TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 105 (judgment of possession does not 
constitute “just title”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. b (2019); Pearce v. Ford, 50 
So. 771 (La. 1909); Tyson v. Spearman, 183 So. 201, 204–06 (La. 1938) (act of 
partition is merely declarative and does not constitute just title for the purposes of 
acquisitive prescription). 
 561. For instance, the judgment of possession merely declares the rights of the 
successors, which existed at the time of death of the decedent and were created 
by the succession itself, not the judgment of possession. See TRAHAN, supra note 
418, at 105; Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., The Chaos and Confusion of Modern Collation: 
A Critical Look into an Institution of Louisiana Successions Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 
411, 434 (2000). Thus, the juridical act creating a testamentary usufruct is the 
testament, not the judgment of possession (which is not even a juridical act). See 
Alexander Baynham, The Intersection of Louisiana Succession Law and Mineral 
Code Article 190: Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil, 75 LA. L. REV. 829, 831 
(2015). See also supra note 242. 
 562. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 228; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, 
No. 486. For a description of the distinction between declarative and constitutive 
judgments, see LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 185–86. 
 563. According to one scholar, compromise is declarative when the parties’ 
settlement concerns a disputed right. An example of this is when two co-owners 
settle their dispute as to their precise shares in the co-owned property. 
Compromise can be translative, however, when the parties’ settlement involves 
creation or transfer of further rights. For instance, the parties to a land dispute may 
settle their dispute by agreeing to establish one common or two reciprocal predial 
servitudes. See DE GAVRE, supra note 552, Nos. 33–35. 
 564. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 235; See DE GAVRE, supra note 552, Nos. 
33–35, 80–86 (discussing the abdicative effects of a compromise). 
 565. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 230.  
 566. See id.; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 497. 
 567. In Louisiana, it is quite clear that acknowledgment of a child is a juridical 
act in the form of an authentic act. LA. CIV. CODE art. 196 (2019). French scholars 
do not agree as to the precise legal nature of the acknowledgment of a child. MARTY 
& RAYNAUD II, supra note 286, No. 390; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 231. 
 568. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 418, Nos. 527–38.  




The preceding brief overview displayed that the tripartite distinction 
between constitutive, translative, and declarative acts is mostly descriptive 
rather than practical. Perhaps the only helpful aspect from this 
categorization is the distinction between translative and declarative acts, 
particularly with respect to dispositions of wealth. The utility of this 
French distinction of patrimonial acts is perhaps better expressed by the 
following German alternative categorizations of attributive versus non-
attributive and promissory versus dispositive acts. 
ii. German Alternatives 
The German theory of Rechtsgeschäft elaborates numerous 
classifications of juridical acts.569 Although most of the categories are 
congruent with the intricate nature of the Rechtsgeschäft, two categories 
of patrimonial juridical acts seem compatible with—and indeed a more 
accurate and systematic depiction of—the above French distinctions. 
These categories are: (1) attributive and non-attributive acts; and (2) 
promissory and dispositive acts. 
The first categorization is between attributive and non-attributive acts. 
Attributive juridical acts570 effect a patrimonial shift—a transmission of 
wealth from one person to another.571 This category is broad, 
encompassing all juridical acts that create, transfer, or extinguish real or 
 
 569. These classifications include bilateral and unilateral acts; inter vivos and 
mortis causa acts; formal and informal acts; extrapatrimonial acts and patrimonial 
acts; real and personal patrimonial acts; patrimonial acts with real or relative 
effects; attributive and non-attributive patrimonial acts, which are further 
categorized into causal and abstract acts; promissory and dispositive acts; and acts 
of free negotiation and adhesive acts. See generally FLUME, supra note 13, 134–
82. 
 570. Zuwendungsgeschäfte. See FLUME, supra note 13, at 135, 152; VON TUHR 
II, supra note 434, § 71; BEKKER, supra note 438, § 100. The term “translative” 
is perhaps a more accurate translation. However, the term “attributive” is 
preferred to avoid confusion with the French category of “translative acts.” The 
term “attributive act” derives from the French term acte juridique attributif, which 
is a translation of the German term Zuwendungsgeschäft. See DICTIONNAIRE 
JURIDIQUE FRANÇAIS – ALLEMAND 32 (Thomas A. Quemner & Hugo Neumann 
eds., 1960). This translated term also appears in the Travaux de l’Association 
Henri Capitant. See, e.g., Maciej Tomaszewski, La responsabilité du banquier: 
Aspects nouveaux. Rapport Polonais, in 34 TRAVAUX DE L’ASSOCIATION HENRI 
CAPITANT 361 (1984). 
 571. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 246, at 446 (describing 
these acts as “legal transactions intended to operate a patrimonial displacement.”) 




personal rights.572 However, the category of attributive juridical acts is 
more precise because it focuses only on patrimonial acts. Thus, the French 
overlapping categories of patrimonial constitutive acts573 and translative 
acts merge neatly into this generic category. The familiar subcategory of 
acts translative of ownership is also found here.574 Conversely, patrimonial 
juridical acts that do not involve a passing of wealth are styled non-
attributive.575 Declarative and several recognitive juridical acts, as 
discussed above, belong in this category. Certain abdicative acts—such as 
renunciation of prescription and unilateral abandonment of real rights—
are also correctly placed in this category. Indeed, these particular 
abdicative acts do not purport to transfer a right; they are not acts 
translative of ownership.576 
The utility of the German classification of attributive and non-
attributive acts is twofold. First, this classification offers a more systematic 
and precise taxonomy of patrimonial juridical acts, as compared to the 
merely descriptive and often overlapping French categories. The 
Louisiana theory of juridical acts can benefit from combining both 
German and French classifications. A useful combination would be to 
adopt the German classifications as the principal categorization of 
patrimonial acts and to utilize the French categories as illustrations and 
descriptions of acts falling under the German categories. Second, the 
German classifications contribute to a pragmatic approach to the civilian 
 
 572. A transmission of wealth under this category can manifest itself in three 
ways: (1) creation of a right (e.g., a contract of lease creates a personal right of 
the lessee to use the thing leased, and a conventional usufruct creates a real right 
of the usufructuary over the thing); (2) transfer of an existing right (e.g., acts 
translative of ownership, such as sale—including assignment of rights, exchange, 
and donation); and (3) extinction of an existing right (e.g., remission of debt). See 
GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 393–94. 
 573. As noted above (supra notes 521–31 and accompanying text), the French 
category of “constitutive acts” also includes extrapatrimonial acts. The German 
category of attributive acts is confined to patrimonial acts and is thus a more useful 
category when classifying patrimonial acts.  
 574. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 517 cmt. c (2019) (“the ownership of an 
immovable is transferred by a contract that ‘purports to transfer the ownership of 
the property.’ . . . Such a contract is often designated in Louisiana doctrine and 
jurisprudence as an ‘act translative of ownership.’ Examples of acts translative of 
ownership are sales, donations, or exchanges of property . . . A unilateral juridical 
act, such as an acknowledgement that a particular person is the true owner of an 
immovable, does not suffice to convey ownership.”) (emphasis added).  
 575. See GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 393–94. 
 576. See PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, at 748; VON TUHR I, supra 
note 10, § 54, at 238–39. 




theory of cause. According to German and Greek doctrine, the civilian 
theory of cause applies primarily to attributive acts.577 “Cause,” strictly 
speaking, refers to the reason behind a transfer of wealth.578 This approach 
is not foreign to, or incompatible with, the French and Louisiana 
understanding of cause. Although cause is understood more broadly in 
France and Louisiana,579 the historical roots of this doctrine580 and its 
modern practical significance581 are found in cases of a transfer of a right 
or a thing. In short, the intricacies of the civilian theory of cause basically 
pertain to attributive acts.   
Next, the classification between promissory and dispositive juridical 
acts is classic in Germany. It is predicated on the famous “principle of 
separation” (Trennungsprinzip) enunciated by Savigny.582 According to 
this principle, in a transaction for the transfer of a thing or a right, the 
promissory element of the transaction ought to be separated from the 
conveyance itself.583 At first blush, this principle does not appear in French 
law, pursuant to which the conveyance is effected by means of the 
 
 577. See VON TUHR II, supra note 434, § 72; FLUME, supra note 13, at 135, 152. 
 578. See WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 98; REGELSBERGER, supra note 37, § 
167; BEKKER, supra note 438, § 100, at 148–51; VON TUHR II, supra note 434, § 
72; FILIOS, supra note 434, at 109–25. 
 579. Theoretically, all juridical acts are causal. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS 
I, supra note 33, §§ 203, 221.  
 580. The Roman causa, albeit not a technical legal term, referred to the reason 
for the transfer of wealth, for which a just cause (iusta causa) was required. This 
ancient understanding of cause—which includes the principle of unjustified 
enrichment—forms the basis of the modern doctrine of cause. See LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 202–07, 221; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 
288, No. 253; JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 419–26 (2006).   
 581. French jurisprudence developed a modern theory of cause with reference 
primarily to contracts involving a transfer of wealth. See LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 216–23; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, 
Nos. 275–84 (discussing the doctrine of “neo-causalism”); YVAINE BUFFELAN-
LANORE & VIRGINIE LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS Nos. 
1279–81 (16th ed. 2018) [hereinafter BUFFELAN-LANORE & LARRIBAU-
TERNEYRE, OBLIGATIONS]; MALAURIE ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 
701 (discussing the notion of the “economy of the contract” (économie du 
contrat)).  
 582. See SAVIGNY III, supra note 49, at 312–13. A counterpart of the German 
principle of separation is the principle of abstraction, which was also developed 
by Savigny. See infra notes 693–701 and accompanying text. 
 583. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 27–37; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 247; YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, 
§ 9:35 (discussing this concept in the context of a contract to sell). 




contract, that is, by the mere consent of the parties (solo consensu).584 
Thus, under German law, a contract of sale of a corporeal movable is 
merely a promise to sell the movable—a promissory juridical act. Transfer 
of the ownership of the movable requires a separate dispositive juridical 
act of conveyance. In French law, as between the parties, ownership of the 
movable passes to the buyer immediately upon agreement, that is, by the 
consent of the parties. On the basis of this initial observation, 
comparativists have perhaps overemphasized the distinction between the 
German separation principle and the French consensual principle for 
transfer of ownership.585 This distinction, however, cannot be carried too 
far.586 Indeed, the German separation principle is attenuated in practice 
when the thing sold is delivered immediately to the buyer587 or when 
constructive delivery takes place by mere agreement of the parties.588 
 
 584. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1138 (1804) (Fr.); CODE CIVIL 
[C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1196 (2016) (Fr.); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 
269, 449; Simler, supra note 156, No. 54. Thus, in a contract of sale under French 
law, ownership of the thing sold passes from the seller to the buyer immediately 
by the mere consent of the parties. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1583 
(1804) (Fr.); PLANIOL II, supra note 246, No. 1416; cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2456 
(2019).  
 585. See LARS P.W. VAN VLIET, TRANSFER OF MOVABLES IN GERMAN, 
FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND DUTCH LAW 31–89 (2000). 
 586. See id. at 201–05 (discussing the convergence of the German and French 
approaches). 
 587. In such a case, promissory and dispositive elements are bundled into the 
same act. See SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 140. 
 588. Civil law systems recognize two general methods of delivery (traditio) of 
a thing. The first method is corporeal delivery; this is the traditional method. The 
second method is constructive delivery by consent of the parties. Several 
subcategories of constructive delivery exist. For instance, there is constructive 
delivery to a transferee who is already detaining the thing (traditio brevi manu). 
An oft-quoted example is that of the lessor selling the leased thing to the lessee 
who is already detaining the thing. Constructive delivery by mere agreement can 
take place from a distance (longa manu traditio), as when the transferor hands 
over the key of the place where the thing is located or negotiates a document of 
title. Another, more specific and technical example of constructive delivery is the 
constitutum possessium when the transferor conveys ownership and possession of 
the thing to the transferee but still detains the thing as a precarious possessor. An 
example of this is an agreement between the seller and the buyer of land that the 
former will remain on the land as a lessee. See VAN VLIET, supra note 585, at 48–
60; APOSTOLOS GEORGIADES, EMPRAGMATO DIKAIO [PROPERTY LAW] 199–216 
(2d ed. 2010) (Greece) [hereinafter GEORGIADES, PROPERTY LAW]; cf. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2477 (2019). Assignment of the action for the recovery of a movable 
also constitutes a transfer of ownership of the movable. Id. art. 519. Delivery of 




Conversely, the French consensual principle only operates between the 
parties. Delivery of the movable makes the buyer’s ownership effective 
toward third parties.589 The French consensual principle is also inoperative 
when the thing is not individualized.590 Notably, the separation between 
promise and conveyance becomes apparent in both German and French 
systems when the conveyance takes place at a later date—for instance, in 
a promise to sell.591 Therefore, it is submitted that the theory of separation 
 
the act of transfer or use of the predial servitude by the owner of the dominant 
estate constitutes “tradition” establishing the predial servitude. Id. art. 722.   
 589. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 518, 2456 (2019); TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 270, § 3:7. 
 590. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2457 (2019). This exception to immediate transfer 
of ownership also extends to things sold by weight, count, or measure, unless it is 
a “lump sale.” TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 3:8–3:10. 
 591. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2623 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, 
supra note 1, at 444 (distinguishing between juridical acts that involve a 
disposition and juridical acts that involve a promise to dispose); YIANNOPOULOS, 
PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 9:35 (discussing the promise to sell immovables); 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, § 5:10 (discussing the legal 
consequences of the contract to sell). The notion of separation between promise 
and conveyance also appears at common law. See SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE 
J. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON’S TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 487 (1938) (“The questions must, therefore, be kept distinct, what 
is essential for the conveyance of a given interest in property, and what is essential 
for an executory contract to convey it.”). Thus, a conveyance of property is 
dispositive in nature and does not require consideration. See id. § 217; 3 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12:43 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); JOHN G. 
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 366 (2000). Comparativists have 
noted the resemblance of the common law act of conveyance with the German 
abstract act of disposition. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 275–
76; Stéphan Sérafin, Transfer by Contract at Common Law and in Equity, 45 
QUEEN’S L.J. 81 (2019). Contract and conveyance are two separate issues in the 
choice-of-law process. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 189 
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1971) (“Distinction between contract and transfer. A 
distinction must here be drawn between a contract for the transfer of an interest 
in land and the actual transfer of such an interest . . . A contract to transfer an 
interest in land may be valid as a contract but inoperative as a transfer, or, in the 
alternative, it may be invalid as a contract but operative as a transfer”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.08 n.1 (AM. L. INST., 
Preliminary Draft Nov. 3, 2017) (“This Restatement . . . distinguishes between 
contracts to transfer interests in real property (which are covered in its Chapter on 
contracts) and transfers of interests in real property as such (which are covered in 
its Chapter on property).”); HAY ET AL., supra note 445, §§ 18.23, 18.24, 19.3; 
See John D. Falconbridge, Contract and Conveyance in the Conflict of Laws: Part 
One, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 661 (1933); John D. Falconbridge, Contract and 




of promise and conveyance is valid in both French and German civil law 
systems. Thus, the distinction between promissory and dispositive 
juridical acts is pertinent. 
Promissory juridical acts merely contain a promise to render a 
performance.592 In essence, these acts create personal rights. The obligee, 
therefore, does not have an actionable right in a thing, but rather an action 
against the obligor to render performance.593 All promissory juridical acts 
are attributive.594 Dispositive juridical acts effect a transfer, encumbrance, 
or extinction of existing real or personal rights.595 The validity of a 
dispositive act requires both the capacity and the power of the transferor 
to alienate.596 Lack of capacity or power to alienate often results in relative 
nullity.597 Frequently, a dispositive act fulfills an obligation undertaken 
 
Conveyance in the Conflict of Laws: Part Two, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1933) 
(discussing the distinction between contract and conveyance). 
 592. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449; 
MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 27–37.  
 593. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmt. a (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, 
supra note 62, § 9:1. Most constitutive acts of the French law fall within this 
category, with the exception of extrapatrimonial acts and certain acts of property 
law (e.g., establishment of conventional servitudes). As discussed supra notes 
397–98, original acquisition of ownership by means of a juridical act is not 
possible. See WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 343. 
 594. See GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 394. 
 595. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449; 
MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 27–37.  
 596. See supra note 284. See also WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 347; 
MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 250; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2015 (1870); LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 517 cmt. b (2019). This rule is absolute for immovables. See 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 8:1–8:12. The rule admits of 
certain exceptions for movables. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 517–25 (2019); 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 7:1–7:17; LOUIS JOSSERAND, 
LES MOBILES DANS LES ACTES JURIDIQUES DU DROIT PRIVÉ (1928, reprt. 1984). 
These exceptions come primarily from the German and Greek theories of 
Rechtsgeschäft. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 cmt. d (2019); id. art. 519 cmt. 
a; id. art. 523 cmt. a (identifying the German and Greek civil codes as the sources 
for the pertinent provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code).  
 597. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 99–100 (noting some exceptions, 
including instances of management of affairs of the owner); MALAURIE ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 701. Thus, a disposition of a nonconsumable 
by a usufructuary who lacks the power to dispose and a sale of the thing of another 
are relatively null acts. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. (c) (2019); id. art. 623 cmt. 
d; YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 6:10, 6:14; 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, § 7:2. For the issue of legal or 
contractual restraints on alienation, see supra note 404. German and Greek 




with a promissory act.598 When the obligation is to transfer ownership or 
other real rights in several items, it is noted that separate dispositive acts 
are required for each individual item, pursuant to the principle of 
specificity.599 Most dispositive juridical acts are attributive.600 
Renunciation of prescription and unilateral abandonment of real rights are 
notable exceptions.601 Some juridical acts are only promissory in nature—
they do not effect a conveyance of a right. Examples include the contracts 
of lease and loan for use.602  
 
doctrines distinguish two separate issues. First, a disposition made by a person 
without authority is absolutely null. Second, if the person has authority but the 
disposition is prohibited by law or court order, then a disposition in violation of 
such prohibition can be absolutely or relatively null, depending on the purpose of 
the prohibition. Thus, a disposition by a minor that is reprobated by law is 
absolutely null as against public policy, whereas a disposition of a judicially 
seized thing made by a debtor in violation of a court order is relatively null at the 
behest of the creditor. Finally, violations of contractually imposed restrictions on 
alienation only give rise to a claim in damages. See BALIS, supra note 141, §§ 61–
63; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 518–22.   
 598. German doctrine elaborates further on this point. The promissory act 
constitutes the cause for the conveyance, whereas the conveyance is the 
fulfillment of the promise. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 27–37. 
 599. The principle of specificity governs real rights and all dispositive acts 
affecting real rights. According to this principle, real rights are established 
specifically for individual assets. In other words, there can be no single ownership 
over several assets—each asset is designated its own real right (tot iura quot res). 
Thus, the transfer of several items entails individual conveyances of each item. 
See also supra note 403. This principle does not apply to promissory acts. 
Accordingly, an obligor may promise to give several individual items. Fulfillment 
of this obligation, however, requires separate dispositions of each item. The 
principle of specificity applies in German and French law. See VAN VLIET, supra 
note 585, at 27, 75. A presumption of specificity is also found in the law of 
obligations in general. Thus, conjunctive obligations are treated as several 
obligations for each specific item of performance. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1807 (2019); 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 8.13.   
 600. See GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 394. 
 601. See PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 415, at 748; VON TUHR I, supra 
note 10, § 54, at 238–39. Abandonment of the servient estate is a written unilateral 
juridical act which the dominant estate owner is “bound to accept.” LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 770 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, §§ 8:11–
8:12. 
 602. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2668, 2891 (2019); VERNON VALENTINE 
PALMER, THE CIVIL LAW OF LEASE IN LOUISIANA §§ 1.1–1.2 (5th ed. 1997); 
LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 408, at 123–30. According to the German 
classifications discussed, a lease is an attributive act because it creates personal 




The classification between promissory and dispositive juridical acts is 
useful when examining certain juridical acts that contain both elements. 
Some contracts—such as sale, exchange, and donation603—contain both 
promissory and dispositive elements. A contract of sale, for example, 
actually bundles two distinct acts—the promise to transfer the thing sold 
(promissory act) and the actual sale (dispositive act).604 The promise to 
 
rights in favor of the parties. According to the broader French classification, a 
lease is a constitutive and patrimonial act, merely creating a personal right. Under 
both systems, a lease is clearly not dispositive because it does not affect a 
conveyance of the thing leased. In other words, a lease is not an act translative of 
ownership (or other real rights). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. b (2019); 
TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 106. See also YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 
62, § 9:1; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2668 cmt. b (2019) (discussing the differences 
between lease (personal right) and usufruct (real right)).  
 603. Donations inter vivos can have immediate effect (contract of donation), or 
their effect can hinge on a term or condition (contract to donate). See Crosby v. 
Stinson, 766 So. 615, 618–20 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a contract to 
donate must meet the same formal requirements of the donation it contemplates); 
Martin A. Hogg, Promise and Donation in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 26 
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 171 (2011) (discussing the promissory and dispositive 
elements of donations inter vivos). Donations mortis causa are clearly dispositive 
in nature. In France and Louisiana, all legacies—universal, general, and particular—
transfer ownership of the bequeathed property to the legatee. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
935 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 4:6, 4:11; Tulane Univ. v. Board of 
Assessors, 40 So. 445 (La. 1905); Baten v. Taylor, 386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979). Thus, 
the legatee, upon being sent into possession, can revendicate the property in the 
hands of other successors or third parties (legatum per vindicationem). Prior to 
1999, particular legatees were not equipped with seizin; they had to demand delivery 
from the universal legatee or heir. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1626 (1870); CROSS, supra 
note 331, at 56 (explaining that particular legatees succeed in the property rather 
than the person of the decedent). Now, particular legatees are entitled to take 
possession in the same way as universal successors. LA. CIV. CODE art. 935 (2001). 
In Germany, and to some extent in Greece, particular legatees do not acquire 
ownership of the property bequeathed to them. Instead, they maintain a personal 
action against the universal successor for delivery of the thing bequeathed (legatum 
per damnationem). This difference between the German and French legal systems 
can give rise to interesting choice-of-law problems. See in more detail Jan Peter 
Schmidt, Die kollisionsrechtliche Behandlung dinglich wirkender Vermächtnisse, 
77 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 1, 4 (2013); Rembert Süss, Das Vindikationslegat im Internationalen 
Privatrecht, 65 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 245, 246–47 (2001); Mariusz Zalucki, Attempts to Harmonize the 
Inheritance Law in Europe: Past, Present, and Future, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2317, 
2335–36 (2018). 
 604. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449. 




transfer the thing sold is a juridical act of obligations law—a personal and 
promissory juridical act. The actual sale is a conveyance, that is, a juridical 
act of property law—a real and dispositive juridical act605 that transfers an 
existing real right.606 The distinction between promissory and dispositive 
elements of a sales contract becomes more apparent when the conveyance 
is agreed to take place at a later time.607  
Nevertheless, promissory and dispositive elements of a sale contract 
ought to be distinguished even in cases of a contract of sale that is effective 
immediately. An example where the distinction of these two elements is 
practically useful is the issue of a sale of a thing belonging to another under 
the convoluted article 2452 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Under this 
 
 605. Another German classification is the distinction between personal and real 
juridical acts. Personal juridical acts create, transfer, modify, or extinguish 
obligations. Real juridical acts create, transfer, modify, or terminate real rights. 
There is a great degree of overlap between this classification and the classification 
of promissory and dispositive acts; however, there are differences. All promissory 
acts are personal. Most dispositive acts are real, but not all. For instance, assignment 
of rights and remission of debt are dispositive because they transfer and extinguish 
an existing right, respectively; they are also personal acts because the right 
transferred or extinguished is a personal right—an obligation. See YIANNOPOULOS, 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449; see also supra note 552.  
 606. Likewise, a conventional assignment of a right is a dispositive act 
effecting a transfer of a right. Usually, the cause for this transfer is furnished by a 
promissory act, which may appear in the same instrument of the conventional 
assignment. This cause is usually onerous. For example, the assignor may have 
promised to sell or exchange the right. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra 
note 270, §§ 9:15, 10:13. The cause, however, could also be gratuitous when the 
assignor donates the right to the assignee. This “gratuitous assignment” or 
donation of an incorporeal is subject to formal requirements. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
1541, 1550 (2019); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1536 (1870). See LORIO, supra note 
285, §§ 8:2–8:10; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 11.23.   
 607. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2623 (2019). See also Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. 
St. Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193, 197 (La. 1908) (“The reason why a sale under 
a suspensive condition does not transfer the ownership is that it is not a sale. If it 
was a sale, it would transfer the ownership; because a sale is a transfer of 
ownership, and it is nothing else. The expression ‘to sell,’ and the expression ‘to 
transfer property for a price in money,’ are convertible; and, as a consequence, it 
is no more possible to sell without transferring ownership than it is possible to sell 
without selling, or to transfer ownership without transferring ownership, or to do 
any other thing without doing it. When a sale is made under a suspensive 
condition, there is no sale until the condition has been fulfilled. There is merely a 
contract that there shall be a sale when the condition is fulfilled.”). 




provision, a sale of a thing by a non-owner is null.608 The type of nullity—
absolute or relative—of such a sale has been a 
source    of    some    disagreement among scholars in France609 and 
 
 608. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 (2019) (“The sale of a thing belonging to 
another does not convey ownership.”) (emphasis added). The revision comments 
to this article state that this article does not change the law. Id. cmt. a. See LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2452 (1870) (“The sale of a thing belonging to another person is 
null; it may give rise to damages when the buyer knew not that the thing belonged 
to another person.”) (emphasis added). The source provision is article 1599 of the 
Code Napoléon, containing identical language. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 270, § 7:1; Hayward v. Campbell, 4 Teiss. 96, 100–01 (La. 
Ct. App. 1906); Bickham v. Kelly, 110 So. 637, 638 (La. 1926); Hale v. New 
Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 321, 323–25 (1866) (discussing the history of the legal 
treatment of the sale of a thing belonging to another). This rule applies by analogy 
to all juridical acts translative of ownership (e.g., exchange and donations inter 
vivos and mortis causa). See Marie Gayet, L’Acquision a non domino, in REVUE 
JURIDIQUE DE L’OUEST 17, 27–28 (2010). The rule applies in all situations of 
unauthorized dispositions of a thing, including dispositions by usufructuaries and 
co-owners. See Gayet, at 35–36; 19 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & LÉO 
SAIGNAT, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL. DE LA VENTE ET DE 
L’ECHANGE No. 120 (3d ed. 1908). It should also be noted that this rule 
contemplates situations in which the seller represents herself as the owner of the 
thing. A promise by a non-owner that the true owner will transfer ownership to 
the promisee is governed by the rules on porte-fort promises. See LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1977 (2019); 2 AMBROISE COLIN & HENRI CAPITANT, COURS ÉLÉMENTAIRE 
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS Nos. 534–35 (8th ed. 1935) [hereinafter COLIN & 
CAPITANT II].  
 609. The prevailing view in French doctrine is that a sale by non-owner is 
relatively null. French scholars defend this view, arguing that a sale by a non-
owner does have some legal effect—examples include just title and warranty for 
eviction. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, supra note 608, Nos. 116–19; 
FRÉDÉRIC MOURLON, RÉPÉTITIONS ÉCRITES SUR LE DEUXIÈME EXAMEN DE CODE 
CIVIL No. 521 (11th ed. 1883); PLANIOL II, supra note 246, Nos. 1422–23; 24 
FRANÇOIS LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL No. 115 (3d ed. 1878); 16 
ALEXANDRE DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS Nos. 176–79 (3d ed. 
1834); 3 RAYMOND THÉODORE TROPOLONG, LE DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUÉ SUIVANT 
L’ORDRE DU CODE. DE LA VENTE Nos. 236–37 (1844); Pierre Guiho, Les actes de 
disposition sur la chose d’autrui, 52 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 1 
(1954). The traditional view seems to have been in favor of absolute nullity. See 
5 CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 351, n.43 (P. 
Esmein ed., 6th ed. 1952) [hereinafter AUBRY & RAU V]; 6 CHARLES-
BONAVENTURE-MARIE TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS Nos. 131–32 (4th ed. 
1824). Some French scholars have argued that such a sale is an inexistent act. See, 
e.g., 6 VICTOR-NAPOLÉON MARCADÉ, EXPLICATION THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU 
CODE CIVIL 212–19 (7th ed. 1875). Contemporary scholars still challenge the 




Louisiana.610 The redactors of the Code Napoléon most likely had absolute 
nullity—or even inexistence—in mind.611 This traditional view, however, 
overlooked the fact that such a sale produces some legal effects, such as 
potential just title for the purposes of acquisitive prescription, claims for 
damages from a purchaser in good faith, and acquisition of ownership of 
movables under the bona fide purchaser doctrine.612 The prevailing view 
is that a sale of the thing of another is a relative nullity.613 This solution 
provides legal justification for the effects of such a sale at the cost of 
sanctioning alienations by non-owners, which arguably runs afoul of 
public policy.614 Aside from these doctrinal considerations, an essential 
factor that should inform the inquiry as to the proper type of nullity is the 
need to balance the interests of the parties, particularly when the buyer is 
in good faith.615  
It is submitted that both sides of the argument as to the character of 
the nullity fall short of striking a fine balance, primarily because they insist 
upon a misleading notion of an indivisible juridical act of sale—one that 
cannot be separated into promise and conveyance.616 A bifurcated 
 
validity of the prevailing view. See, e.g., Gayet, supra note 608, at 27–34 
(discussing several approaches). French jurisprudence follows the prevailing 
doctrinal view in favor of relative nullity. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Apr. 16, 1973, Bull. civ. III, No. 303 
(Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1er civ., Dec. 
4, 1967, D. 1968. 283 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] 3e civ., Dec. 8, 1999, D. 2001. 269, note Albiges (Fr.). 
 610. The prevailing view in Louisiana jurisprudence is that a sale of the thing 
of another is relatively null. See, e.g., Jefferson Sawmill Co. v. Iowa & La. Land 
Co., 48 So. 428, 430–31 (La. 1909); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. c (2019). For 
other interesting approaches in Louisiana doctrine, compare LEVASSEUR & 
GRUNING, supra note 408, at 28 (comparing a sale by a non-owner with a sale 
under suspensive condition), with Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 
706–08 (examining a possible characterization as an inexistent act). 
 611. See PLANIOL II, supra note 246, Nos. 1422–23. 
 612. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 cmt. a (2019); BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
SAIGNAT, supra note 608, Nos. 116–19; PLANIOL II, supra note 246, Nos. 1422–
23; COLIN & CAPITANT II, supra note 608, No. 535.  
 613. See supra notes 609–10. 
 614. See MOURLON, supra note 609, Nos. 515–21; Gayet, supra note 608, at 
27–34, 40–42.  
 615. See MOURLON, supra note 609, Nos. 522–25 (discussing several 
variations of parties in good and bad faith).  
 616. See Gayet, supra note 608, at 31–33; EUGÈNE GAUDEMET, THÉORIE 
GÉNÉRALE DES OBLIGATIONS 102 (1937) (distinguishing between the personal and 
real effects of a contract of sale). Most scholars discussing this issue begin by 
describing and then quickly dismissing the bifurcated system of promise and 




approach under the theory of promissory and dispositive acts might prove 
useful here. The promissory element of a sale by a non-owner, that is, the 
promise of the putative seller to the buyer is, in principle, a valid 
conventional obligation.617 Thus, the putative seller remains liable 
in contract for her failure to perform.618 The dispositive element of such a 
 
conveyance under Roman law. See, e.g., BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, 
supra note 608, No. 116; AUBRY & RAU V, supra note 609, § 351, n.43; 
MOURLON, supra note 609, No. 514.  
 617. Cf. LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 408, at 28 (arguing that the sale 
by a non-owner is valid but has no real effect). Indeed, all promises are presumed 
valid within the bounds of mandatory law. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1969, 1971 (2019). 
A promise to sell made by a non-owner seems to be a legal impossibility because 
the putative seller lacks power to dispose. This promise, however, is not 
objectively impossible because it is always possible that the seller may procure 
ownership of the thing prior to being sued by the buyer for performance. LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 1972 (2019); id. art. 2452 cmt. e; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 33, § 31; LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 408, at 28. If both the seller 
and the buyer are in bad faith, it would seem accurate to conclude that the 
conventional obligation would have an illicit cause. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1968, 
2030 (2019). In such a case, any attempt to recover performances from such an 
absolutely null contract may be estopped under the “clean hands” doctrine. Id. art. 
2033; id. art. 2452 cmt. d; LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 
242, at 110–12. Cf. MOURLON, supra note 609, No. 525 (attempting a similar 
approach based on French doctrine). Nevertheless, under prevailing French 
doctrine, the sale by a non-owner remains relatively null even when both parties 
are in bad faith. See MOURLON, supra note 609, Nos. 522–25; BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, supra note 608, No. 119.  
 618. Therefore, the buyer has a personal action against the seller who fails to 
fulfill her promise. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 cmt. d (2019). Here, the seller could 
be liable for a breach of the warranty of eviction. A bad faith buyer would be 
precluded from claiming breach of this warranty. Id. arts. 2500, 2503; TOOLEY-
KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 7:2, 10:28–10:29. This approach 
provides doctrinal justification for the added clause in the source provision of 
article 2452 that such a nullity “may give rise to damages when the buyer knew 
not that the thing belonged to another person.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 (1870); 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1599 (1804) (Fr.). Several French scholars favor the 
approach of dissolution of the contract. See, e.g., COLIN & CAPITANT II supra note 
608, No. 537; Gayet, supra note 608, at 31–34. Naturally, if the seller promised 
to sell a thing in the future, the seller may procure ownership of that thing and 
discharge her obligation by proper performance. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 cmt. e. 
(2019); id. art.726; id. art. 2502; LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 408, at 28; 
TOOLEY KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 10:46–10:49 (discussing the 
“after-acquired title doctrine”); YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra 
note 391, § 1:11, at 25 n.3; Bordelon v. Bordelon, 499 So. 2d 1050 (La. Ct. App. 
3d Cir. 1986); Greene v. Greene, 373 So. 2d 756 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Hale 




sale is the sale itself, that is, the conveyance of the thing; however, this is 
a dispositive act made by a person who lacks the power to dispose.619 And 
here is where the relative nullity is located—the dispositive act is 
relatively null.620 According to the prevailing view, this relative nullity is 
established in favor of the buyer.621 Perhaps a more accurate statement of 
this rule is that the dispositive act is relatively null in favor of the buyer as 
 
v. New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 321 (1866). Ratification of the sale by the true owner 
that is made prior to the rescission of the sale validates the sale. See LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1843 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 12.58–
12.60; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, supra note 608, No. 122; LAURENT, 
supra note 609, No. 120; COLIN & CAPITANT II, supra note 608, No. 537. But see 
Hale, 18 La. Ann. at 326 (dismissing the characterization of the owner’s act as a 
“ratification” on the basis of a French doctrinal view that the sale of a thing 
belonging to another is an inexistent act; this view, however, is not the prevailing 
view in France). 
 619. In other words, such a disposition violates the principle, nemo dat quod 
non habet. See supra note 290; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, supra note 
608, No. 116; PLANIOL II, supra note 246, Nos. 1422–23. Subsequent acquisition 
of ownership by the seller may validate the dispositive act. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2452 cmt. e (2019). Likewise, ratification of this juridical act by the true owner 
validates the act. Id. art. 1843; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 
87, §§ 12.58–12.60. Furthermore, this rule admits exceptions with regard to things 
not yet individualized. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 cmt. b (2019). A sale of a movable 
by a non-owner may also transfer ownership immediately under the bona fide 
purchaser doctrine. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 7:1–
7:17; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 518–25 (2019). 
 620. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. c (2019); BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
SAIGNAT, supra note 608, Nos. 116–26; AUBRY & RAU V, supra note 609, § 351, 
at 39–43; McDonald v. Richard, 13 So. 2d 712 (La. 1943).  
 621. According to the prevailing view in France, the nullity prescribed in the 
case of a sale by a non-owner is established for the protection of the buyer. French 
scholars justify this conclusion with recourse to the law of error. Under this view, 
the buyer is laboring under a unilateral error as to the qualities of the seller (as 
owner) and as to the object (as belonging to the seller). Theoretically, there are 
instances in which the seller may be in error; however, according to the same 
view, the seller’s error will most likely be inexcusable. Essentially, the buyer is 
given an opportunity to rescind the contract before she is evicted by the true 
owner. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, supra note 608, Nos. 118, 125; 
LAURENT, supra note 609, No. 117.  




between the parties;622 as to the true owner, this act is “inopposable.”623 
The dispositive act may serve as a just title under the Louisiana law of 
acquisitive prescription.624 The buyer who rescinds the dispositive act also 
 
 622. Thus, a confirmation of the sale by the buyer is strictly confined to the 
parties and has no real effect—that is, it does not result in actual transfer of 
ownership to the buyer. By confirming the sale—expressly or tacitly—the buyer 
essentially waives her rights to rescind the contract. The contract maintains its 
force as a mere promise of the seller to transfer ownership and, potentially, to 
warrant the buyer against eviction if the buyer remains in good faith. The same 
result obtains if the buyer’s action for rescission has prescribed, although the 
buyer may still raise the nullity as a defense against the seller’s action to enforce 
the buyer’s obligations. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2031, 2032 (2019). See BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, supra note 608, No. 119; AUBRY & RAU V, supra note 
609, § 351, at 41. 
 623. Under the prevailing view, the action for rescission is not available to the 
true owner. For the owner, this sale is res inter alios acta (an act between third 
parties) that does not affect the owner’s right of ownership, although it may lead 
to eviction of the owner from possession. The owner maintains her real actions to 
revendicate ownership and possession in the hands of the buyer. BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, supra note 608, Nos. 118, 125; LAURENT, supra note 
609, No. 117; Bonvillain v. Bodenheimer, 42 So. 273, 278 (La. 1906); LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 3433, 3479 (2019). This opinion unduly restricts the legal protection 
of the true owner. If the relative nullity provided in article 2452 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code is intended for the protection of private parties, and if it is accepted 
that the buyer is always entitled to such protection, then by even greater force (a 
fortiori) it ought to follow that the true owner is also protected. This solution is 
followed in Quebec. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 1714 (Can.) 
(“The true owner may apply for the annulment of the sale and revendicate the sold 
property from the buyer unless the sale was made under judicial authority or 
unless the buyer can set up acquisitive prescription.”). In Louisiana, the naked 
owner may set aside an unauthorized sale of a nonconsumable made by the 
usufructuary and revendicate the thing in the hands of the acquirer. See LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 623 cmt. d (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 
391, §§ 6:10, 6:14. Thus, “inopposability” may have effects that are tantamount to 
relative nullity. French scholars have also made this observation. See, e.g., 
MALAURIE ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 701. For the distinction 
between inopposability and nullity, see infra notes 774–86 and accompanying text. 
 624. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. b (2019). Generally, the term “title” can 
refer to a juridical act (negotium) or to a document, such as a deed (instrumentum). 
See LARGUIER, supra note 243, Nos. 6–7. Here, “title” refers to a dispositive 
juridical act. “Title” is synonymous with juridical act also in the law of servitudes. 
See YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:9, at 370. In 
Germany and Greece, a sale by a non-owner is a valid promissory act but an 
absolutely null dispositive act. Nevertheless, this null act is still considered a “just 
title” in the guise of a “putative title.” German and Greek scholars argue that their 




has a claim for dissolution of the promissory act and damages where 
appropriate.625 This approach satisfies both sides of the argument. It 
isolates the relationship between seller and buyer in the law of contract, 
thus protecting the owner from bad faith attempts to alienate her property. 
Furthermore, it furnishes legal justification for the limited real effects of 
such a sale, including the establishment of just title where applicable. This 
approach is also faithful to the traditional distinction between contract and 
property law.626 It is permissible to promise something out of nothing;627 
it is impossible to convey something out of nothing.628 
In conclusion, the German classifications of attributive versus non-
attributive and promissory versus dispositive offer a systematically 
accurate taxonomy of patrimonial obligations. These classifications also 
help shed some light on certain intricacies of civilian doctrine. It is 
submitted that the Louisiana theory of juridical acts ought to endorse these 
classifications and utilize the more descriptive French subcategories as 
illustrations of the German subcategories.  
 
recent land registry system will diminish the practical importance of acquisitive 
prescription. For an interesting Canadian perspective on the value of a land 
registry and how an imperfect implementation of such as system could backfire, 
see Gaële Gidrol-Mistral & Thuy Nam Tran Tran, Publicité des droits et 
prescription acquisitive: des liaisons dangereuses?, 46 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE 
DROIT 303 (2016). 
 625. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2013, 2018 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II, 
supra note 376, §§ 263–78. A purchaser in bad faith should be estopped from 
claiming restitution or damages from the seller by application of the “clean hands” 
doctrine. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2033 cmt. c (2019); id. art. 2503; LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 2452 (1870); MOURLON, supra note 609, Nos. 519, 525; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT 
& GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 7:2, 10:28–10:29; LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 110–12. In any event, such a purchaser would 
be dubbed a bad faith possessor for the purposes of accession and acquisitive 
prescription. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 487, 3480 (2019). 
 626. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 31, at 50 n.2. 
 627. The common law of contract espouses this principle. A contract is a 
promise to perform or pay damages. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path 
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). In the civil law, a similar precept 
appears in the law of remedies for failure to perform a conventional obligation. 
The primary contractual liability is specific performance; the secondary liability 
is damages. See, e.g., LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 47, 48 
(discussing this concept with reference to the will theory and objective theory in 
the law of obligations).  
 628. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2015 (1870); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 442-43. 




c. Conservatory Acts, Acts of Administration, and Acts of Disposition 
The tripartite distinction between conservatory, administrative, and 
dispositive acts is a common and useful French subcategorization of 
patrimonial juridical acts.629 It applies to cases in which property of the 
owner is co-owned with,630 or entrusted to,631 others. The primary function 
of this classification is to delineate the authority632 of persons who act with 
respect to the thing co-owned or held.633  
 
 629. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 154; CARBONNIER I, supra 
note 60, Nos. 294, 297; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 141. 
 630. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 797–818 (2019); Symeonides & Martin, supra 
note 404, passim (ownership in indivision). See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2346–
55.1 (2019); CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 343, § 5:3 (explaining that in the 
case of community property, as a rule, “[a] unique type of co-ownership is 
established by which each co-owner [spouse] has the power to alienate the thing 
without the consent of the other”); cf. Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 276–77; RENÉ 
VERDOT, LA NOTION D’ACTE D’ADMINISTRATION EN DROIT PRIVÉ FRANÇAIS, Nos. 
104–10 (1963). 
 631. Examples in the Civil Code abound. Illustrations include legal 
representation of minors; tutorship; curatorship of absentees or interdicts; usufruct 
of nonconsumables; loan for use and lease; adverse possession; trust; administration 
of successions; conditional obligations; and litigious rights. See LARROUMET, supra 
note 417, Nos. 443–50; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 238–368.  
 632. For example,  
The usufructuary of nonconsumable things is under obligation to 
perform conservatory acts, may have authority to perform acts of 
administration, and, in principle, lacks authority to make acts of 
disposition. In this context, ‘authority’ means the power of the 
usufructuary to represent the owner and to perform juridical acts with 
binding effect toward the naked owner and third persons. 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:2, at 200; see also 
VERDOT, supra note 630, Nos. 42–63, 56–59 (discussing conservatory and 
administrative acts of usufructuaries). Authority is delineated differently in the 
law of mandate and, by analogy, negotiorum gestio. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2292, 
2293, 2989 (2019); Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 30, at 1126–31 (discussing 
the concept of “authority” in the law of mandate); cf. Brenner, supra note 37, No. 
239; VERDOT, supra note 630, Nos. 25–41, 135–47. But see YIANNOPOULOS, 
PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:15 (“neither a negotiorum gestor nor a 
usufructuary may establish on the estate of which he has the usufruct any charges 
in the nature of a predial servitude.”) (emphasis added). 
 633. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:2; 
Symeonides & Martin, supra note 404, at 111–13; BETTI, supra note 2, at 302–
03; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 238; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 261-
2. This tripartite classification, therefore, informs the provisions in the Louisiana 
Civil Code dealing with the relationship between the owner and others who hold 




Conservatory acts are those that tend to preserve a thing within a given 
patrimony to prevent it from being destroyed, damaged, or lost.634 Such 
acts may involve preservation of the property,635 verification of the 
 
real or personal rights in the thing or who manage the thing. The distinction also 
appears in the allocation of expenses between the parties. Generally, expenses are 
classified as necessary, useful, and luxurious. LA. CIV. CODE art. 527 cmt. b 
(2019); id. art. 528 cmt. b; id. art. 806 cmt. b; id. art. 1259; YIANNOPOULOS, 
PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 11:21; TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 129. This 
allocation varies according to the relationship of the parties—for example, its 
onerous or gratuitous nature. Compare, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2689, 2691–94 
(2019) (lessor responsible for necessary repairs and expenses), with id. arts. 2894–
99 (borrower in loan for use responsible for necessary repairs and expenses). See 
also id. art. 806; Symeonides & Martin, supra note 440, at 147–52 (discussing the 
allocation of expenses among co-owners).   
 634. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 444; 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:2, at 198–99; PAUL-
ALBERT PAGEAUD, UN ASPECT DE LA SÉCURITÉ JURIDIQUE. L’ACTE 
CONSERVATOIRE COMME ACTE NÉCESSAIRE (1941). It is said that the purpose of 
conservatory acts is to remove the patrimony or one of its elements from imminent 
danger, with a small expenditure relative to the gravity of this peril. But this 
description is not completely accurate according to French doctrine. See MARTY & 
RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 154; CORNU, supra note 370, No. 129. 
Conservatory acts are static in nature. Their purpose is to preserve property in the 
present for their future use by the owner. See CORNU, supra note 370, No. 130.  
 635. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Whitmer, 69 So. 189 (La. 1919); Gregory v. Kedley, 
185 So. 105 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1938) (payment of property taxes); Brenner, 
supra note 37, No. 248 (harvesting crops, care and feeding of livestock); Nabors 
Oil and Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Co., 91 So. 765 (La. 1922) (necessary 
repairs). The costs of ordinary maintenance and repairs, however, are not 
necessary expenses. Ferrier v. Mossler, 23 So. 2d 341 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1945); 
Brown v. Tauzin, 168 So. 502 (La. 1936); Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana v. Miller, 
10 So. 779 (La. 1892).  




patrimony,636 completion of formalities,637 prohibition measures,638 
safeguard measures,639 and several other additional measures.640 
Conservatory acts are intended to protect rights in existence641 and also 
other interests, such as conditional rights,642 litigious rights,643 and rights 
pending acceptance.644 Conversely, mere expectancies are not 
 
 636. For instance, inventory of a thing subject to usufruct or of the items of a 
succession. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 154; Brenner, supra 
note 37, No. 249. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 
4:2–4:6; TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 193 (discussing inventory in the context of 
the law of usufruct); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 6:4, 15:7 (discussing the inventory 
and descriptive list in the administration of successions); Succession of 
Menendez, 115 So. 2d 829, 831–32 (La. 1959) (holding that execution of an 
inventory of decedent’s estate does not constitute tacit acceptance of the 
succession); CROSS, supra note 331, at 359; VERDOT, supra note 630, Nos. 68–72 
(explaining that conservatory and administrative acts normally do not amount to 
tacit acceptance of the succession). See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 4101–02 
(inventory of minor’s property by tutor); id. art. 4563 (inventory of interdict’s 
property); William Reed Huguet, New Law of Interdiction – Clear and 
Convincing Revision, 47 LOY. L. REV. 1059 (2001).  
 637. See, e.g., CORNU, supra note 370, No. 130; LARROUMET, supra note 417, 
No. 425 (inscription of mortgages); LA. CIV. CODE art. 566 (2019) (necessary 
actions available to usufructuary); Litton v. Litton, 36 La. Ann. 348 (1884) 
(insurance costs). See generally YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra 
note 391, §§ 3:21–3:25 (discussing the usufructuary’s recourse to justice); 
Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 249–51. 
 638. For example, opposition to partition or non-acceptance of defective work 
of a contractor. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 252. 
 639. For instance, affixing seals, appointing receivers, effecting deposit or 
sequestration. See CORNU, supra note 370, No. 130.  
 640. Some additional acts may occasionally be characterized as conservatory. 
Examples include interruption of prescription, oblique and revocatory actions, 
injunction, and payment or settlement of debt to avoid foreclosure or seizure. See 
LARROUMET, supra note 417, No. 426; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 257–59.  
 641. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 261. 
 642. Thus, the obligee of a conditional obligation may exercise all lawful 
measures to preserve her right pending the condition. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1771 
(2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 5.8. Similarly, 
the surety may, before payment, take precautionary measures to protect her right. 
Brenner, supra note 37, No. 262.  
 643. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 266. 
 644. Thus, a successor, prior to accepting or renouncing the succession, can 
perform conservatory acts. The performance of such acts is not inferred as a tacit 
acceptance of the succession. See LORIO, supra note 285, § 6:4; Brenner, supra 
note 37, Nos. 278, 326. 




protected.645 Conservatory acts enjoy favorable treatment in the law and 
are sometimes obligatory, especially in cases of management of the 
property of another.646 The rules on capacity for conservatory acts are 
more relaxed as compared to other acts.647 
Acts of administration are acts of management of a thing or group of 
things that exceed the limits of conservatory measures.648 Numerous 
 
 645. Thus, during the lifetime of the decedent, the successors—including 
forced heirs—have no right of action—their “right” being merely an expectancy 
not protected by conservatory acts. See 4 HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., LEÇONS DE 
DROIT CIVIL, SUCCESSIONS, LIBÉRALITÉS No. 927 (L. Leveneur & S. Leveneur 
eds., 5th ed. 1999); Brenner, supra note 37, No. 264. 
 646. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 539, 570, 577, 581, 584, 585 (2019) 
(usufruct of non-consumables); id. art. 2369.3 (former community property); 
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Co-Ownership of Former Community Property: A Primer 
on the New Law, 56 LA. L. REV. 677, 685–86, 696–98 (1995) [hereinafter Spaht, 
Former Community Property]. Conversely, unilateral conservatory acts are 
permissible but not obligatory in the law of co-ownership. LA. CIV. CODE art. 801 
(2019); Symeonides & Martin, supra note 404, at 112–16; Spaht, Former 
Community Property, at 681. Expenses incurred for the preservation of a thing 
may be reimbursed. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 806 (2019) (co-owner); id. art. 
527 (evicted adverse possessor); id. arts. 1257, 1268 (co-heir who makes collation 
of immovable in kind); id. art. 2694 (lessee); id. art. 2899 (borrower). In certain 
cases, claims for such expenses also enjoy a privilege. See, e.g., id. arts. 3224–26 
(2019); cf. Brenner, supra note 37, No. 260. 
 647. Some conservatory acts are available to incompetents. See, e.g., LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 395 cmt. e (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 
391, § 3:2, at 199. Cf. Brenner, supra note 37, No. 272; 1 MARCEL PLANIOL & 
GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, LES PERSONNES, 
No. 273 n.4 (R. Savatier ed., 2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter PLANIOL & RIPERT I]. 
 648. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 444; 3 GABRIEL 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & JULIEN BONNECASE, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE 
DE DROIT CIVIL: SUPPLÉMENT Nos. 317–344 (1926) [hereinafter BONNECASE III]; 
ANDRÉ TRASBOT, L’ACTE D’ADMINISTRATION EN DROIT PRIVÉ FRANÇAIS (1921). 
Acts of administration lie in the middle between conservatory acts—which are 
necessary—and acts of disposition whose fulfillment is strictly regulated. Thus, 
acts of administration absorb all conservatory acts, while certain acts of 
disposition may qualify as acts of administration. See Brenner, supra note 37, 
Nos. 291–92. The distinction, however, is not always easy. As Professor 
Yiannopoulos aptly explains,  
The classification of a juridical act as a conservatory act, as an act of 
disposition, or as an act of administration frequently depends on its 
purpose rather than its nature. Especially with regard to the 
administration of an entire patrimony, certain acts that are necessary or 
useful for the orderly management of the property are classified as acts 




attempts have been made to specify this rather vague definition.649 In 
general, such acts contemplate the idea of ordinary exploitation, 
management, and development of the patrimony.650 Some examples of 
acts of administration include useful improvements;651 usual or 
foreseeable expenses;652 participation in shareholder meetings and 
voting;653 production of income without depletion of the property;654 
 
of administration although they may tend to divest the owner of a real or 
of a personal right.  
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:2, at 199–200. Of 
course, this classification expresses general principles of civil law. Special—and 
sometimes detailed—rules apply in certain cases. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
arts. 4261–75 (2019) (tutorship); cf. VERDOT, supra note 630, Nos. 204–09 
(tutorship in French law); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 4566–67 (2019) (curators of 
interdicts); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 801–06 (2019); Symeonides & Martin, supra note 
404, at 116–52 (co-ownership); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2369.1–2369.8 (2019); Spaht, 
Former Community Property, supra note 646, at 686–722 (former community 
property); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 47–53 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3437–40 
(2019); Monica Hof Wallace, A Primer on Absent Persons in Louisiana, 64 LOY. 
L. REV. 423, 430–32 (2019) [hereinafter Wallace, Absent Persons]; Jeanne Louise 
Carriere, The Rights of the Living Dead: Absent Persons in the Civil Law, 50 LA. 
L. REV. 901, 938–47 (1990) (curators of absent persons); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
2346–2355.1 (2019); CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 343, §§ 5:1–5:23 
(community property); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 15:11–15:20 (succession 
representative).  
 649. See BONNECASE III, supra note 648, Nos. 333–34. One approach is 
subjective—focusing on whether the owner or an administrator performs the act. 
See PLANIOL I, supra note 153, No. 2339. A second method is objective—focusing 
on the purpose of the act itself as an act of wealth management. See TRASBOT, 
supra note 648, at 197. A third method combines subjective and objective 
elements. It also distinguishes between administration of the patrimony of capable 
persons—e.g., mandate and negotiorum gestio—and administration handled by 
caretakers of incapable persons. See VERDOT, supra note 630, No. 20; 
BONNECASE III, supra note 648, No. 332; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, 
No. 154.  
 650. See MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 261-2; CARBONNIER I, supra 
note 60, Nos. 294, 297; CORNU, supra note 370, No. 129. Conversely, in principle, 
the administrator of another’s property may not burden the property with a 
servitude. See YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:15. 
 651. See, e.g., YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, §§ 11:21–11:22 
(discussing the concepts of useful expenses and improvements). 
 652. See CORNU, supra note 370, No. 129; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 306–
07. 
 653. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:15. 
 654. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 306. 




leasing the property, depending on the duration;655 collection of fruits and 
harvest;656 insuring the property;657 some dispositions or acquisitions 
useful to the property;658 dispositions of things substantially impaired by 
use, wear, or decay;659 prosecuting suits and enforcing claims;660 collecting 
payments;661 and making payments.662 The default rules on contractual 
capacity apply to acts of administration.663  
Generally, acts of disposition are acts that cause a substantial change 
in the patrimony, exceeding acts of administration. For this reason, these 
acts are normally disallowed without prior authorization by the owner or 
permission of the court.664 The term “disposition” here is a broader term 
 
 655. See CORNU, supra note 370, No. 129; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 307–
09. In the Louisiana law of usufruct of nonconsumables, however, leases and 
loans by the usufructuary are potentially acts of disposition. See LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 568, 568.2 (2019); but also see id. arts. 567, 2716; YIANNOPOULOS, 
PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 3:3–3:9.  
 656. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:14. 
 657. See id, § 3:13 (usufruct); see also 1 CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, 
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, No. 430 (P. Esmein & A. Ponsard eds., 7th ed. 1964) (acts 
of administration by tutor in favor of minor). 
 658. For instance, sale of fruits, crops, or timber produced by the thing. See 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:14. 
 659. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 568, 569 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, 
PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:17; PLANIOL & RIPERT I, supra note 
647, No. 274; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 154. 
 660. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 319; YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL 
SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 3:21–3:25 (discussing the usufructuary’s 
recourse to justice). 
 661. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 3:10–
3:13 (usufruct); CROSS, supra note 331, at 79–81 (succession representative). 
 662. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 258, 321; CROSS, supra note 331, at 83–
84 (succession representative). Subsequent transfer of the property does not affect 
the validity of previous acts of administration and conservatory acts. Likewise, 
such acts are not disturbed by the subsequent fulfillment of a suspensive or 
resolutory condition. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1775 (2019); LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 5:12, at 91–92; LARROUMET, supra 
note 417, Nos. 434–35.  
 663. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 28, 1918 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL 
SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 3:2, at 199; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 329.  
 664. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:2; 
CORNU, supra note 370, No. 128; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 336; CROSS, supra 
note 331, at 84–85. French scholars have struggled to define this category. They 
agree, however, that it has the most serious consequences compared to conservatory 
acts and acts of administration. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 337. Thus, although 
a co-owner may take conservatory measures without the concurrence of the other 




that encompasses the legal notion of abusus, meaning total or partial 
alienation of the property.665 Thus, acts translative of ownership or of a 
limited real right are acts of disposition par excellence.666 Abdicative acts, 
such as renunciation, abandonment, remission, compromise, and 
voluntary encumbrances, are also considered acts of disposition.667 
Disposition is also understood in economic terms. In this light, acts of 
disposition include not only acts of alienation, but also acts that engage the 
future of the patrimony or are likely to impair its value.668 A long-term 
lease of the property would be considered an act of disposition under this 
broad definition.669 Additionally, acts of disposition require capacity and 
power to alienate.670 In default of more specific rules, the general rules of 
capacity apply.671  
The preceding discussion highlighted significant categories of 
juridical acts that are seen in civilian theory and legal practice. The theory 
of juridical acts recognizes several other classifications. 
 
co-owners, unanimous consent of all co-owners is required for disposition of the 
property. Use and management is determined by agreement of all the co-owners or 
by the court. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 800–05 (2019); Symeonides & Martin, supra note 
404, at 112–47; TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 144–50. Concurrence of the spouse is 
necessary for disposition of former community property. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.4 
(2019). Such concurrence is a unilateral juridical act. See Spaht, Former Community 
Property, supra note 646, at 708. 
 665. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 3:2; 
Brenner, supra note 37, No. 336; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 261-2; 
PLANIOL & RIPERT I, supra note 647, Nos. 276–77. As a rule, a non-owner cannot 
dispose of the property. See supra notes 608–28 and accompanying text; WEILL 
& TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 347. Special rules apply for the disposition of 
property by legal representatives of minors. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 230, 
336 (2019); id. art. 1922 cmt. b; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 4301–71 (2019). 
 666. See YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 6:10; 
CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, Nos. 294, 297; CORNU, supra note 370, No. 128. 
 667. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 339; CORNU, supra note 370, No. 128. 
 668. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 339; CORNU, supra note 370, No. 128. 
 669. A lease of a non-consumable by a usufructuary is treated as an act of 
disposition. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 568, 568.2 (2019); but also see id. arts. 567, 
2716; YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 3:3–3:9. 
 670. See YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 3:2, at 
199; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 358–59. On the issue of capacity and power to 
alienate, see supra note 284. 
 671. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 28, 1918 (2019) (default rules on capacity); id. 
arts. 1470–84; LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 9:1–9:6 (capacity to make and receive 
donations). 




3. Other Classifications 
Civilian theory offers numerous other classifications of juridical acts. 
These classifications include juridical acts inter vivos and mortis causa; 
consensual, real, and solemn acts; positive and negative acts; and causal 
and abstract acts. These categories either relate to one specific area of the 
law or are purely theoretical. For the purposes of this Article, discussion 
of these four categories is brief and in passing.  
First, juridical acts can be classified as inter vivos or mortis causa. 
Juridical acts inter vivos produce their effects during the lifetime of the 
parties. Juridical acts mortis causa are made in consideration of the death 
of one of the parties and do not achieve their purposes until the date of 
death.672 In Louisiana civil law, this category is restricted almost 
exclusively to the law of donations,673 where it is discussed thoroughly.674 
Next, juridical acts may be consensual, solemn, or real. Most juridical 
acts are consensual, meaning that they are not subject to any formalities.675 
Juridical acts subject to mandatory formalities are formal (or solemn).676 
Solemn form is traditionally common in extrapatrimonial acts, such as 
marriage677 and acknowledgment of a child.678 Solemn acts also exist in 
 
 672. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 319–21; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, No. 28; 
Brenner, supra note 37, No. 195. 
 673. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 137–40. 
 674. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1467–69 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, §§ 8:1, 
12:1. Under Louisiana law, dispositions mortis causa are permissible only by 
testament, unless provided otherwise by state or federal law. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
1570 (2019); See LORIO, supra note 285, § 12:1. Other types of donations taking 
effect upon death, such as the donation causa mortis recognized at common law 
and other civilian jurisdictions, are generally not enforceable. Succession of 
Sinnott v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 105 La. 705 (La. 1901).   
 675. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 120–23; LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 12–13; BETTI, supra note 2, at 
281–97; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, No. 29; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 
37, Nos. 583–85; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 383–84. 
 676. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 120–23; LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 12–13; BETTI, supra note 2, at 
281–97; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, No. 29; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 
37, Nos. 583–85; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 383–84. 
 677. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1828 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, § 11.43. 
 678. Solemn acts of personal law, such as the marriage contract, are formed in 
public because they may produce effects that are also binding on third parties. The 
solemn form may lead to the presumption that the author of the act had an 
enlightened awareness of its significance. See GUERRIERO, supra note 340, at 134. 




patrimonial law.679 Examples include sale of immovables,680 conventional 
mortgage,681 donations inter vivos682 and mortis causa,683 matrimonial 
agreements,684 renunciation of the succession,685 and conventional 
subrogation by the obligor.686 Form comprises the authentic act,687 the act 
under private signature,688 and, in certain cases, the delivery of the material 
object of the contract. In the latter case of delivery of the thing, the juridical 
act is characterized as real.689 Formality is governed by special provisions 
depending on the nominate type of the act.  
Additionally, a juridical act can be categorized as positive or negative. 
A juridical act is positive when the action of the maker is required for 
performance of the act.690 Examples include contracts giving rise to 
obligations to give or to do. The vast majority of acts are positive. In a 
negative juridical act, the legal effects of the act depend of the maker’s 
omission. Contracts giving rise to obligations not to do, such as those 
imposed in a non-compete agreement, constitute an example.691 This 
distinction involves the law of conventional obligations, where it is 
discussed more fully.692 
 
The heightened formality also objectifies the consent provided by the parties. 
Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 183–84. Thus, annulment for a vice of consent is 
more restricted in such contracts. See Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So. 2d 356, 
362 (La. 1987); LA. CIV. CODE art. 93 (2019); GUERRIERO, supra note 340, at 
129–30. A covenant marriage, on the other hand, may be annulled for fraud. See 
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and 
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 91–93 (1998) [hereinafter Spaht, Covenant 
Marriage]. 
 679. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 182. 
 680. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2440 (2019). 
 681. See id. art. 3287. 
 682. See id. art. 1541. 
 683. See id. art. 1570. 
 684. See id. art. 2331. 
 685. See id. art. 963. 
 686. See id. art. 1828. 
 687. See id. art. 1833. 
 688. See id. art. 1837. 
 689. Delivery (tradition) of the thing constitutes formation in “real contracts” 
of deposit, loan, and pawn, but also in the contracts of giving in payment and 
manual gift. See LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 
13; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 423; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, 
supra note 33, § 123. 
 690. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 133–34. 
 691. See id. at 134. 
 692. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II, supra note 376, §§ 13–172.  




Finally, juridical acts may be causal or abstract. Virtually all juridical 
acts in French and Louisiana law are causal, that is, their validity depends 
on the existence of a valid cause. German law accepts the existence of 
abstract acts, the validity of which does not depend on cause.693 A 
counterpart of the German principle of separation694 is the principle of 
abstraction,695 pursuant to which some dispositive acts are valid regardless 
of the validity of the underlying promissory act.696 Thus, in a contract of 
sale of a movable, nullity of the promissory act will not affect the validity 
of the dispositive act of conveyance. As a result, the buyer obtains 
ownership of the thing sold notwithstanding the invalidity of the promise 
of sale.697 This means that the seller who has rescinded the promissory act 
cannot revendicate the thing in the hands of the buyer. Instead, the seller 
has an action of unjust enrichment against the buyer.698 French scholars 
vehemently reject this principle.699 German and Greek legal scholars 
defend this principle by arguing that the abstract nature of the disposition 
safeguards the rights of innocent third parties.700 Nevertheless, most 
 
 693. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 449–51; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 233–34, 244–48; BETTI, supra note 
2, at 209–11; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 24, at 114–16. 
 694. See discussion supra notes 582–83 and accompanying text. 
 695. See 2 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALS 
TEIL DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 249, 253–54 (1853); ARCHIBALD 
BROWN, AN EPITOME AND ANALYSIS OF SAVIGNY’S TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS 
IN ROMAN LAW 122–24 (1872). 
 696. Most promissory juridical acts are causal. Conveyance of movables, 
assignment of rights, and remission of debt are notable examples of abstract 
dispositive juridical acts. Certain promissory acts are also abstract. Examples 
include acknowledgment of a debt and obligations arising from negotiable 
instruments. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 450. 
 697. See VAN VLIET, supra note 585, at 24–25. 
 698. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 450; BALIS, 
supra note 141, §§ 34, 65; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 29. 
 699. The existence of abstract acts had been suggested in French legal doctrine 
by application of article 1132 of the Code Napoléon, which provides that “an 
agreement is not the less valid, though the cause be not expressed.” Nevertheless, 
this view has been rejected. The prevailing view interprets this provision to mean 
that cause is still required in every juridical act; the existence and validity of cause, 
however, is presumed. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, No. 272. This 
prevailing doctrinal view is expressed more clearly in the text of the Louisiana 
Civil Code. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1969 (2019) (“An obligation may be valid 
even though its cause is not expressed.”); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, 
supra note 1, at 450. 
 700. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 27–28; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, § 248; REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF 




German and Greek proponents of this principle concede numerous 
exceptions to its application.701 In Louisiana, the distinction between 
causal and abstract acts is theoretical.  
Classifications of juridical acts contribute to a better understanding of 
their notion and function. As shown in the preceding analysis, there are 
scattered instances in the Louisiana Civil Code of juridical acts of a varied 
nature. Their categorization and systematization contribute to the 
elaboration of a cohesive theoretical basis for further legal scholarship and 
accurate judicial analysis.702 Having considered establishment and 
categorization of juridical acts, the discussion turns to extinction of 
juridical acts.  
C. Extinction of Juridical Acts 
Special rules according to the nominate type of a juridical act govern 
the lifespan and extinction of the act. Most of these rules adhere to the 
following general principles relating to the extinction of juridical acts. A 
general distinction can be made between termination of valid juridical acts 
and invalidity of juridical acts. 
1. Termination of Valid Juridical Acts 
Juridical acts terminate naturally by performance.703 The term 
“performance” here should be understood broadly, encompassing any act 
or event that fulfills the purpose of the juridical act.704 In the law of 
 
OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 866–68 (1990, 
reprt. 1992); VAN VLIET, supra note 585, at 33; CAPITANT, CAUSE, supra note 
433, No. 173. 
 701. In most civil law systems modeled after the German Civil Code, the 
transfer of immovables is causal. Furthermore, even when the dispositive act is 
abstract, if the promissory act is absolutely null as against public policy (an oft-
quoted example of nullity is unconscionability), this nullity may also taint the 
dispositive act. Naturally, the dispositive act itself will be null if the vice or other 
defect concerns that act. Lastly, the parties can turn an abstract act into a causal 
act by inserting the cause as a condition on their juridical act. See, in more detail, 
MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 30; BALIS, supra note 141, §§ 34, 65, 66, 
75; GEORGIADES, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 588, at 587–90; VAN VLIET, supra 
note 585, at 35–36. 
 702. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
 703. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1854 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 13.1–13.2; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 248, at 132–37. 
 704. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 13.1–13.2. 




conventional obligations, payment is an example of performance.705 Some 
juridical acts are instantaneous, that is, they are performed immediately 
once they are made. An example is a cash sale of a corporeal movable. 
The legal effects produced by such an act, however, can continue upon its 
termination. These effects are now juridical facts for the parties. In the 
preceding example, the sale of the movable results in the buyer’s 
ownership—a veritable juridical fact for the buyer and the seller.706 
Juridical acts of a longer duration terminate naturally by expiration.707 
Juridical acts can also terminate pursuant to an agreement of the 
parties.708 Unless otherwise provided by mandatory law, the parties to a 
contract may subsequently agree to termination.709 The original act may 
include a resolutory condition, the fulfillment of which terminates the 
contract.710 The parties to a juridical act may have also included a 
suspensive condition in their act that was not fulfilled;711 in this case, 
 
 705. “Payment” means performance in general; it is not restricted to payment 
of money. In Louisiana, payment is considered a juridical act. See LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §13.2, at 403. The legal nature of 
payment is controversial in France. The prevailing view considers payment a 
juridical act, especially when it comprises separate implementing acts, such as 
transfer of ownership or execution of documents. See AUBRY & RAU XII, supra 
note 113, § 762; NICOLE CATALA, LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DU PAYEMENT (1961); 
Moore, supra note 135, at 307–12. In the particular case of payment of money, 
the performance itself is a juridical act, but whether the money was actually paid 
is a matter of fact. Procedural acts that are made in performance of a conventional 
obligation are juridical acts. Thus, acts performed by an attorney in fulfillment of 
a contract to render legal services are acts of performance. Procedural acts, 
however, are governed by procedural law. See supra note 242.  
 706. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 46. 
 707. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1777 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, § 6.3 (describing the resolutory, or extinctive, term). 
Juridical acts cannot impose a perpetual performance. Life commitments are not 
necessarily null; however, an objective limit is fixed to the duration of such acts, 
beyond which they incur the prohibition of perpetuity. Thus, the maximum 
duration of a lease is set at 99 years. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2679 (2019).  
 708. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 251–53; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 
331. 
 709. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, § 13.1 (discussing the various ways in which an 
obligation can be extinguished); MIRABAIL, supra note 224, at 117–25. 
 710. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1767, 1775, 1776 (2019); LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 5.1, 5.3–5.5, 5.7–5.14. 
 711. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1767 (2019). 




however, it is more accurate to state that the act is null rather than 
terminated.712 
Bilateral juridical acts—contracts—can also be abruptly terminated by 
dissolution in the case of breach.713 Contracts of unspecified duration are 
also terminated by notice.714 Further discussion of this topic belongs to the 
law of conventional obligations.715  
Performance and discharge are natural ways in which a juridical act 
may be terminated. Juridical acts that are defective may be terminated or 
invalidated in accordance with the rules on nullity.  
 2. Nullity of Juridical Acts 
Juridical acts produce their legal effects within the bounds of 
mandatory law.716 Thus, a juridical act that violates a rule of mandatory 
law is defective. Determining the extent and effects of such defect is the 
object of the doctrine of nullity.717 This doctrine—being part of the theory 
 
 712. See BALIS, supra note 141, § 103. Likewise, a juridical act fails as a result 
of “caducity,” which is the accidental disappearance of an element or the non-
occurrence of an event necessary for the production of its effects. Caducity has no 
retroactive effect. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1741, 1749 (2019) (donation of 
property to be left at death “has no effect at all” if the donee predeceases the donor, 
renounces the donation, or is declared unworthy); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 105. Cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 
1186, 1187 (2016) (Fr.); MALAURIE ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 
668; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 158; BUFFELAN-LANORE, supra note 258, at 7–
8; RANA CHAABAN, LA CADUCITÉ DES ACTES JURIDIQUES. ETUDE DE DROIT CIVIL 
Nos. 11–30 (2006). 
 713. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2013–23 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, 
No. 366, at 428. 
 714. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2024 (2019). 
 715. See LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 464, passim. 
 716. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 7, 1971 (2019). 
 717. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 375–403, 474–86; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, 
Nos. 56–62; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 161–90; LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 102–12; CAPITANT, 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, Nos. 272–90; AUBRY & RAU IV, supra note 552, 
§§ 332–39; PLANIOL I, supra note 153, Nos. 326–49; RIPERT & BOULANGER, 
supra note 37, Nos. 625–45; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 331–36; 
WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 285–342; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra 
note 106, Nos. 158–62; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, Nos. 348–58; FLOUR 
ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 322–34; Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, 
at 664–65. 




of juridical acts—traces its roots to Roman ideas718 as expounded by civil 
law scholars.719 Savigny was one of the first to attempt a systematic 
categorization of nullities in his theory of the Rechtsgeschäft.720 Savigny 
approaches nullities in a two-step process. First, he identifies the reason 
for the nullity. He observes that nullity of a juridical act is a sanction 
prescribed by mandatory law.721 Mandatory laws, however, present 
differing degrees of sanctions.722 Some laws expressly or impliedly 
 
 718. See CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, No. 273; PLANIOL I, supra 
note 153, No. 328; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, No. 289; PETROPOULOS, 
supra note 36, at 595; Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 655–57. 
 719. Although it is universally accepted that the theory of juridical acts—
including the doctrine of nullity—derive from Roman concepts, scholars point out 
that the actual source of this theory is found in the later writings of civilian 
scholars who researched Roman law. Indeed, the Romans understood and 
employed the notion of nullity in a quite different—and not fully explored by legal 
historians—procedural context. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 181–88 
(explaining the Roman understanding of nullity in a procedural context); Scalise, 
Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 657; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 700, at 679–
80 (observing the incoherent nature of the Roman concept of nullity). See also 
PETROPOULOS, supra note 36, at 589; WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 82, at 425 
n.2 (noting the lack of a systematic categorization of nullities in the Roman 
sources as compared to modern categories of nullity).   
 720. See 4 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN 
RÖMISCHEN RECHTS §§ 202–03 (1841) [hereinafter SAVIGNY IV]; FLUME, supra 
note 13, at 30. 
 721. See SAVIGNY IV, supra note 720, § 202. Thus, nullity is a juridical fact, 
a legal consequence of mandatory law. Based on this observation, several scholars 
have noted the futility in any attempt to categorize nullities in any systematic way. 
According to this view, nullity is more of a practical exercise in statutory 
interpretation rather than a legal theory. See SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 220; 
see also IOANNIS ARAVANTINOS, AKYROTIS, MERIKI AKYROTIS, METATROPI. 
SYMVOLI EIS TIN THEORIA TOU ANISCHYROU [NULLITY, PARTIAL NULLITY, 
CONVERSION. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF NULLITY] 3 (1957). Nullity, 
however, may result by agreement of the parties. Indeed, parties may insert a 
suspensive condition in their contract, the failure of which would result in a null 
(unenforceable) contract. The parties may also jointly declare that their contract 
is null and ineffective. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 184; PLANIOL I, 
supra note 153, No. 327; see also FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER, YVES 
LEQUETTE & FRANÇOIS CHÉNEDÉ, DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS Nos. 537–38 
(12th ed. 2019) [hereinafter TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS]; MALAURIE ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 697 (discussing the concept of nullité 
conventionelle). 
 722. In this respect, Roman laws (leges) fall into three broad categories: 
(1) “perfect laws” (leges perfectae) that impose nullity on any act that derogates 
from these laws; (2) “less than perfect laws” (leges minus quam perfectae) that 




invalidate acts completely, that is, incurably.723 Other laws grant certain 
persons the right to validate or invalidate acts.724 Lastly, some mandatory 
laws are silent as to their sanctions. Whether such laws fall under one of 
the above categories is a matter of teleological interpretation.725 Second, 
Savigny examines who may raise the issue of nullity. He notes that 
instances of complete invalidity of juridical acts are automatic (ipso iure) 
and absolute (erga omnes), whereas instances of invalidation must be 
judicially declared.726    
Based on Savigny’s theory, modern German and Greek legal doctrines 
recognize two main categories and several intermediate categories of 
defective juridical acts. The two main categories are absolutely null and 
 
simply impose a fine on the parties to an act that derogates from these laws; and 
(3) “imperfect laws” (leges imperfectae) that impose no penalty but rather provide 
an exception to a party impaired by an act to raise the issue of nullity. See 
SAVIGNY IV, supra note 720, § 203; PETROPOULOS, supra note 36, at 125–26; 
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 700, at 698–701. 
 723. Savigny describes this category as “complete nullity” (vollständige 
Ungültigkeit) Examples include the lack of a mandatory requirement for the 
formation of a juridical act and illicit juridical acts. See SAVIGNY IV, supra note 
720, § 202.  
 724. Savigny identifies this category as “incomplete nullity” (unvollständige 
Ungültigkeit). He also refers to this category as “annullability” (Anfechtbarkeit). 
He admits that this category is multifarious. One distinct subcategory of cases 
includes acts that are invalid as to certain persons who may validate them later. 
Examples range from the unauthorized alienation of property by a non-owner to 
failed juridical acts giving rise to a claim in restitution. These acts are curable, in 
the sense that the party protected by such nullities can validate the act. Another 
distinct subcategory includes the right to rescind a contract because of fraud or 
duress. In this case, Savigny notes that it is not precise to refer to the nullity as 
curable. The protected party may simply waive her right to rescind the contract. 
See SAVIGNY IV, supra note 720, §§ 202, 203.  
 725. Savigny posited that all mandatory laws contain a presumption in favor 
of “complete nullity,” unless it is clear that nullity would be incompatible with 
the purpose of the law. SAVIGNY IV, supra note 720, § 203. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 10 cmt. b (2019) (explaining the principle of teleological interpretation with 
reference to “the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law”); 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 225–57. See also PLANIOL 
I, supra note 153, No. 337; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 349; MALAURIE 
ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 696 (discussing the concept of “tacit 
nullity”).  
 726. See SAVIGNY IV, supra note 720, § 203. This distinction is also traced back 
to Roman sources. See PLANIOL I, supra note 153, No. 328; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, 
supra note 2, at 181–83; Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 655–57. 




annullable acts. A juridical act is absolutely null727 when, because of a 
serious defect, the act is completely invalid.728 This invalidity occurs by 
operation of law (ipso iure), it is retroactive, and it can be raised by any 
interested person.729 Absolutely null acts cannot be confirmed, but parties 
may make a new act, if permitted.730 Examples of absolutely null juridical 
acts are acts made by incapable persons,731 acts lacking a mandatory 
form,732 and acts that are illicit,733 immoral,734 or unconscionable.735 A 
 
 727. Nichtigkeit. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 56; WINDSCHEID, supra 
note 10, § 82. This category generally coincides with the French category of 
“absolute nullity.” 
 728. Totale Unwirksamkeit. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 56, at 282; 
WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 82; FLUME, supra note 13, at 549. 
 729. The nullity exists by operation of law. Interested parties do not need to 
seek a judicial declaration of nullity. Nevertheless, a party may seek a declaratory 
judgment to protect her interests. Exceptionally, judicial declaration is required in 
the case of an absolutely null marriage. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 56, at 
281–82; WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 82. For a description of the distinction 
between declarative and constitutive judgments, see LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra 
note 2, at 185–86. 
 730. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 141, ¶ 1 (2019) 
(Ger.); cf. ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 180, 184 (2019) (Greece). 
 731. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 105 (2019) 
(Ger.). For exceptions to this rule with respect to minors, see id. §§ 105a–118; see 
also ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 130 (2019) (Greece). For 
exceptions concerning minors, see id. arts. 134–37.  
 732. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 125 (2019) 
(Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 159 (2019) (Greece). 
 733. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 134 (2019) 
(Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 174 (2019) (Greece). 
 734. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 138 ¶ 1 (2019) 
(Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 178 (2019) (Greece). 
 735. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 138 ¶ 2 (2019) 
(Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 179 (2019) (Greece). See 
SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 223; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 552. 
Conversely, the Louisiana Civil Code contains no specific provision on 
unconscionability; however, it is generally accepted among commentators that the 
issue is governed by the general provisions on consent, the vices of consent 
(including lesion), contract interpretation, good faith, and the legality of cause. 
See Ronald L. Hersbergen, Unconscionability: The Approach of the Louisiana 
Civil Code, 43 LA. L. REV. 1315 (1983); Jean-Louis Baudouin, Oppressive and 
Unequal Contracts: The Unconscionability Problem in Louisiana and 
Comparative Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1119 (1986); R. Fritz Niswanger, An 
Unconscionability Formula For Louisiana Civilians?, 81 TUL. L. REV. 509 
(2006); Christopher K. Odinet, Commerce, Commonality, and Contract Law: 
Legal Reform in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 75 LA. L. REV. 741, 773–90 (2015); Lafleur 




juridical act is annullable736 when the maker’s consent is vitiated by error, 
fraud, or duress.737 The maker may seek a judicial rescission of the act 
within a certain peremptive period.738 Rescission generally has retroactive 
effects.739 The maker may also confirm the act.740 These two categories of 
absolutely null and annullable acts are at the ends of the spectrum of 
defective acts. In the middle, there are several intermediate categories. 
Two such categories are noteworthy—relative invalidity and suspended 
invalidity. A juridical act is relatively invalid741 when it is null only as to 
certain persons for whose protection the law established the nullity.742 
Only these persons can demand a judicial nullification of the act. Until the 
 
v. Buzbee, 960 So.2d 105, 112 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007). See also LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 2004 (2019) (clause limiting liability); id. art. 2012 (excessive stipulated 
damages clause); LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 464, §§ 11.14, 13.9, 13.18, 
13.19. Prior to 2016, unconscionability was dealt with under the general rules of 
the French Civil Code on cause and consent. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 128–
44, 153–54. As a result of the 2016 revision of the French law of obligations, 
unconscionability in adhesion contracts is now addressed in a specific provision 
of the French Civil Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1171 (2016) 
(Fr.); Charles R. Calleros, U.S. Unconscionability and Article 1171 of the New 
French Civil Code: Achieving Balance in Statutory Regulation and Judicial 
Intervention, 45 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 259 (2017). The term also appears 
sporadically in special Louisiana statutes influenced by common law sources. See, 
e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:3516(36) and 9:3551 (consumer credit law). 
 736. Anfechtbarkeit. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 57, at 297–98; 
WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 82; FLUME, supra note 13, at 569. This category is 
narrower than the French category of “relative nullity.” 
 737. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] §§ 120–23 (2019) 
(Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 140–54 (2019) (Greece). See 
VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 57; WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 82; SPYRIDAKIS, 
supra note 272, at 226–32; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 563–600. 
 738. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 124 (2019) 
(Ger.) (one year from when the vice is discovered or from when it ceases, and in 
every case 10 years from when the act was made); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] 
[CIVIL CODE] art. 157 (2019) (Greece) (two years from when the vice is 
discovered or from when it ceases, and in every case 20 years from when the act 
was made). 
 739. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 57; WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 82; 
SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 226–32; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 563–600. 
 740. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 57; WINDSCHEID, supra note 10, § 82; 
SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 226–32; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 563–600. 
 741. Relative Unwirksamkeit. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 58; 
SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 221–22; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 552–54. 
 742. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 58, at 327–29; SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 
272, at 221–22; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 552–62. 




act is voided, it produces civil effects. The right to set aside the act is 
imprescriptible unless the law provides otherwise.743 It is lost if the 
protected person confirms the act.744 Examples of relatively invalid acts 
include acts of disposition made in violation of a court order or special 
legislation.745 Lastly, the validity of a juridical act may be suspended746 
until it is ratified by the proper party or by a third person. An example is 
acts of a representative made without the authority of the principal.747  
The French and Louisiana doctrines of nullity are not as detailed. The 
provisions on nullity are found in the law of conventional obligations, but 
they generally apply to all juridical acts.748 Two types of nullity exist: 
absolute nullity749 and relative nullity.750 This binary system of nullity 
traces its sources back to the general theory of juridical acts.751 According 
to this theory, in oversimplified terms, “nullity” refers to a defect in the 
 
 743. The revocatory action—also known as the Paulian action—is an example. 
See, e.g., ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 946 (2019) (Greece) (five-
year liberative prescription); Panagiotis Kargados, Eisagogikai Paratiriseis eis 
Arthra 939–946 [Introduction to Articles 939-946], in 3 ERMINEIA TOU ASTIKOU 
KODIKOS. ENOCHIKON DIKAION. EIDIKON MEROS, TMHMA TRITON, ARTHRA 
939–946 [3 COMMENTARY TO THE CIVIL CODE. LAW OF OBLIGATIONS. SPECIAL 
PART, PART THREE, ARTICLES 939–946] (Alexandros Litzeropoulos et al. eds., 
1961) (Greece); PETROPOULOS, supra note 36, at 585.   
 744. See VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 58, at 327–29; SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 
272, at 221–22; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 552–62. 
 745. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] §§ 135–36 (2019) 
(Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 175–76 (2019) (Greece); see 
also VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 58, at 329–33; SPYRIDAKIS, supra note 272, at 
221–26; GEORGIADES, supra note 60, at 552–54. 
 746. Schwebende Unwirksamkeit. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 330, at 
233 (comparing this German concept with the English concept of “negative 
voidable contracts”). 
 747. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 185 (2019) 
(Ger.); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 239 (2019) (Greece). 
 748. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1917, 2029–35 (2019); MARTY & RAYNAUD I, 
supra note 106, No. 158; AMOS, supra note 275, at 138–140; GUERRIERO, supra 
note 340, at 366–70; CARBONNIER II, supra note 135, No. 1024. 
 749. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 
168–71; cf. RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, Nos. 633–37. 
 750. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2031 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 
171–72; cf. RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, Nos. 638–40. 
 751. See generally RENÉ JUPIOT, DES NULLITÉS EN MATIÈRE D’ACTES 
JURIDIQUES: ESSAI D’UNE THÉORIE NOUVELLE (1909); MARTY & RAYNAUD I, 
supra note 106, No. 158; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 426–27. 




formation of the juridical act.752 The degree and the effects of nullity—
including the persons who may raise the issue of nullity—are determined 
by the legal rule that is violated.753 Thus, a juridical act is absolutely null 
when it violates a rule intended for the protection of the public order.754 
Absolute nullity, when pronounced judicially, renders the act invalid at 
its inception and as to all persons.755 The invalidity is incurable.756 It is 
pronounced judicially when raised by any interested person757 or upon the 
court’s own motion.758 Absolute nullity is usually produced when one of 
 
 752. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2029 (2019) (“A contract is null when the 
requirements for its formation have not been met”) (emphasis added); WEILL & 
TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 331–32. 
 753. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 375–403, 474–86; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, 
Nos. 56–62; CARBONNIER II, supra note 135, No. 1024; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra 
note 288, No. 292; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 327. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 2030–31 (2019). 
 754. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 106–08; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 328, 
337–38. The concept of public order (ordre public) includes good morals (bonnes 
mœurs) and certain rules and fundamental principles pertaining to personal status 
and public law. It may also expand into certain rules and principles pertaining to 
transactions (ordre public économique de direction). WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 
288, Nos. 241–48; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 167–71.  
 755. The contemporary and prevailing view in France and Louisiana is that 
absolute nullity does not occur by operation of law. It is declared by the court. An 
exception exists in the case of a null marriage. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 94 (2019). 
(“A judicial declaration of nullity [of an absolutely null marriage] is not required, 
but an action to recognize the nullity may be brought by any interested person”); 
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 184; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 322, 
329. Cf. MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 158; WEILL & TERRÉ III, 
supra note 288, Nos. 300–01; TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 721, No. 
534 (generally dismissing the older notion of a nullité de pleine droit); contra 
PLANIOL I, supra note 153, No. 335 (arguing in favor of the traditional approach). 
 756. See FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 326; Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, 
supra note 12, at 691–96 (characterizing absolute nullity as a permanent defect). 
 757. The range of potential plaintiffs claiming absolute nullity is restricted to 
“interested persons.” NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 77. The parties to the act may 
invoke the nullity. However, they may not benefit from retroactive annulment if 
they have “unclean hands.” See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 304, 
334–36. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2033 cmt. c (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 
2, at 173, 189–90; Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 681–83. 
 758. In Louisiana, actions for annulment of absolutely null acts are 
imprescriptible. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2032 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 
2, at 175–81. The prevailing view in French jurisprudence has been that actions 
for annulment of absolutely null acts fall under the older general prescriptive 




the constituent elements of a juridical act is absent759 or when the 
legal flaw is detected in the intended legal consequences—cause and 
object.760 Relative nullity occurs when there is a violation of a rule 
intended for the protection of private parties.761 The contract produces its 
civil effects until the protected party, or her legal representative, brings an 
action to rescind the contract within a specified prescriptive period.762 The 
 
period of 30 years that applied to all real and personal actions. This period has 
now been significantly reduced to five years. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] 
art. 2262 (1804) (Fr.) (repealed by Loi 2008-561 du 17 juin 2008 portant réforme 
de la prescription en matière civile [Law 2008-651 of June 17, 2008 on the reform 
of prescription in civil matters], Journal officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Government Gazette of the French Republic], June 18, 2008, p. 9856); CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2224 (2008) (Fr.). See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra 
note 288, No. 315 (discussing the older jurisprudence); TERRÉ ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 721, No. 565 (discussing the current rule).   
 759. Examples from French doctrine include the lack of consent (erreur-
obstacle), certain cases of lack of capacity to enjoy, and lack of mandatory form. 
See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 293–97. Traditional French doctrine 
has resisted characterizing these cases as inexistent acts. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, 
supra note 288, No. 291; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 356. Contra 
PLANIOL I, supra note 153, Nos. 332–33, 345–49. Inexistence is, at best, a subset 
of absolute nullity in Louisiana law. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 186–
88; Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 696–709. 
 760. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030 (2019); WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, 
Nos. 293–99; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 336; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra 
note 2, at 168–71.  
 761. Ordre public de protection. Rules protecting minors and other persons 
incapable of making juridical acts and rules protecting the free will of the parties 
are two noted examples. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 248–49; 
FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 328, 339–40. 
 762. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2032 (2019) (five-year liberative prescription). Cf. 
WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 316–22; TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, 
supra note 721, No. 561 (discussing the current rule). Usually, the protected 
person is one of the parties to the juridical act. The protected person’s legal 
representatives can bring the action for rescission of the relatively null act. The 
protected person’s universal and particular successors may also bring the action 
to rescind the act, provided that the legal right to which they succeeded is 
heritable. The person’s creditors may also include a claim for rescission through 
an oblique action. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, No. 303. Cf. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2044 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 
242, at 125–27. See also infra note 779. Nullity can always be raised as a defense 
against an action on the contract. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2032 (2019). This rule is 
based on the long-standing Roman maxim, quae temporalia sunt ad agendum 
perpetua sunt ad excipiendum (things which afford a ground of action if raised 
within a certain time, may be pleaded at any time by way of exception). See WEILL 




protected person may also cure the nullity by confirming the relatively null 
act.763 Usually, relative nullity refers to a defect in the declaration of will—
capacity and consent.764 As simple as these categories may seem, this 
binary system is not always accurate.765 It is obvious that the two French 
categories of nullities are situated at the ends of the spectrum of 
defective acts. Legal scholars in France and Louisiana quickly identified 
categories of nullities that fell in the middle.766  
One of these intermediate categories is “inopposability.” This concept 
is not new in French and Louisiana doctrines.767 In a more general sense, 
inopposability is an accepted term of art in the public records doctrine, 
pursuant to which an act involving rights in immovables that is unrecorded 
has no legal effect—is inopposable—to third persons.768 In a more 
technical sense, inopposability refers to the right of a third person to set 
aside a juridical act that impairs her rights.769 The revocatory action is a 
notable example.770 In this sense, inopposability closely resembles an 
 
& TERRÉ III, supra note 288, No. 323; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 356. 
See also DIG. 44.4.5.6 (Paul, Ad Edictum 71); BALIS, supra note 141, § 163. 
 763. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1842, 2031 (2019); LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 109; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 87, §§ 12.52–12.57. See also Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 
12, at 689–91 (characterizing relative nullity as a temporary defect); cf. LITVINOFF 
& TÊTE, supra note 2, at 173–75. 
 764. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 293–99; FLOUR ET AL., 
supra note 105, No. 336. 
 765. See Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 685–89 (critiquing the 
traditional factors for determining the type of nullity). 
 766. See WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 332; Scalise, Rethinking 
Nullity, supra note 12, at 709–13 (identifying an intermediate category of “mixed 
nullities”); cf. LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 188 (discussing “oddities in the 
law of the theory of nullity”).  
 767. See DANIEL BASTIAN, ESSAI D’UNE THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DE 
L’INNOPOSABILITÉ (1929). 
 768. See CARBONNIER II, supra note 135, No. 1024; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra 
note 84, Nos. 331, 335; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, No. 228; TERRÉ ET 
AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 721, No. 135; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 
106, No. 162.  
 769. See MALAURIE ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, Nos. 669 and 701; 
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 188–89; GOUTAL, supra note 397, Nos. 32–45. 
 770. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2036–42 (2019); cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL 
CODE] art. 1167 (1804) (Fr.); Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, arts 1631–
36 (Can.). The revocatory action (historically known as the “Paulian action”) is 
an action available to an obligee to annul certain acts of the obligor that are 
prejudicial to the obligee’s rights. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2036 (2019); Albert 
Tate, Jr., The Revocatory Action in Louisiana Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW 




extended version of relative nullity.771 Although relative nullity is confined 
to the parties in a juridical act, inopposability extends the possible circle 
of plaintiffs to third parties.772 In essence, inopposability is situated 
between relative and absolute nullity.773  
Unauthorized dispositive acts constitute a good example of how 
inopposability in its technical sense is an extended version of relative 
nullity. To illustrate this point, it is necessary to revisit the discussion of 
the sale of a thing of another under article 2452 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code. As mentioned,774 under the prevailing view, a sale by a non-owner 
is relatively null in favor of the buyer.775 This is so because it is accepted 
that article 2452 is a rule intended for the protection of the buyer, 
regardless of her good or bad faith.776 This conclusion is far from 
 
OF OBLIGATIONS 133 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1969); Raymond Landry, The 
Revocatory Action in the Quebec Civil Code: General Principles, in id. at 115; 
LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 119–21; MARTY 
& RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 162; PETROPOULOS, supra note 36, at 585. 
The revocatory action is expressly characterized as an action of inopposability in 
the revised French law of obligations. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 
1341-2 (2016) (Fr.) (“An obligee may also bring a personal action to declare acts, 
made by the obligor in fraud of the obligee’s rights, inopposable as to him [the 
obligee]. In the case of an onerous act made by the obligor, the obligee must 
establish that the third party knew of the fraud.”); TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, 
supra note 721, Nos. 1574–78.    
 771. See PLANIOL I, supra note 153, No. 327A; MALAURIE ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, Nos. 669, 701; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, 
at 188–89; LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 81–84 
(referring to the example of counterletters); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2025 (2019). 
See also LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 121 
(explaining that the principal effect of a revocatory action is nullity of the act).  
 772. See TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 721, No. 135. Most French 
scholars distinguish between impossibility and nullity, precisely because 
inopposability involves third parties. See, e.g., FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 
322; BUFFELAN-LANORE & LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 581, 
No. 1440. 
 773. See Antoni Vaquer, From Revocation to Non-Opposability: Modern 
Developments of the Paulian Action, in REGIONAL PRIVATE LAWS & 
CODIFICATION IN EUROPE 199, 217–20 (Hector L. MacQueen et al. eds., 2003) 
(likening inopposibility to the German intermediate category of “relative 
invalidity”).  
 774. See supra notes 609–10. 
 775. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 (2019). See supra notes 608–28 and 
accompanying text.  
 776. See supra notes 608–28 and accompanying text. 




incontrovertible.777 If a bad faith buyer—that is, a buyer who knowingly 
purchases a thing not belonging to her seller—is a protected party under 
article 2452, then the true owner of the thing ought to be a protected party 
by even greater force.778 One solution would be to include the true owner 
as one of the plaintiffs in a suit for rescission under the rules of relative 
nullity. This solution presents a doctrinal oddity because it extends the 
right of rescission to a non-party to the juridical act, who theoretically may 
also confirm the act.779 In practice, this solution could actually harm the 
true owner rather than help her. The action for rescission is subject to a 
shorter prescriptive period.780 Failure by the owner to timely bring the 
action may amount to a tacit—and often unintentional—confirmation of 
the sale.781 This could also impair the owner’s likelihood of success in her 
real actions against the adverse possessor.782 It is submitted that the rights 
 
 777. See supra notes 608–28 and accompanying text. 
 778. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 171–72 (identifying the true 
owner as the party protected by the nullity prescribed in article 2452 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code). 
 779. Relative nullity is usually confined to the parties. Thus, the right to 
rescind the act is normally not available to third persons, with the exception of the 
parties’ legal representatives or creditors through the oblique action. See WEILL 
& TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 288, 303, 305; MALAURIE ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 699. Likewise, confirmation of the relatively 
null act is normally reserved for the protected party or her legal representatives as 
the case may be. See FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 349 (discussing the 
relative effects of confirmation). Third parties may ratify an act. For the difference 
between ratification and confirmation, see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1842–45 (2019); 
LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 127. The right to 
rescind or confirm may be exercised by the protected person’s universal and 
particular successors, provided that the legal right to which they succeeded is 
heritable. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, No. 303; cf. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 1765, 1766, 1984 (2019). 
 780. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2032 (2019) (five-year prescriptive period). 
 781. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1842 (2019). The traditional doctrinal view is that 
prescription of the action to annul gives rise to a presumption of tacit 
confirmation. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, No. 318; FLOUR ET AL., 
supra note 105, Nos. 326, 352; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 
87, § 12.54; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 125–27. 
Under the law of relative nullity, the protected party can still raise the nullity as a 
defense. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2032 (2019); see supra note 762. This option, 
however, offers little or no assistance to a third party whose rights are impaired 
by the confirmed act. 
 782. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 11:16; Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Ruminations on Real Actions, 51 LA. L. REV. 493 (1991) (discussing 
several procedural pitfalls, including issue preclusion in real actions). 




of the true owner are more fully protected under a theory of inopposability. 
Under this approach, the owner remains a third party to the sale and avoids 
any unintentional confirmation of the sale.783 The owner maintains her real 
actions against the adverse possessor. The owner also has the option to 
bring a separate personal action to set aside the sale; this action is a kind 
of revocatory action against the parties to the sale or their successors.784 It 
is noted that a similar approach exists in at least one occasion in Louisiana. 
The naked owner can set aside an unauthorized sale of a nonconsumable 
by the usufructuary and revendicate the thing in the hands of the acquirer 
or her successor.785 An analogous approach exists in the French law of 
usufruct in the case of an unauthorized lease of a nonconsumable.786  
 
 783. Of course, the owner may decide to ratify the sale. See LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 1843–44 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 
12.58–12.60. 
 784. This action, as a personal action, is subject to a liberative prescription of 
10 years. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3499 (2019). Failure to bring such an action, 
however, would not effect a tacit confirmation because the owner is not a party to 
the unauthorized sale. A similar approach is followed in Quebec. See Civil Code 
of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 1714 (Can.) (“The true owner may apply for the 
annulment of the sale and revendicate the sold property from the buyer unless the 
sale was made under judicial authority or unless the buyer can set up acquisitive 
prescription.”). See Gayet, supra note 608, at 40–42. Cf. TERRÉ ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 721, No. 1578 (characterizing the revocatory action as 
a personal action).  
 785. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 623 cmt. d (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL 
SERVITUDES, supra note 391, §§ 6:10 and 6:14. 
 786. Under the French Civil Code, the naked owner may set aside an 
unauthorized lease of a nonconsumable by the usufructuary. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] 
[CIVIL CODE] art. 595 ¶ 4 (1804) (Fr.). See MALAURIE ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra 
note 291, No. 701 (referring to this case as a “nullity that comes very close to 
inopposability”); FRANÇOIS TERRÉ & PHILIPPE SIMLER, DROIT CIVIL. LES BIENS 
No. 818 (10th ed. 2018). The Cour de Cassation retains the characterization of 
relative nullity, admitting, however, that it is an extended version of relative 
nullity because the plaintiff is a third party. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme 
court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Jan. 26, 1972, JCP G., 1972.II.17104, note 
Goubeaux; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 
July 17, 1986, Gaz. Pal. 1986, 2, 792, note Challine & Lepetit. Following the 2010 
amendments to the law of usufruct in Louisiana, a lease for a term extending 
beyond the duration of the usufruct is effective against the naked owner See LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 568.2 (2010). 




The default provisions on nullity also govern its general retroactive 
effects,787 unless such effects are attenuated by more specific rules.788 
Generally, relative nullities are curable by the unilateral juridical act of 
confirmation.789 Confirmation generally has retroactive effects, subject to 
the rights of third parties.790 When applying these rules, it should be 
 
 787. See WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 286, 324–42; LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 110–12 (discussing the 
retroactive effects of nullity); NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 77 (explaining that “the 
effects of nullity once established are the same for both types”); cf. LA. CIV. CODE 
arts. 2033–35 (2019). 
 788. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra No. 106; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra 
note 37, Nos. 641–45. The provisions on putative marriage constitute an example 
of a special rule. LA. CIV. CODE art. 96 (2019). Another example is the concept of 
“caducity,” which is the posterior ineffectiveness of an act because of non-
fulfillment of its elements or the conditions to produce its effects. Caducity has 
no retroactive effect. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1741 and 1749 (2019) 
(donation of property to be left at death “has no effect at all” if the donee 
predeceases the donor, renounces the donation, or is declared unworthy); 
LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 105; TERRÉ ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 721, Nos. 135, 589–94; MALAURIE ET AL., 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 291, No. 668; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 158; 
BUFFELAN-LANORE, supra note 258, at 7–8; CHAABAN, supra note 712, Nos. 11–
30. Caducity also appears in the revised French law of obligations. CODE CIVIL 
[C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1186 and 1187 (2016) (Fr.). 
 789. Confirmation may be express or tacit. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1842, 2031 
(2019); BETTI, supra note 2, at 253–54; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 87, §§ 12.52–12.57; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 173–74; 
WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 307–12; TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, 
supra note 721, Nos. 545–56; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 
248, at 125–27; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 341–45. Confirmation is a 
juridical act that is independent from the confirmed act. As such, it can be 
absolutely or relatively null. FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 345.  
 790. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1844 (2019); MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 
106, Nos. 158–59; FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, Nos. 341, 349–50; WEILL & 
TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 312–13; TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 
721, Nos. 556–57. Confirmation is thus different from repeating the act. In French 
doctrine, confirmation is also distinguished from regularization of the act, which 
is also a concept of retroactive validation of a null act. Confirmation is a waiver 
of the protected party’s right to annul the act. Only the protected party—or 
potentially her representatives and successors—can confirm. Regularization 
supplements the act and removes the cause of nullity. In certain cases, the other 
party may regularize the act. See TERRÉ ET AL., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 721, 
No. 544; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 344. Thus, a person, upon attaining 
majority, may confirm certain acts made during minority. See YIANNOPOULOS, 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 452. But see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 90.1 and 96 




remembered that a complete nullification of the act is the last resort. The 
judge, where appropriate, ought to salvage at least part of the act. This 
principle finds application in three instances. First, nullity of a portion of 
a juridical act does not render the entire act null, unless such portion was 
essential according to either the agreement of the parties or the nature of 
the act.791 Thus, as a rule, an invalid legacy in a testament does not affect 
other legacies in the same testament.792 Second, certain excessive acts are 
reduced to the legal limit.793 For instance, automatic reduction to the 
statutory limit occurs in the cases of an option or right of first refusal for 
purchase of an immovable exceeding 10 years794 and a lease exceeding 99 
years;795 additionally, a donation impinging upon the legitime of a forced 
 
(2019); cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 185 (Fr.). A lesionary sale is 
regularized if the buyer supplements the price. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2591 (2019); 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 270, § 13:11. Transfer of a real right 
by a non-owner can be regularized when the transferor obtains ownership. See 
WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 334; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 152, 354. 
In Louisiana, this is referred to as the “after-acquired title” doctrine. See LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 726 (2019); id. art. 2452 cmt. e; id. art. 2502; TOOLEY KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 270, §§ 10:46–10:49; YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL 
SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 1:11, at 25 n.3; Bordelon v. Bordelon, 499 So. 2d 
1050 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Greene v. Greene, 373 So. 2d 756 (La. Ct. App. 
3d Cir. 1979). 
 791. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2034 (2019); BETTI, supra note 2, at 486–88; 
Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 147–48. Further to this rule, nullity normally does 
not disturb previous acts of administration, collection of fruits from good faith 
possessors, and rights of third parties in good faith. See MARTY & RAYNAUD I, 
supra note 106, No. 159; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 327–33. Of 
course, in the case of absolute nullity, the wrongdoer cannot benefit from 
retroactive effects of nullity. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2033 (2019); id. cmt. c 
(explaining that this provision expresses the Louisiana “clean hands doctrine”); 
LEVASSEUR, CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 110–12; 
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 173, 189–90; Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, 
supra note 12, at 681–83; cf. MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 159; 
WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra note 288, Nos. 334–36. 
 792. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1589, 1590–96 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, 
§§ 13:6–13:7. 
 793. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 149. 
 794. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2628 (2019); TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, 
supra note 270, §§ 5:30–5:35; Litvinoff, Consent, supra note 48, at 748–50 
(explaining that indefinite options or rights of first refusal would bring property 
out of commerce). 
 795. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2679 (2019); LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 
408, at 129. 




heir is reducible to the disposable portion.796 Third, when a null act 
contains all necessary elements of another act that would be in accordance 
with the will of the parties, the judge may convert the act.797 Thus, an act 
that is invalid as a donation for lack of form may nevertheless be converted 
into a valid onerous contract.798 If a donative intent is present and 
formalities have been observed, an invalid sale may be converted into a 
donation.799 An invalid juridical act purporting to extend prescription800 
may stand as an acknowledgment interrupting prescription.801 A covenant 
marriage that is invalid for want of a premarital formality or for a vice of 
consent may stand as a valid standard marriage.802 
French and German scholars have identified another potential reason 
for invalidity of a juridical act—inexistence.803 According to this theory, 
when an essential constituent element of a juridical act is lacking, the act 
could be considered inexistent.804 As such, this permanently defective act 
is no act at all; it is a non-event having no legal consequences—an 
inoperative fact.805 An example would be a marriage without a 
ceremony.806 It is apparent that inexistence closely resembles 
 
 796. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2019); LORIO, supra note 285, § 10:8. 
 797. See Brenner, supra note 37, No. 150.  
 798. See Litvinoff, Cause, supra note 373, at 11–13. 
 799. See id. at 13. 
 800. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3471, 3505–3505.4 (2019). 
 801. See id. art. 3464; Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes, supra note 84, at 
133 n.3. 
 802. See Spaht, Covenant Marriage, supra note 678, at 94; Cynthia Samuel, 
Letter from Louisiana: An Obituary for Forced Heirship and a Birth Announcement 
for Covenant Marriage, 12 TUL. EUR. CIV. L. F. 183, 192–93 (1997). 
 803. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 186–88; BETTI, supra note 2, at 
473–74; LEHMAN, supra note 264, § 27, at 132–33; CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, 
No. 168; RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 37, No. 628; JOSSERAND, supra note 
258, No. 140, 151–54; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 161; 
GUERRIERO, supra note 340, at 385–66.  
 804. See Serge Gaudet, Inexistence, nullité, et annulabilité du contrat: essai 
de synthèse, 40 MCGILL L. J. 291 (1995). 
 805. See Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 696–97. Another 
example could be the acknowledgment of a child by a man who is not the 
biological father. See Trahan, Filiation, supra note 338, at 440 (citing with 
approval 4 FRANÇOIS LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 75, at 
113); cf. Succession of Robinson, 654 So. 2d. 682, 684 (La. 1995) (“Absent a 
biological relationship the avowal is null. ‘A fact cannot be avowed when it has 
never existed’ 1 Planiol, supra, § 1490(2). If the acknowledgment is null, it 
produces no effects.”) (emphasis added).  
 806. See Scalise, Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 706. 




absolute nullity,807 although theoretically the two concepts are distinct.808 
For instance, absolutely nullity generally requires judicial determination, 
whereas inexistence does not.809 Although the concept of inexistence is 
universally recognized in Germany and Greece, traditional French and 
Louisiana doctrines have not embraced it.810 
The preceding analysis presented the basic components of a Louisiana 
theory of juridical acts. Conclusion of this analysis is not possible without 
delineating the boundaries between juridical act and juridical fact.  
III. JURIDICAL ACT AND JURIDICAL FACT 
The distinction between juridical act and juridical fact is a well-
received French contribution to civilian doctrine.811 This binary system is 
practical because it avoids intermediate categories and theoretical 
complications that are found in German doctrine. The premise of this 
distinction is simple enough: All operative facts that are not juridical acts 
fall into the residual category of juridical facts.812 This distinction also 
carries significant practical connotations to the extent that 
 
 807. Inexistence occurs when the act is “tainted by a particularly serious 
irregularity to the point that formation of the act is not logically or reasonably 
conceivable, having regard to the nature of the act and the spirit of the law.” Brenner, 
supra note 37, No. 141. See also WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 333.  
 808. The distinction, though subtle, could be useful. For instance, 
performances made under an absolutely null contract are recovered by application 
of the rules on nullity, whereas the same performances under an inexistent 
contract would be recovered by resort to the provisions on enrichment without 
cause. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298 (2019); cf. LEVASSEUR, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
supra note 301, at 388–411; Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 
122–23 (La. 1974).  
 809. See PLANIOL I, supra note 153, Nos. 332–33, 345–49.  
 810. See CARBONNIER II, supra note 135, No. 1024; WEILL & TERRÉ III, supra 
note 288, No. 291; MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 356. Contra PLANIOL 
I, supra note 153, Nos. 332–33, 345–49. It is doubtful whether there is room for 
inexistence as a concept separate from absolute nullity in Louisiana law. Cf. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2030 (2019); LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 186–88; Scalise, 
Rethinking Nullity, supra note 12, at 699. The concept does not appear in the 
Quebec Civil Code. See FLOUR ET AL., supra note 105, No. 326. 
 811. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–38. 
 812. See LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 5–6; 
NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 36–37. While the concept of juridical act is known in 
France and Louisiana, the notion of juridical fact remains mystifying. See 
Brenner, supra note 37, No. 43. 




fundamentally different rules apply to each category.813 In this respect, 
identifying the precise boundaries between juridical acts and facts 
becomes crucial.814  
As previously discussed, this task has bedeviled the French scholars. 
The difficulties became apparent in the preceding discussion of certain 
licit acts that lie somewhere between juridical act and fact—these licit acts 
are voluntary actions or expressions whose legal consequences were not 
necessarily intended. German doctrine places these acts with precision in 
the intermediate categories of “quasi-juridical acts,” to which the rules of 
Rechtsgeschäft apply by analogy, and “material acts,” to which the rules 
of Rechtsgeschäft do not apply. French theory, on the other hand, 
maintains the simplicity of the acte and fait juridique at the expense of 
misplacing some of these acts in the wrong category and ignoring others 
altogether. Thus, putting in default is a German quasi-juridical act and a 
French acte juridique. Voluntary establishment of domicile is a German 
quasi-juridical act and a French fait juridique. Occupancy is a German 
material act, an acte juridique according to traditional French doctrine, and 
a fait juridique according to modern French doctrine. Lastly, 
reconciliation and other tacit (de facto) acts are quasi-juridical in Germany 
and unclassified in France.815 
A Louisiana theory of juridical acts enjoys the opportunity to benefit 
from both systems. For historical and practical purposes, Louisiana 
doctrine should maintain the simplicity of the French categories of acte 
juridique and fait juridique, but it should also avail itself of the precision 
and depth of the German approach. In the above example, a closer look at 
the German categories of quasi-juridical acts and material acts reveals a 
notable difference—capacity of the maker is required in the former 
category but not the latter. French scholars emphasize the role of 
 
 813. Thus, requirements for validity exist for juridical acts, whereas juridical 
facts apply directly by operation of law. Proof of a juridical act is, in general, 
subject to restrictions, whereas juridical facts are generally proven by any 
available means of evidence. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 42, 45; 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 427; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, 
No. 6; Simler, supra note 156, Nos. 137–55; AUBRY & RAU XII, supra note 113, 
§ 754, at 125–26 n.1; id. § 762, at 245 n.5. Some juridical facts may be declared 
by the court on its own initiative. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030 (2019). Rules 
of conduct, liability, and prescription differ between juridical act and juridical 
fact. See, e.g., Harrison v. Gore, 660 So. 2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995) 
(differing prescriptive periods for actions in contract and in delict). 
 814. See Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 9, 25, 42, 47 (explaining the significance 
of the distinction between acte juridique and fait juridique).  
 815. See supra notes 78–87, 133–52 and accompanying text. 




the maker’s will as an absolutely necessary condition for the legal 
consequences of a juridical act.816 This prevailing view perhaps overlooks 
the fact that the power of the will is predicated upon the capacity of the 
maker.817 It is submitted, therefore, that the decisive factor in 
distinguishing a juridical act from a juridical fact in the above borderline 
cases is the element of capacity of the maker of the act in question. If 
capacity is required, then the act is a juridical act. If, on the other hand, 
capacity is irrelevant, the act is an event having legal consequences—a 
veritable juridical fact. It follows that as a matter of Louisiana 
jurisprudence and doctrine, capacity is required in the acts of putting 
in default,818 voluntary establishment of domicile,819 reconciliation,820 and 
tacit concession in favor of a precarious quasi-possessor821—thus, these 
acts are veritable juridical acts. Conversely, capacity is not required for 
occupancy,822 which is a juridical fact. This approach effectively 
transplants the findings of German doctrine into a French-based system.  
In light of the preceding comparative analysis, a proposed 
classification of all operative facts in Louisiana would identify the 
following categories:  
(a) Juridical acts. As explained, these are licit volitional acts—in the 
form of a manifestation of will—that are intended to produce legal 
consequences. This category includes: (1) the French concept of acte 
juridique; (2) all acts that qualify as Rechtsgeschäft under German theory; 
and (3) all acts that qualify as quasi-juridical acts under German theory.  
(b) Juridical facts. Juridical facts produce legal consequences 
regardless of a person’s will and capacity—they can generate, modify, or 
extinguish rights, legal relationships, or juridical situations. Juridical facts 
 
 816. See MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, at 26–27; Brenner, supra 
note 37, No. 70; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 11. 
 817. See MARTY & RAYNAUD II, supra note 286, No. 508; BETTI, supra note 2, 
at 82–93; GOUDSMIT, supra note 51, § 49; AMOS, supra note 275, at 132–34. See 
also BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 351; Petit & Rouxel, supra note 163, No. 6. 
 818. See LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 464, § 2.2, at 31; Bowlero, Inc. v. 
Allen, 205 So. 2d. 196, 197 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1967). 
 819. See Succession of Robert, 2 Rob. 427, 430–31 (La. 1842) (finding that 
capacity is required for voluntary establishment of domicile). 
 820. See, e.g., Succession of Chaney, 413 So. 2d 936 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
1982) (finding that the decedent’s ill health would not permit him to 
conscientiously forgive his son for striking him). 
 821. See Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. 2015) ([f]inding 
that “the concept of implied permission as it relates to precarious possession is 
still a viable theory of [Louisiana] civilian law.”). 
 822. See Sturm v. Hutchinson, 37 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1948) (holding 
that a minor impounding cattle running at large is legally entitled to payment of fee). 




have one or more subjects, which are persons who benefit from or suffer 
these legal consequences.823 This category is vast and residual; it includes 
all operative facts that are not juridical acts. As such, juridical facts defy 
any systematic categorization.824 Therefore, the following classification of 
juridical facts is merely descriptive. It is based on the French distinction 
between conduct and events,825 with some slight German modifications.  
Because juridical facts constitute a residual category, their 
classification is made with reference to juridical acts. As discussed, a 
juridical act is a licit act intended to have legal consequences. By way of 
exclusion, then, juridical facts can appear as: 
i. Illicit acts. Here, the person’s conduct violates mandatory law or a 
contractual obligation. In other words, the person’s voluntary or 
involuntary acts or omissions prompt the application of mandatory law.826 
Examples include offenses, quasi-offenses,827 fraud,828 duress,829 and 
breach of contract.830 Juridical facts in this category clearly 
distinguish themselves from juridical acts. French and German doctrines 
 
 823. See 2 JACQUES FLOUR ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS, FAIT 
JURIDIQUE No. 1 (14th ed. 2011); BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, Nos. 45, 533. 
 824. See GOMAA, supra note 249, Nos. 236, 302; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 
43; Moore, supra note 135, at 296. 
 825. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 (Fr.) (distinguishing 
between events and human conduct); Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 30. 
This general distinction is also adopted in modern French doctrine. See, e.g., 
MAZEAUD ET AL. I, supra note 37, No. 278. 
 826. See BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140. 
 827. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315, 2316 (2016); Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 
121, No. 35. Delictual liability is not only confined to the law of obligations. 
Adverse possession may give rise to delictual liability. See YIANNOPOULOS, 
PROPERTY, supra note 62, §§ 11:39, 12:34–12:44. Civil liability is also found in 
the laws pertaining to the obligations of neighborhood. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, 
Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Articles 667–69 and 2315 of 
the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REV. 195 (1974). 
 828. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1953 (2019); Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra 
note 355, at 78–79; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360. 
 829. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1959 (2019); Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra 
note 355, at 103–04; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360. 
 830. Breach of contract is an “illicit” juridical fact because it violates the terms 
of an existing juridical act. The act of breach itself need not be unlawful or illicit. 
A contract can be breached by another juridical act, as when a seller in a contract 
to sell breaches the contract by transferring the thing to a third person. See 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 452–58, 514; Brenner, supra note 37, Nos. 
19, 46. A more nuanced question is the issue of cumulation of contractual and 
delictual responsibility. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 466–79; 
LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 464, §§ 16.1–16.31. 




treat such acts under the separate heading of civil responsibility.831 
Culpability and fault, rather than capacity and consent, are operative 
here.832  
ii. Licit acts that are not juridical acts. In this subcategory, the person’s 
lawful conduct unintentionally triggers the application of mandatory law. 
Thus, the legal consequences of such conduct ensue regardless of the 
person’s will or capacity.833 French doctrine identifies this subset as 
“voluntary licit acts,” referring mostly to quasi-contracts.834 Thus, 
enrichment without cause,835 negotiorum gestio,836 and payment of a 
 
 831. See CARBONNIER I, supra note 60, No. 170; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, 
No. 266; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 429; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra 
note 106, No. 163; HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA 
RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE DÉLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE (1965). For a comparative 
discussion of the doctrine of efficient breach, see Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Why No 
“Efficient Breach” in the Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of 
Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 721 (2007).  
 832. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 426–32; RIPERT & BOULANGER, 
supra note 37, No. 561; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, Nos. 95–102; AMOS, supra 
note 275, at 137–38; JEAN PINEAU & MONIQUE OUELLETTE, THÉORIE DE LA 
RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 41–61 (2d ed. 1980) (Quebec) (discussing fault in the 
context of the law of civil responsibility). In civil law, liability for breach of 
contract and delictual liability are fault-based, whereas at common law liability 
for breach of contract is in principle absolute. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 31–
32, 50, 171, 228–31; LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 464, §§ 5.1–5.35; LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 1996, 1997, 2315–17 (2019); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3556(13) (1870). 
 833. See Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 31. 
 834. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 429; WEILL & TERRÉ I, 
supra note 84, No. 308; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 163; Becqué-
Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 31; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 
140; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 29. 
 835. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298 (2019); LEVASSEUR, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
supra note 301, at 28–31; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 310; MARTY & 
RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 163, at 294; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 
360; Moore, supra note 135, at 296; BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, Nos. 535–
38; PINEAU, supra note 37, at 128. 
 836. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2292 (2019); LEVASSEUR, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
supra note 301, at 28–31; MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 112, No. 21; WEILL 
& TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 311; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, 
No. 140; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360; Moore, supra note 135, at 296; 
BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, Nos. 535–38; 1 ANGERS LAROUCHE, LES 
OBLIGATIONS: THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES CONTRATS; QUASI-CONTRATS 38–39 
(1982) (Quebec); PINEAU, supra note 37, at 128.    




thing not due837 are illustrations of acts that give rise to legal obligations, 
that is, obligations imposed by law, not by agreement. Nevertheless, the 
German category of “material acts” should be added here. “Material acts” 
are physical acts that produce legal consequences by application of law 
regardless of the maker’s capacity.838 Examples include occupancy839 and 
possession.840 In essence, the factor that separates these licit acts from 
juridical acts lies in the subjective element—the power of the will to 
produce legal consequences. Juridical acts require capacity and consent 
for their validity and legal effect. These other licit acts may be volitional, 
but the requirement of capacity is inoperative.841  
 
 837. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2299 (2019); LEVASSEUR, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
supra note 301, at 28–31 (1991); MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 163, 
at 294; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 36; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, 
No. 360; Moore, supra note 135, at 296; BAUDOIN & JOBIN, supra note 163, Nos. 
535–38; PINEAU, supra note 37, at 128.  
 838. See MANIGK, supra note 76, at 652; VON TUHR I, supra note 10, § 48, at 112. 
 839. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3412 (2019); MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 
112, No. 20; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 31; PLANIOL & RIPERT III, supra note 
415, No. 589; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360; TRAHAN, supra note 418, 
at 84–87 (aptly characterizing certain instances arising from application of 
Louisiana Civil Code articles 3419 and 3420 as “quasi-occupancy”).  
 840. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3421, 3422, 3446 (2019). See YIANNOPOULOS, 
PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 12:8; Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes, supra note 
84, at 83 n.35; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 312; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, 
supra note 106, No. 163, at 294–95; STARCK, supra note 112, Nos. 373–76; 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360; Moore, supra note 135, at 298–99; Storck, 
supra note 292, No. 11. Juridical acts may evidence “acts of possession” and may also 
signify civil possession. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, § 12:5, at 
684. “Legal disturbance” of possession, in the context of the possessory action, “is a 
juridical act contradicting one’s right to possession.” A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real 
Actions in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 25 LA. L. REV. 589, 612 (1965); LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3659 (2019). Adverse possession constitutes a “disturbance in 
fact” that is actionable under the possessory action. Id. arts. 3655–63. This disturbance 
may also constitute interference with one’s ownership or possession, which gives rise 
to a delictual action—also known by the common law term “trespass.” LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 2315 (2019); YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 62, §§ 11:39, 12:34–12:44. 
 841. The revision to the law of negotiorum gestio added a requirement of 
capacity for the manager, even when the manager is only performing a material 
act. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2296 (1996); id. art. 2292 cmt. b; cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2300 (1870). As a result, incapacity of the manager gives rise to a juridical fact 
other than negotiorum gestio—the rules of enrichment without cause or delictual 
obligations apply. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2296, 2298, 2315 (2019). Additionally, 
negotiorum gestio still remains a juridical fact because of the lack of consent of 
the parties—otherwise it would be a contract of mandate. Id. arts. 2292, 2293, 




iii. Events giving rise to involuntary legal consequences.842 This 
category is residual and vast. It primarily includes all non-acts, that is, events 
and occurrences other than the person’s own conduct. The legal 
consequences of these events ensue without regard to the person’s 
conduct.843 In other words, the person is submitted to the legal consequences 
of these juridical facts.844 Examples include natural personality,845 
 
2296; cf. Brenner, supra note 37, No. 30 (explaining that “the manager may have 
intended to manage the affairs of others, but he did not intend the resulting 
obligations from such management.”). See supra note 301. 
 842. The term “event” (événement) appears in the definition of fait juridique 
in the French Civil Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 (Fr.); 
Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 32.  
 843. See BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140. 
 844. See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 429. 
 845. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 25–26 (2019); Wallace, Natural and Juridical 
Persons, supra note 278, at 409–12, 415–21. Issues of personal status, such as 
conception, birth, age, and marital status, are juridical facts par excellence. See 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 360, 367, 377; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, 
No. 304; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 30; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 29; 
BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140; Moore, supra note 135, at 296.  




filiation,846 legal domicile,847 capacity and incapacity,848 death,849 
absence,850 things and their legal classifications,851 natural accession,852 
 
 846. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 178–79 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, 
Nos. 360, 367, 377; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 304; Becqué-Ickowicz, 
supra note 121, No. 30; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 29. Biological filiation is a 
juridical fact for the child and the parents—persons without contractual capacity 
can become legal parents. Succession of Robinson, 654 So. 2d. 682, 684 (La. 
1995) (“The word ‘filiation’ describes the fact of biological parentage.”) 
(emphasis added). See Trahan, Filiation, supra note 338, at 388–91 (citing 
numerous Louisiana and French sources on this subject). Biological filiation can 
have immediate legal effect at birth. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 184–94 (2019) (proof of 
maternity and paternity). Biological filiation can also be declared and take effect 
by virtue of certain formal juridical acts, the validity of which presupposes a 
biological relationship. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 190.1, 195–98 (2019) (three-
party acknowledgment, subsequent marriage and acknowledgment, formal 
acknowledgment, paternity action, avowal action); Succession of Robinson, 654 
So. 2d at 684 (avowal is null in the absence of a biological relationship). See also 
LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2718–2720.15 (gestational surrogacy agreements). Filiation 
by adoption can be established by formal juridical act. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 213 
(2019) (adult adoption by authentic act). The act of adoption, however, usually 
requires a judgment, but its legal effects are assimilated to those of biological 
filiation. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 199 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:461 (2019); LA. 
CHILD. CODE arts. 1218, 1240, 1256 (2019).  
 847. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 41–43 (2019). Conversely, voluntary 
establishment of domicile, also known as domicile of choice, is a juridical act 
requiring legal capacity. Id. arts. 44–46; Succession of Robert, 2 Rob. 427, 430–
31 (La. 1842).  
 848. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 27–29 (2019). See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, 
Nos. 360, 367; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 304; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra 
note 121, No. 30; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 29. Incapacity due to minority is 
removed upon attainment of majority or by juridical act of emancipation. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 365 (2019). See Dane S. Ciolino & Monica Hof Wallace, Recodifying 
Emancipation: A Précis of the 2009 Revision of Louisiana Emancipation Law, 56 
LOY. L. REV. 135 (2010). Incapacity of a minor can be prolonged beyond majority 
by continued or permanent tutorship. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 354, 359 (2019). 
Temporary incapacity of an otherwise capable person—e.g., temporary deprivation 
of reason—is a juridical fact. Pronouncement of a long-term incapacity requires a 
judgment of interdiction. Id. arts. 389–91.  
 849. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 25 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:111 (2019); 
BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 304; 
Becqué-Ickowicz, supra note 121, No. 30; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 29; BRIERLEY 
& MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140; Moore, supra note 135, at 296; Wallace, 
Natural and Juridical Persons, supra note 278, at 412–15. Termination of natural 
personality is a natural juridical fact for the deceased. The same event, however, can 
give rise to other juridical facts—licit, as, for example, the opening of the decedent’s 




natural and legal predial servitudes,853 legal usufruct,854 fortuitous 
events,855 intestate succession and forced heirship,856 the passage of 
 
succession, and perhaps illicit in the case of wrongful death. See STARCK, supra note 
112, No. 372.  
 850. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 47 (2019); Wallace, Absent Persons, supra note 
648, passim; BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360. 
 851. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 360, 
366, at 429. Classifications of things are legal abstractions that do not always correspond 
with lay notions. Some of these classifications are suppletive, that is, susceptible to 
recharacterization by the parties’ juridical act. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra 
note 62, §§ 2:17–2:19 (discussing classification of things into consumable and 
nonconsumable; fungibles and non-fungibles; divisible and indivisible). 
 852. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 482 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 
360, 366, at 429; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140; TRAHAN, 
supra note 418, at 132. 
 853. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 654 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 
360, 366, at 429; YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, §§ 2:1–
5:26; TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 163–69. 
 854. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 
360, 366, at 429; YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, supra note 391, § 
1:29; TRAHAN, supra note 418, at 188–89. 
 855. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1875 (2019); WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 
306; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140; BONNECASE II, supra 
note 25, No. 360; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, Nos. 105–06; Becqué-Ickowicz, supra 
note 121, No. 32; Brenner, supra note 37, No. 29; Moore, supra note 135, at 296; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 16.11–16.36.  
 856. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, Nos. 
360, 366, at 429; WEILL & TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 262; LORIO, supra note 
285, §§10:1–10:15. 




time,857 and forced sales and expropriations.858 Some French scholars 
routinely refer to natural events entirely outside the person’s control when 
describing this category.859 This description is rather restrictive and not 
entirely accurate. Indeed, some of the events listed above are entirely 
outside of any person’s control—for example, fortuitous events. Other 
 
 857. Time can be a simple fact or a juridical fact, as when it counts toward the 
accrual of prescription, the arrival of a term, or the age of majority. See WEILL & 
TERRÉ I, supra note 84, Nos. 305, 307; BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, 
No. 140; SCIALOJA, supra note 246, Nos. 107–13. Generally, in civil law, the smallest 
unit of time is a day. Computation of periods of time is usually made by calendar days, 
not business days. The day that marks the commencement of the period is not counted. 
The last day of the period is included, unless it is a legal holiday, in which case it does 
not count for purposes of prescription or other procedural acts. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
3454 (2019); id. arts. 3455–56 (computation of time by months and by years for 
purposes of acquisitive prescription); id. art. 1784 (term for performance not fixed); 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 5059 (2019) (computation of time for procedural acts); LA. 
REV. STAT. § 1.55 (2019) (legal holidays). A notable exception to these rules is the 
calculation of a natural person’s age—the day of birth counts, and the annual 
anniversary of this day (the person’s birthday) accrues regardless of holidays. Thus, a 
natural person attains majority “upon reaching the age of eighteen years,” that is, on 
the day of her eighteenth birthday. LA. CIV. CODE art. 29 (2019). Cf. CAPITANT, 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, No. 324; PLANIOL I, supra note 153, No. 1616 (“Age 
should be counted by hours beginning from the moment of birth.”); State ex rel. 
Fleming v. Joyce, 123 La. 637 (1909); De Armas v. De Armas et al., 3 La. Ann. 527 
(1848). Parties enjoy freedom to agree to a different method of computation of a term 
for performance in their contract. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1785 (2019); LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 6.13. However, there are certain limits to 
the parties’ contractual freedom with regard to prescriptive periods. See LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 3471, 3505–3505.4 (2019).  
 858. A sale made by authority of law is a juridical fact, at least as to the debtor. As 
such, it obviously does not qualify as a “voluntary act” that would trigger the odious 
consequences of self-enclavement in the law of legal servitudes. Whether this could be 
a case of “voluntary omission” is still questionable. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 493 (2019); 
YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 87, § 5:9–5:10; LeBlanc v. 
Thibodeaux, 615 So. 2d 295, 298–99 (La. 1993); Petrovich v. Trabeau, 780 So. 2d 1258, 
1260–61 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2001). For a methodical approach to this issue with 
reference to the distinction between juridical act and fact, see Scott D. Huffstetler  ̧Don’t 
Fence Me In: Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit Expands “Voluntariness” Under Louisiana 
Civil Code Article 693, 63 LA. L. REV. 111, 122–25 (2002) (arguing that the exception 
of article 693 of the Louisiana Civil Code applies to juridical acts, not juridical facts).  
 859. Some scholars have referred to this category as “purely material facts” (faits 
purement matériels). See BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 366, at 429; BRIERLEY & 
MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 140. Others name this subcategory “natural and 
involuntary juridical facts” (faits juridiques naturels et involontaires). See WEILL & 
TERRÉ I, supra note 84, No. 304; MARTY & RAYNAUD I, supra note 106, No. 163. 




events, however, involve some human interaction—for instance, 
conception and birth—or some existing relationship, such as forced 
heirship. Furthermore, certain juridical facts could fall under more than 
one subcategory,860 and other juridical facts presuppose an existing legal 
relationship, juridical act, or another juridical fact. Examples include 
nullity,861 compensation,862 confusion,863 privileges,864 legal security,865 
legal subrogation,866 registry,867 natural obligations,868 and contracts and 
 
 860. For instance, error is perhaps the clearest example of lawful conduct resulting 
in unintended consequences for the party in error and, quite possibly, for the other 
party in the case of rescission. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 355, at 11–
12. Lesion, according to the “subjective theory,” is a vice of consent tantamount to 
error. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1860 (1870) (“The remedy given for this injury, is 
founded on its being the effect of implied error or imposition”) (emphasis added). 
Under an “objective approach,” lesion expresses a rule of public policy, thus implying 
violation of mandatory law. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1965, 2589–2600 (2019). See 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING supra note 270, § 13:2; BONNECASE II, supra note 
25, No. 360; Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 355, at 111–12; LEVASSEUR, 
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 242, at 52. 
 861. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2029 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 
360; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 162–90.  
 862. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1893 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360. 
Compensation can be renounced by juridical act with certain mandatory restrictions. 
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 7, 1899 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra 
note 87, §§ 19.2–19.3. Compensation may be renounced. Compensation may also be 
conventional. See LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 170–71. 
 863. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1903 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 
360; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 20.1–20.2. 
 864. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3186 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360. 
 865. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3136 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 360. 
 866. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1829 (2019); BONNECASE II, supra note 25, No. 
360; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, § 11.59; LEVASSEUR, 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 112–19. The will of the parties is 
generally inoperative in the case of legal subrogation. This explains why recovery 
of the new obligee is limited only to the extent of the performance rendered. See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1830 cmts. a, c (2019).  
 867. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3338 (2019). 
 868. A natural obligation is a juridical fact, which can stem from a preexisting 
juridical act. For example, a prescribed contractual debt may give rise to a natural 
obligation. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1762(1) (2019); id. art. 1762 cmt. b. Furthermore, a 
preexisting natural obligation may furnish an onerous cause for a subsequent juridical 
act. Id. art. 1761 cmt. d. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 
2.4–2.8; LEVASSEUR, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 248, at 13–18.   




juridical acts of others.869 In fact, one single event can give rise to a multitude 
of juridical facts.870 These categorizations, therefore, are far from 
systematic.871 They are useful illustrations, however, of the structural 
difference between juridical act and juridical fact. In a valid and enforceable 
juridical act, the person activates the legal consequences.872 In a juridical fact, 
the law imposes the legal consequences on the person.873  
A schematic depiction of this proposed system follows: 
The Louisiana System 




 869. See RIEG, supra note 46, at 10–11; HAUSER, supra note 66, No. 160; Petit 
& Rouxel, supra note 163, No. 7. 
 870. See BETTI, supra note 2, at 8. The same event could also trigger several 
legal consequences. As mentioned, wrongful death results in delictual liability of 
the tortfeasor; death also causes the opening of the decedent’s succession. See 
STARCK, supra note 112, No. 372.  
 871. German legal doctrine avoids classifying juridical facts in the strict sense. 
Instead, it refers to “the law.” See BETTI, supra note 2, at 11–19. See also 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 33, §§ 64, 65 (discussing the German 
approach in the context of the sources of obligations). See also TANCELIN, 
SOURCES, supra note 190, No. 10.2 (observing that fait juridique is not a particular 
category but comprises any legally significant event or conduct other than a 
juridical act). Cf. SALMOND, supra note 164, § 124 (distinguishing between “acts 
in the law”—volitional acts having legal effects—and “acts of the law”—legal 
effects by operation of law).  
 872. See BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 147, No. 141. 




- Acte juridique (Fr.)
- Rechtsgeschäft (Ger.)




- Licit acts not juridical
- Quasi-contract (Fr.)
- Material acts (Ger.)
Other legal events
- Natural events (Fr.)
- Residual category (Ger.)





A civil code is only the surface of a civil law system. In fact, codes are 
not even a necessary component of civil law.874 Louisiana’s civilian tradition 
is shaped by its general principles, methodology, and terminology. These 
values ought to inform present and future reforms to the law so that the 
Louisiana Civil Code faithfully expresses this tradition.875 An inseparable part 
of this rich heritage is the Louisiana notion of juridical act. Proper 
understanding of this fundamental concept by means of a comprehensive 
theory will provide needed clarity to Louisiana lawyers, judges, and law 
students.876 This Article has introduced the basic components of a Louisiana 
theory of juridical acts. The approach is based primarily on the French theory 
of acte juridique, but it also borrows useful components from other 
jurisdictions and adapts them to the Louisiana system and jurisprudence. In 
line with traditional civilian doctrine, the purpose of a Louisiana theory of 
juridical acts is threefold.  
This theory explores the structure and validity of the juridical act as an 
intentional declaration of will that is performed in order to acquire, exercise, 
modify, transfer, or extinguish rights; when the act is done by competent 
persons and in the prescribed manner, the law recognizes the act and carries 
out the intent within the bounds of mandatory law.877 The notion of juridical 
act stems from the principle of the autonomy of the will, and it permeates the 
entire civil law. Several aspects of the law of obligations apply by analogy to 
juridical acts concerning other areas of the law. Thus, juridical act is not 
limited to obligations law. Instead, juridical act and fact may generate, affect, 
and terminate legal relationships, juridical situations, and all sorts of rights, 
real and personal.878  
 
 874. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 94; Olivier 
Moréteau, The Future of Civil Codes in France and Louisiana, 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 
39 (2009). 
 875. See Yiannopoulos, Requiem, supra note 239, at 409 (expressing hope for a 
“comprehensive revision of the Louisiana Civil Code” that will preserve Louisiana’s 
unique civil law system); Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 203, at 35–51 
(posing the important question: “Quo vadis Codex Civilis Louisianensis?”); Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, The Anomalous Interaction Between Code and Statute—Lessor’s Warranty 
and Statutory Waiver, 78 TUL. L. REV. 379 (2014) (highlighting the normative value of 
the Civil Code in the age of a multitude of statutes in civilian jurisdictions).  
 876. See NICHOLAS, supra note 3, at 37–38; Moréteau, supra note 874, at 57–
59 (identifying guiding principles and values in a civil law system). 
 877. See POUND, supra note 33, at 420–21; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 447–48. 
 878. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1917 (2019); LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 87, §§ 1.10, 12.24. 




Furthermore, the theory highlights the notion and function of juridical 
acts by surveying their various classifications.879 Examination focuses 
primarily on patrimonial juridical acts. The theory endorses the useful 
German categorization of attributive versus non-attributive acts and 
promissory versus dispositive acts. French categories of translative and 
declarative acts are excellent illustrations of acts falling neatly within the 
German categories. The theory preserves the familiar and successful French 
categories of conservatory, administrative, and dispositive acts. Having 
properly identified the notion of juridical acts, the analysis circles back to 
validity and focuses on the doctrine of nullity. A closer comparative 
examination reveals the existence of an intermediate category of “mixed 
nullities” in the binary system of absolute and relative nullities.  
Finally, the theory identifies capacity as the distinguishing factor 
between juridical act, which requires the maker’s capacity, and juridical 
fact, where capacity is inoperative. On the basis of this criterion, the 
Louisiana notion of juridical act encapsulates the German juridical and 
quasi-juridical acts. The theory thus places juridical acts in a world of 
operative facts, the proper elaboration of which is the topic of further study 
on the general principles of Louisiana civil law. Indeed, the theory of 
juridical acts is but a part of a modern Louisiana theory of private rights—
a “droit subjectif louisianais.” This Article is intended to stimulate interest 
in, and draw attention to, the general principles of Louisiana civil law as a 




 879. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 448–51. 
